Shakur v. Schriro

Ninth Circuit

Shakur v. Schriro

89 F. App'x 110

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 26, 2004

DocketNo. 03-15504; D.C. No. CV-00-01483-PGR

StatusPublished

This text of 89 F. App'x 110 (Shakur v. Schriro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Shakur v. Schriro, 89 F. App'x 110 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM

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Arizona state prisoner Amin Rahman Shakur appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the defendant retaliated against him for filing grievances by having him validated as a member of a security threat group. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). We vacate and remand.

Because the district court deemed the legitimate penological purpose issue to be dispositive and did not have the benefit of our subsequent decision in Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir.2003), we remand for reconsideration.

Shakur’s contention that the district court judge was biased and prejudiced fails because previous adverse rulings alone do not suffice and he offered no evidence that such prejudice came from an extrajudicial source. See Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir.1984); see also Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to move for recusal increases burden on appeal to demonstrate trial court judge erred in not recusing himself).

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 39(a)(4).

VACATED and REMANDED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM

***

Arizona state prisoner Amin Rahman Shakur appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the defendant retaliated against him for filing grievances by having him validated as a member of a security threat group. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). We vacate and remand.

Because the district court deemed the legitimate penological purpose issue to be dispositive and did not have the benefit of our subsequent decision in Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir.2003), we remand for reconsideration.

Shakur’s contention that the district court judge was biased and prejudiced fails because previous adverse rulings alone do not suffice and he offered no evidence that such prejudice came from an extrajudicial source. See Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir.1984); see also Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to move for recusal increases burden on appeal to demonstrate trial court judge erred in not recusing himself).

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 39(a)(4).

VACATED and REMANDED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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89 F. App'x 110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shakur-v-schriro-ca9-2004.

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