Shaffi v. Leidos, Inc.

• Court: District Court, D. Maryland
• Decided: May 12, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-02554
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

HUSSAIN SHAFFI,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 24-cv-2554-ABA v.

LEIDOS, INC., et al., Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Hussain Shaffi brought this lawsuit against Defendants Leidos, Inc. and Leidos Biomedical Research, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants” or “Leidos”) alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. See ECF 5 (amended complaint). Mr. Shaffi sought “compensatory, general, statutory, and special damages,” attorney’s fees and costs, and other relief. Id. at 10. In December 2024, Leidos filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF No. 11. Plaintiff did not respond to the motion. See ECF No. 12 (Defendants’ “Notice of Plaintiff’s Failure to Respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss”). A plaintiff who does not respond to a motion to dismiss “has effectively conceded” the grounds for dismissal presented in the motion. Parker v. Am. Brokers Conduit, 179 F. Supp. 3d 509, 515 (D. Md. 2016); see also Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004) (district court is entitled to dismiss suit on the uncontroverted bases asserted in an unopposed motion to dismiss). Therefore, “for that reason alone” the complaint “is susceptible to dismissal.” Parker, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 515. “Of course,” a court “‘need not grant a motion to dismiss based on the failure to file a timely opposition when the motion is plainly lacking in merit.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sasscer, No. Y-97-3026, 2000 WL 1479154, at 2 n.6 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2000)). But here, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is not “plainly lacking in merit.” See id. For example, as to Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants were acting under color of law. ECF No. 11-1 at 5-6; see also Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2018) (“To state a claim for relief

under § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants’ effort . . . was perpetrated under color of state law.”). Accordingly, Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim on which relief can be granted. As to Plaintiff’s section 1981 claim for retaliation, as Defendants point out, regardless of whether the complaint alleges cognizable “protected activity,” the complaint, even with the allegations accepted as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in Plaintiff’s favor, does not allege facts that would give rise to a claim for constructive discharge, which is the only potential theory of adverse action given that Plaintiff concedes that he resigned and was not terminated. See ECF No. 5 ¶ 2; see, e.g., Decoster v. Becerra, 119 F.4th 332, 339-40 (4th Cir. 2024) (explaining the legal standard for “constructive discharge premised on a hostile work environment”). CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 11, is GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

Date: May 12, 2025 /s/ Adam B. Abelson United States District Judge