Shaklee Corp. v. Loehmann's Inc.

218 A.D.2d 511, 629 N.Y.S.2d 766, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8224
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedAugust 3, 1995
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 218 A.D.2d 511 (Shaklee Corp. v. Loehmann's Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shaklee Corp. v. Loehmann's Inc., 218 A.D.2d 511, 629 N.Y.S.2d 766, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8224 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane Solomon, J.), entered May 17, 1994, which granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition, unanimously reversed, on the law, respondent’s motion denied and the matter remanded for further proceedings, without costs.

In this turnover proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5227 and 5525 (b) the IAS Court, relying upon the decision in Matter of Supreme Mdse. Co. v Chemical Bank (70 NY2d 344), dismissed the petition upon a finding that petitioner had failed to establish that at the time of service of the restraining notice respondent was in possession of property of or indebted to petitioner’s judgment debtors, inasmuch as the only relationship of which there was any evidence was that pertaining to the one outstanding letter of credit posted in favor of the judgment debtor in the amount of $62,160. In Supreme Mdse, (supra), the Court of Appeals held that a beneficiary’s interest in an executory negotiable letter of credit supporting an international sale of goods is not property of the beneficiary for purposes of attachment by a party in unrelated litigation, the rationale being the contingent nature of the obligation and the policy considerations involved in negotiable letters of credit concerned with international sales transactions, and "for present purposes must be considered a contingent, nonattachable 'debt’ under CPLR 5201 (a) rather than attachable 'property’ under CPLR 5201 (b)” (supra, at 351). Here, however, the letter of credit is not being attached or seized, but rather is being used as evidence of a "debt”. CPLR 5227 clearly applies against "any person who it is shown is or will become indebted to the judgment debtor, [and] the court may require such person to pay to the judgment creditor the debt upon maturity”. Thus, if Shaklee is ultimately successful in this proceeding, the paper Loehmann’s may be directed to make would be an attornment or some similar kind of commitment to pay the debt to Shaklee, when it falls due, instead of to the judgment debtor (see, Siegel, NY Prac § 510, at 789 [2d ed]). Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Wallach, Kupferman and Asch, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Shaklee Corp. v. Loehmann's Inc.
250 A.D.2d 446 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1998)
Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. First Trust Co. of New York
58 F. Supp. 2d 52 (S.D. New York, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
218 A.D.2d 511, 629 N.Y.S.2d 766, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shaklee-corp-v-loehmanns-inc-nyappdiv-1995.