Shaffstall v. Adams County

CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 11, 2025
Docket24CA2100
StatusUnpublished

This text of Shaffstall v. Adams County (Shaffstall v. Adams County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shaffstall v. Adams County, (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

24CA2100 Shaffstall v Adams County 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2100 Board of Assessment Appeals No. 23BAA4563

William A. Shaffstall,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Adams County Board of Equalization,

Respondent-Appellee,

and

Board of Assessment Appeals,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LUM Tow and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025

William A. Shaffstall, Pro Se

Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Meredith P. Van Horn, Assistant County Attorney, Brighton, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brooke H. Meyer, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 Petitioner, William A. Shaffstall, appeals the final agency order

of the Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) determining the value of

his property for the 2023 tax year. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Shaffstall owns a 924-square-foot mobile home (the property).

He appealed his 2023 property valuation to the Adams County

Board of Equalization (BOE), and the BOE adjusted the property

value to $200,000.

¶3 Shaffstall then appealed the BOE’s decision to the BAA.

Shaffstall argued, as he does here, that the property should be

valued based on the cost approach (rather than the market

approach) and that its value was $73,330. The BAA issued its

decision rejecting Shaffstall’s arguments and valuing the property

at $199,200.1 Shaffstall appeals.

1 In its order, the BAA accepted Adams County’s recommended

property value of $199,200, which was slightly lower than the BOE’s value of $200,000. The BAA noted that this lower value was based on the “Restricted Summary Appraisal Report,” which was admitted during the hearing.

1 II. Standard of Review

¶4 We review BAA decisions under the State Administrative

Procedure Act, § 24-4-106(11), C.R.S. 2025. See § 39-8-108(2),

C.R.S. 2025; Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Sampson, 105 P.3d 198,

208 (Colo. 2005). “It is the function of the BAA, not the reviewing

court, to weigh the evidence and resolve any conflicts.” Sampson,

105 P.3d at 208. “A decision of the Board may be set aside only if it

is unsupported by competent evidence or if it reflects a failure to

abide by the statutory scheme for calculating property tax

assessments.” Id.

III. Analysis

¶5 Shaffstall argues that the BAA erred by failing to consider the

cost approach when determining the value of his property. We

perceive no error.

A. Valuation of Mobile Homes

¶6 A mobile home or “manufactured home” is a “preconstructed

building unit,” § 38-29-102(6), C.R.S. 2025, that, among other

things, “[i]s designed for residential occupancy” and “[i]s not

licensed as a recreational vehicle.” § 24-32-3302(20)(b),(e), C.R.S.

2025. A mobile home is considered “purged” once it is permanently

2 affixed to the ground, converting it from personal property to real

property. § 38-29-118(2), C.R.S. 2025 (when a mobile home is

“permanently affixed to the ground” and is “no longer capable of

being drawn over the public highways,” the home “shall become real

property upon the filing and recording of the certificate of

permanent location”). Shaffstall’s mobile home title was purged

from the State Division of Motor Vehicle records in 2000; thus, his

mobile home was converted to real property that year. § 38-29-

114(2), C.R.S. 2025; § 38-29-118(2).

¶7 Colorado law requires assessors to use the market approach

when determining the “actual value” of residential real property for

tax purposes. Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(8)(c) (“Actual value shall be

stated on all property tax bills and valuation notices and, for

residential real property, determined solely by the market approach

to appraisal.”); see also § 39-1-103(5)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (“The actual

value of residential real property shall be determined solely by

consideration of the market approach to appraisal.”)

¶8 “Market value has been described as ‘what a willing buyer

would pay a willing seller under normal economic conditions.’

Thus, the market approach involves analyzing sales of comparable

3 properties in the market.” Sampson, 105 P.3d at 203 (quoting Bd.

of Assessment Appeals v. Colo. Arlberg Club, 762 P.2d 146, 151

(Colo. 1988)). “‘Actual value’ is synonymous with market value.”

Id.; see also San Miguel Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Telluride Co.,

947 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Colo. 1997) (“[A]ctual value is the guiding

principle for the taxation of real property in Colorado.”).

¶9 As relevant here, section 39-1-102 defines “[r]esidential real

property” as “residential land and residential improvements.” § 39-

1-102(14.5), C.R.S. 2025. Residential land is land on which

residential improvements are located. § 39-1-102(14.4)(a)(I).

Manufactured homes and mobile homes are “residential

improvements.” § 39-1-102(14.3).

B. The Market Approach Valuation Was Proper, and Competent Evidence Support’s the BAA’s Order

¶ 10 Shaffstall argues that Adams County should have valued his

property using the cost approach2 and that the BAA erred by not

considering the cost approach in its order. Shaffstall relies on

2 The cost approach values property by “adding the estimated value

of the land to the current cost of constructing a reproduction or replacement for the improvements.” ASARCO, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 916 P.2d 550, 554 (Colo. App. 1995) (citation omitted).

4 section 39-1-103(13)(a) and (c), but his reliance is misplaced.3

Though section 39-1-103(13) references the cost approach, it

relates to the appraisal of personal property, not residential real

property. See § 39-1-103(13)(a)-(c).

¶ 11 Because Shaffstall’s mobile home was purged, it is residential

real property for property tax purposes. See §§ 38-29-114(2), 38-

29-118(2), 39-1-102(14.3), 39-1-102(14.4)(a)(I), 39-1-102(14.5).

Thus, the BAA was required to value it using the market approach,

and it correctly applied the law in doing so. See § 39-1-103(5)(a);

Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(8)(c).

¶ 12 Furthermore, the BAA’s order valuing the property at

$199,200 is supported by competent evidence in the record.

During the hearing, Adams County presented (and the BAA

admitted) evidence of the property’s value under the market

approach, including an appraisal report opining that the market

value of the property is $199,200. To the extent Shaffstall

3 Shaffstall’s briefing refers to “C.R.S. (103)-(13)-(a)” and “C.R.S.

(103)-(13)-(c).” We interpret these as references to section 39-1- 103(13)(a) and (c), C.R.S. 2025.

5 presented contrary evidence, it is the BAA’s sole prerogative to

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Related

Asarco, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners
916 P.2d 550 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1995)
Board of Assessment Appeals v. Colorado Arlberg Club
762 P.2d 146 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1988)
Board of Assessment Appeals v. Sampson
105 P.3d 198 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2005)
San Miguel County Board of Equalization v. Telluride Co.
947 P.2d 1381 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1997)

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Shaffstall v. Adams County, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shaffstall-v-adams-county-coloctapp-2025.