Shahrooz Jahanbin, V. The Boeing Company

CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedFebruary 23, 2026
Docket86522-6
StatusUnpublished

This text of Shahrooz Jahanbin, V. The Boeing Company (Shahrooz Jahanbin, V. The Boeing Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shahrooz Jahanbin, V. The Boeing Company, (Wash. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

SHAHROOZ JAHANBIN, No. 86522-6-I Appellant,

v. DIVISION ONE

THE BOEING COMPANY, ERIN KELLY, an individual, NATHAN UNPUBLISHED OPINION THOMAS, an individual, and RICH KAWAGUCHI, an individual,

Respondents.

CHUNG, J. — Shahrooz Jahanbin started working for The Boeing Company

(Boeing) in 2009. In 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) notified Boeing that

it had information suggesting Jahanbin was using his Boeing computer to share

information with non-Boeing personnel. After Boeing conducted a lengthy investigation,

which included installing monitoring software on Jahanbin’s work computer, Boeing

terminated Jahanbin’s employment for misconduct in 2021. Jahanbin filed suit against

Boeing alleging disparate treatment, discriminatory discharge, and wrongful termination

in violation of public policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in Boeing’s favor

and dismissed Jahanbin’s claims. On appeal, Jahanbin challenges the trial court’s

dismissal of his claims on summary judgment. We affirm. No. 86522-6-I/2

FACTS

Shahrooz Jahanbin, a United States citizen born in Iran, began working for

Boeing as an aircraft mechanic in 2009. Jahanbin then took a position as a Structural

Analysis Engineer and progressed to become a Structural Analysis Engineer Level II. In

2017, Jahanbin was asked to join the “Next Generation Quality team” as an

Experienced Structural Analysis Engineer for the 777X program, whose goal was to

streamline efficiency. Around this time, Jahanbin raised concerns to his supervisors that

removing inspection procedures to save costs would lead to violations of federal law

and could lead to premature defects that could jeopardize aircraft safety. He and other

employees who also had concerns with the change in procedure attempted to elevate

those concerns up the chain of command. For example, Jahanbin gave presentations

on the issues and deficiencies he perceived. However, their concerns were dismissed.

While on the Next Generation Quality team, Jahanbin developed four technical

memoranda, proposing the invention of an “alternative method to address in-service

inspections of 777X crucial components that were removed during the manufacturing

process.” Boeing sought patents of Jahanbin’s inventions. Despite vocalizing concerns,

Jahanbin received several positive evaluations from his relevant managers between

2012 and 2018 and was nominated for an “appreciation award” based on his inventions.

Subsequently, Jahanbin left the Next Generation Quality team and took a

different position as a Structural Engineer. In 2019, he was promoted to Flight

Operational Manager, a position in which he was “responsible for preflight and delivery

of 777X airplanes.” In May 2020, Jahanbin took a position as a Senior Safety Engineer,

which required him to communicate with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). He

2 No. 86522-6-I/3

again tried to speak out about his concerns with the change in safety procedures, but

his senior manager dismissed his concerns.

In April 2019, Boeing’s Strategic Intelligence team, which monitors, analyzes,

and investigates “potential insider threats” to Boeing, received information from the FBI

that Jahanbin had used his Boeing-issued computer to “share aviation information with

non-Boeing personnel, and more specifically, with non-identified Iranian individuals in

violation of OFAC [(Office of Foreign Assets Control)] sanctions.” Independently,

another Boeing employee on the Strategic Intelligence team “discovered anomalous

data and activity associated with Mr. Jahanbin’s use of the Boeing IT network.” Erin

Kelly, an Insider Threat Specialist with the Strategic Intelligence team, began

investigating Jahanbin in April 2019. During this time, Kelly discovered that Jahanbin

downloaded unapproved software onto his Boeing computer, including Zoom,

Telegram, Microsoft Teams and WhatsApp. This led Kelly to install a forensic

monitoring tool (FMT) that “capture[d] screenshots, every three seconds, of Mr.

Jahanbin’s activities” on Jahanbin’s Boeing-issued computer.

After using the FMT between May 2020 and November 2020, Kelly concluded

that Jahanbin “repeatedly violated Boeing Procedures and Information Security

Standards.” In May and June 2020, the FMT captured information that showed

Jahanbin copying folders labeled as “Boeing Proprietary” into a draft in his personal

email account, responding to an email in Farsi, accessing a restricted database, and

copying a screenshot of aircraft information into another email draft. In August 2020, the

FMT captured Jahanbin downloading five export-controlled “Aircraft Illustrated Parts

Catalog” manuals and uploading them to a third-party storage site. In October and

3 No. 86522-6-I/4

November 2020, the FMT captured Jahanbin recording meetings between Boeing and

the FAA, which he saved on the unapproved Telegram application.

On December 3, 2020, the FBI conducted a search of Jahanbin’s house and

seized his Boeing laptop and other devices. Subsequently, on December 4, 2020,

Jahanbin’s then-manager, Nathan Thomas, placed Jahanbin on a leave of absence, as

instructed by Boeing’s Human Resources department. Boeing then interviewed

Jahanbin about his alleged misconduct.

The Boeing Employee Corrective Action Review Board (ECARB) addresses

employee misconduct that may warrant discharge. A Special Action Review (SAR)

committee is utilized in situations where “an employee is accused of particularly

egregious conduct that raises special concerns for Boeing,” such as insider threats.

Boeing assembled the SAR committee to address Jahanbin’s misconduct and

concluded that his “actions were egregious and a clear violation of Boeing policies.”

After considering the Employee Corrective Action Process Requirements for 2H

violations—the misuse or failure to protect information or intellectual property—and 2F

violations—creating an unacceptable liability or potential liability—the SAR committee

determined that terminating Jahanbin was appropriate.

In January 2021, Anthony Garcia, counsel for Boeing, authored a

recommendation to the ECARB, summarizing the findings from the investigation that

Jahanbin “misappropriated Boeing proprietary information, supplied Boeing information

to non-Boeing personnel without authorization, downloaded unauthorized applications

to his Boeing laptop, recorded Boeing meetings with the [FAA] without the participants’

consent, and was not credible during his interview in the investigation.” On January 28,

4 No. 86522-6-I/5

2021, his manager, Thomas, informed Jahanbin that his employment was terminated

effective immediately and provided him with a copy of the Employee Corrective Action

Memo, which explained that his “actions have created an unacceptable liability” and that

such serious violations were the cause of his discharge.

In October 2022, Jahanbin filed a lawsuit against Boeing, alleging wrongful

discharge in violation of public policy, discrimination based on his nationality, retaliation,

and creation of a hostile work environment pursuant to the Washington Law Against

Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW. Boeing filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, which the court denied. 1 After a series of

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