Shahrokhi v. Tao

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 11, 2021
• Docket: 2:20-cv-02346
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 *** 4 5 ALI SHAHROKHI, individuallyand as natural 6 father and next friend for B.E.S., minor, 7 Plaintiff, 2:20-cv-02346-GMN-VCF ORDER 8 vs. JUDGE JEROME T. TAO, individually; JUDGE 9 BONNIE A. BULLA, individually; JUDGE MICHAEL P. GIBBONS, individually; DOES 1 10 – 10, 11 Defendants. 12 13 Before the Court is Defendant Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF NO. 12). 14 LEGAL STANDARD 15 When evaluating a motion to stay discovery while a dispositive motion is pending, the court 16 initially considers the goal of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1. The guiding premise of the Rules is that 17 the Rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 18 of every action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. It needs no citation of authority to recognize that discovery is 19 expensive. The Supreme Court has long mandated that trial courts should resolve civil matters fairly but 20 without undue cost. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962). This directive is echoed 21 by Rule 26, which instructs the court to balance the expense of discovery against its likely benefit. See 22 FED.R.CIV.P. 26(B)(2)(iii). 23 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate that trial courts should balance fairness and cost, 24 the Rules do not provide for automatic or blanket stays of discovery when a potentially dispositive motion 25 is pending. Skellerup Indus. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 163 F.R.D. 598, 600–01 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1), “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to 2 protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” 3 Whether to grant a stay is within the discretion of the court. Munoz–Santana v. U.S. I.N.S., 742 F.2d 561, 4 562 (9th Cir. 1984). The party seeking the protective order, however, has the burden “to ‘show good cause’ 5 by demonstrating harm or prejudice that will result from the discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 6 Satisfying the “good cause” obligation is a challenging task. A party seeking “a stay of discovery carries 7 the heavy burden of making a ‘strong showing’ why discovery should be denied.” Gray v. First Winthrop 8 Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D.Cal.1990) (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp. 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 9 1975)). 10 Generally, imposing a stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss is permissible if there are no 11 factual issues raised by the motion to dismiss, discovery is not required to address the issues raised by the 12 motion to dismiss, and the court is “convinced” that the plaintiff is unable to state a claim for relief. Rae 13 v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); White v. Am. Tobacco Co., 125 F.R.D. 508 (D. Nev. 14 1989) (citing Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982). 15 Typical situations in which staying discovery pending a ruling on a dispositive motion are appropriate 16 would be where the dispositive motion raises issues of jurisdiction, venue, or immunity. TradeBay, LLC 17 v. Ebay, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 597, 600 (D. Nev. 2011). 18 Courts in the District of Nevada apply a two-part test when evaluating whether a discovery stay 19 should be imposed. Id. (citations omitted). First, the pending motion must be potentially dispositive of the 20 entire case or at least the issue on which discovery is sought. Id. Second, the court must determine whether 21 the pending motion to dismiss can be decided without additional discovery. Id. When applying this test, 22 the court must take a “preliminary peek” at the merits of the pending dispositive motion to assess whether 23 a stay is warranted. Id. The purpose of the “preliminary peek” is not to prejudge the outcome of the motion 24 to dismiss. Rather, the court’s role is to evaluate the propriety of an order staying or limiting discovery 25 with the goal of accomplishing the objectives of Rule 1. 1 Under LR7-2(d), the failure of an opposing party to file points and authorities in response to any 2 || motion, except a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or a motion for attorney’s fees, constitutes a consent to 3 || the granting of the motion. 4 Here, no opposition has been filed and the time to file an opposition has passed. It would seem as 5 || though Plaintiff has consented to the granting of the instant motion. 6 DISCUSSION 7 Defendant’s Motion to stay is granted on the merits. After a “preliminary peek" and in light of the 8 || goals of Rule 1 to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of all cases, the Court finds 9 || that the Motion to Dismiss has merit and Defendant has demonstrated good cause to stay discovery. 10 Accordingly, and for good cause shown, 11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF NO. 12) is 12 GRANTED. In the event resolution of Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) does not result in the 13 || disposition of this case, the parties must file a new joint discovery plan within 21 days of the issuance of 14 || the order resolving that motion. 15 16 DATED this 11th day of March, 2021.

18 CAM FERENBACH 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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