1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 APRIL SHAKOOR-DELGADO, Case No. 24-cv-1811-MMA-BLM individually and on behalf of all others 12 similarly situated, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 13 MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiff,
14 v. [Doc. No. 11] 15 CORNERSTONE FIRST MORTGAGE, 16 LLC, 17 Defendant. 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff April Shakoor-Delgado brings this putative class action against Defendant 22 Cornerstone First Mortgage, LLC’s (“Defendant” or “Cornerstone”) pursuant to the Fair 23 Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”). On February 10, 2025, 24 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action. Doc. No. 11. 25 Plaintiff filed an opposition, to which Defendant replied. Doc. Nos. 15, 26. The Court 26 found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument 27 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 17. For the reasons set forth below, the 28 Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Cornerstone is a full-service mortgage lender. Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 23. From 3 November 2021 through November 2023 and then again from February 2024 through the 4 date of the Complaint, Plaintiff was employed by Cornerstone as a loan officer. Id. ¶ 15. 5 Generally speaking, Plaintiff alleges that Cornerstone failed to pay her and other 6 employees minimum and overtime wages and failed to reimburse expenses in violation of 7 the FLSA as well as the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq. (“IMWL”) 8 and Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 IILCS 115/1 et seq. (“IWPCA”).1 9 She seeks to represent two classes of employees who worked for Cornerstone in Illinois. 10 Id. ¶ 73. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 Plaintiff initiated this action on October 9, 2024. See Compl. Doc. No. 1. 13 Defendant was served with the summons and Complaint on October 30, 2024. Doc. 14 No. 7. However, Defendant did not file a responsive pleading within 21 days after being 15 served.2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Instead, some three months later, Defendant filed 16 an Answer, Doc. No. 10, followed shortly thereafter by a motion to dismiss pursuant to 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure3 12(b)(6), Doc. No. 11. Defendant did not obtain an 18 extension of time to file either its Answer or motion to dismiss. 19 Thus, the Court notes at the outset that Defendant’s responsive filings are 20 untimely. More importantly, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 21 22 23 1 Regarding the references to Illinois and Illinois law in the Complaint, the Court notes that Plaintiff curiously pleads that venue in the Southern District of California is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 24 “because acts giving rise to the claims of Plaintiff and the Collective Members occurred within the 25 Northern District of Illinois.” Compl. ¶ 10. Clearly, this is a typographical error. Nevertheless, because Plaintiff pleads that Defendant Cornerstone has its principal place of business in San Diego, California, 26 id. ¶ 12, the Court assumes on this limited record that venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 2 And based upon Plaintiff’s filing of proof of service, there is no indication that Defendant timely 27 waived service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). Even assuming Defendant had duly waived service, it did not file a responsive pleading within 60 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(ii). 28 1 relief can be granted “must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.” 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also MacDonald v. Grace Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 3 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be made before the responsive pleading.”) 4 (quoting Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2004)). And 5 here, Cornerstone filed its motion after it filed a responsive pleading.4 Consequently, the 6 Court treats Cornerstone’s motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 7 Rule 12(c). Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[I]f a motion to 8 dismiss for failure to state a claim is made after the answer is filed, the court can treat the 9 motion as one for judgment on the pleadings”); Birdwell v. AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc., 10 No. 21-cv-00864-JST, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173120, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2023). 11 A. Legal Standard 12 A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought, “after pleadings are 13 closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). When considering a 14 motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court “must accept all factual allegations in the 15 complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 16 Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 17 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004)). The movant is entitled to judgment only where it has been 18 “clearly established on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to 19 be resolved.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co, Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 20 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). An “analysis under Rule 12(c) is ‘substantially identical’ to 21 analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, ‘a court must determine whether 22 the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.’” 23 Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)). 24 25 4 Cornerstone seemingly contends that it has only answered Plaintiff’s first two claims and not the third. 26 Doc. No. 11 at 5 (“Here, Cornerstone is answering Plaintiff’s first and second counts, but hereby moves to dismiss the third count, . . .”) (emphasis in original). But Cornerstone’s Answer includes responses to 27 every allegation in the Complaint, including those related to Claim 3, compare Doc. No. 1, with Doc. No. 10. In any event, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate answers to complaints, not 28 1 — Analysis 2 As noted, Cornerstone only challenges Plaintiff's third claim.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 APRIL SHAKOOR-DELGADO, Case No. 24-cv-1811-MMA-BLM individually and on behalf of all others 12 similarly situated, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 13 MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiff,
14 v. [Doc. No. 11] 15 CORNERSTONE FIRST MORTGAGE, 16 LLC, 17 Defendant. 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff April Shakoor-Delgado brings this putative class action against Defendant 22 Cornerstone First Mortgage, LLC’s (“Defendant” or “Cornerstone”) pursuant to the Fair 23 Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”). On February 10, 2025, 24 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action. Doc. No. 11. 25 Plaintiff filed an opposition, to which Defendant replied. Doc. Nos. 15, 26. The Court 26 found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument 27 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 17. For the reasons set forth below, the 28 Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Cornerstone is a full-service mortgage lender. Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 23. From 3 November 2021 through November 2023 and then again from February 2024 through the 4 date of the Complaint, Plaintiff was employed by Cornerstone as a loan officer. Id. ¶ 15. 5 Generally speaking, Plaintiff alleges that Cornerstone failed to pay her and other 6 employees minimum and overtime wages and failed to reimburse expenses in violation of 7 the FLSA as well as the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq. (“IMWL”) 8 and Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 IILCS 115/1 et seq. (“IWPCA”).1 9 She seeks to represent two classes of employees who worked for Cornerstone in Illinois. 10 Id. ¶ 73. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 Plaintiff initiated this action on October 9, 2024. See Compl. Doc. No. 1. 13 Defendant was served with the summons and Complaint on October 30, 2024. Doc. 14 No. 7. However, Defendant did not file a responsive pleading within 21 days after being 15 served.2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Instead, some three months later, Defendant filed 16 an Answer, Doc. No. 10, followed shortly thereafter by a motion to dismiss pursuant to 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure3 12(b)(6), Doc. No. 11. Defendant did not obtain an 18 extension of time to file either its Answer or motion to dismiss. 19 Thus, the Court notes at the outset that Defendant’s responsive filings are 20 untimely. More importantly, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 21 22 23 1 Regarding the references to Illinois and Illinois law in the Complaint, the Court notes that Plaintiff curiously pleads that venue in the Southern District of California is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 24 “because acts giving rise to the claims of Plaintiff and the Collective Members occurred within the 25 Northern District of Illinois.” Compl. ¶ 10. Clearly, this is a typographical error. Nevertheless, because Plaintiff pleads that Defendant Cornerstone has its principal place of business in San Diego, California, 26 id. ¶ 12, the Court assumes on this limited record that venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 2 And based upon Plaintiff’s filing of proof of service, there is no indication that Defendant timely 27 waived service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). Even assuming Defendant had duly waived service, it did not file a responsive pleading within 60 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(ii). 28 1 relief can be granted “must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.” 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also MacDonald v. Grace Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 3 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be made before the responsive pleading.”) 4 (quoting Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2004)). And 5 here, Cornerstone filed its motion after it filed a responsive pleading.4 Consequently, the 6 Court treats Cornerstone’s motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 7 Rule 12(c). Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[I]f a motion to 8 dismiss for failure to state a claim is made after the answer is filed, the court can treat the 9 motion as one for judgment on the pleadings”); Birdwell v. AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc., 10 No. 21-cv-00864-JST, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173120, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2023). 11 A. Legal Standard 12 A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought, “after pleadings are 13 closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). When considering a 14 motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court “must accept all factual allegations in the 15 complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 16 Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 17 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004)). The movant is entitled to judgment only where it has been 18 “clearly established on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to 19 be resolved.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co, Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 20 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). An “analysis under Rule 12(c) is ‘substantially identical’ to 21 analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, ‘a court must determine whether 22 the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.’” 23 Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)). 24 25 4 Cornerstone seemingly contends that it has only answered Plaintiff’s first two claims and not the third. 26 Doc. No. 11 at 5 (“Here, Cornerstone is answering Plaintiff’s first and second counts, but hereby moves to dismiss the third count, . . .”) (emphasis in original). But Cornerstone’s Answer includes responses to 27 every allegation in the Complaint, including those related to Claim 3, compare Doc. No. 1, with Doc. No. 10. In any event, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate answers to complaints, not 28 1 — Analysis 2 As noted, Cornerstone only challenges Plaintiff's third claim. Plaintiff's third 3 || claim is for violation of the [WPCA based upon Cornerstone’s alleged failure to 4 ||reimburse her and other employees the costs of high-speed internet, phone, and other 5 home office expenses. Compl. 114. Cornerstone moves to dismiss this claim, arguing 6 || that Plaintiff fails to plead that she complied with the [WPCA by submitting a 7 ||re1mbursement request. Doc. No. 11 at 4-6. 8 Plaintiff does not dispute that the IWPCA explicitly sets forth such a requirement. 9 ||Doc. No. 15 at 3. Indeed, the IWPCA requires an employer to reimburse employees “for 10 || all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee within the employee’s 11 || scope of employment and directly related to services performed for the employer” and 12 || also provides that employees “shall submit any necessary expenditure with appropriate 13 || supporting documentation within 30 calendar days after incurring the expense, except 14 || that an employer may provide additional time for submitting requests for rermbursement 15 a written expense rer1mbursement policy.” 820 ILCS 115/9.5(a). However, it is not 16 that a plaintiff must plead compliance with this requirement in order to state a claim 17 under the IWPCA. And where, as here, Plaintiff pleads that Cornerstone’s policy is that 18 || these expenditures are not eligible for reimbursement, Compl. □□ 128-129, the Court 19 || cannot say on this limited record that it is clearly established no factual issues remain, 20 || and that Plaintiff is precluded from recovery. Accordingly, the Court finds that 21 ||Cornerstone is not entitled to judgment on this claim. 22 III. CONCLUSION 23 Based upon the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant Cornerstone’s motion. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: April 21, 2025 26 WMiaths Uu- / hihlr 27 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 28 United States District Judge