SGM Holdings LLC v. Andrews

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 25, 2023
Docket1:15-cv-08142
StatusUnknown

This text of SGM Holdings LLC v. Andrews (SGM Holdings LLC v. Andrews) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SGM Holdings LLC v. Andrews, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ne eee ee een nn nee SGM HOLDINGS LLC, SYNDICATED GEO : MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, RICHARD : FEATHERLY, LAWRENCE FIELD, and PREMIER NATURAL RESOURCES LLC, : 15 Civ. 8142 (PAC) (HBP) Plaintiffs, : -against- : OPINION & ORDER A. JAMES ANDREWS, RICHARD GAINES, : and KARL SCHLEDWIT7Z, : Defendants. :

pene ee tenner tcncn HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge: Plaintiffs Charles Stephenson, on his own behalf and as assignee of all claims of former plaintiffs SGM Holdings LLC (“SGM”), Syndicated Geo Management Corporation, Richard Featherly, and Premier Natural Resources LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendants A. James Andrews, Richard Gaines, and Karl Schledwitz (collectively, “Defendants”) pursuant to New York Judiciary Law § 487 based on allegedly deceitful statements made to this Court in DNV Investment Partnership v. SGM Holdings LLC, No. 15 Civ. 1255 (S.D.N.Y.). Having completed discovery, the parties have both moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court DENIES both motions. BACKGROUND This case arises from a botched joint venture to purchase and redevelop several oil and gas wells. The botched joint venture resulted in a litigation (the “DNV Action”), whereby a set of investors (represented by Defendants here) sued its joint venturers (Plaintiffs here) for fraud. DNV Inv. P’ship v. Field (“DNV V”), No. 15 Crv. 1255, 2020 WL 2539029, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19,

2020). On May 19, 2020, this Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, terminating the DNV Action. /d. at *9. Plaintiffs now bring this action pursuant to New York Judiciary Law § 487 alleging that Defendants knowingly made false and deceptive statements to this Court during the prior DNV Action. Pls.” Mem. Law Sup. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. “Pls.” Mem.”) 1, ECF No, 96. Because this case arises in connection to the DNV Action, the Court briefly recounts the transaction and alleged fraud underlying the DNV Action, relying on the record in this case and the Court’s prior opinion granting summary judgment to the defendants (the “DNV Defendants”). i. DNV Action A. The Parties to the Underlying Joint Venture Plaintiff Richard Featherly was the President of Plaintiff Syndicated Geo Management Corporation (“Syndicated Geo”), and then manager of SGM Holdings, LLC (“SGM”). Pls.’ Rule 56.1 Statement Material Fact (“Pls.’ SOF”) 9 38, ECF No. 97. He also served as the initial president of Reed. Id. Syndicated Geo entered a letter agreement with Regent Private Capital, LLC (“Regent”) which was run by Lawrence Field, to act as Syndicated Geo’s agent in obtaining financing. LaMons Decl: Ex. 53 (“Field Decl.”) 17-18. Regent described itself as a joint family office of the Charles Stephenson and Lawrence Field families. DNV V, 2020 WL 2539029, at *1, Stephenson is the chairman of the board of Premier Natural Resources, LLC (“Premier”), an Oklahoma-based oil and gas exploration company. /d.

Generally, if the Court refers to a document in the record as “ECF No. _”, it refers to the docket in this present case, SGM Holdings LLC v, Andrews, No. 15 Civ. 8142 (filed October 15, 2015). If the Court refers to a document on the docket for DNV Investment Partnership v. SGM Holdings LLC, No. 15 Civ. 1255 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed Apr. 2, 2014) “(DNV Action”), the document is labeled “DNV Action, ECF No. __.”

The joint venture also involved a private equity firm called Metropolitan Equity Partners (“MEP”) and its managing partner, Paul Lisiak. Jd. MEP was the manager and founder of Metropolitan EIH13, LP (“Met13”), a partnership and fund created specifically to raise capital for the joint venture. fd. at *2. B, The Joint Venture In 2011, Syndicated Geo, through its agent Regent, sought financing to pay for the acquisition and development of oil and gas fields.” Pls.’ SOF {J 1-2. Lawrence Field, the founder and director of Regent, introduced the investment opportunity to private equity fm MEP. DNV V, 2020 WL 2539029, at *1.° Ultimately, Regent brokered a deal where MEP and SGM would jointly own and manage the oil and gas fields. Jd. at *2. To finance the deal, MEP formed a new limited partnership and raised a new fund called “Met13.” Jd. Additionally, MEP formed a subsidiary for the joint venture named Reed Energy LLC (“Reed”). Jd. Met13 intended to use the capital it raised to lend money to Reed at a 20% interest rate. 7d. In return for the capital, Reed would acquire drilling rights from SGM. The proposed ownership of Reed was: Met13—52%, SGM—40%, Regent—6%, and MEP—2%. Id. □

Reed was to be managed by two representatives of MEP and two representatives of SGM, including Lisiak and Featherly. fd.

2 The oil and gas fields at issue include aging oil and gas wells in Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania (the “Shallow Operations”) and mineral mining rights in the Utica Shale (the “Deep Rights”). Pls.” SOF 4] 1-3. 3 Syndicated Geo was unable to obtain financing, and thereafter became inactive. LaMons Decl. Ex. 52 (“Featherly Decl.”) | 13, ECF No. 99. Subsequently, Featherly founded SGM which obtained purchase contracts and options for oil and gas properties. Id. J 14. Ultimately, SGM (not Syndicated Geo) and MEP worked together to develop the rights. Jd. { 16.

The joint venture did not go well. Shortly after the project was funded, natural gas prices tanked to a 10-year low, substantially reducing the value of the oil and gas fields. Jd at *5. Moreover, the operations were in disrepair and required extensive investment to become productive. Pls.’ SOF {¥ 18-29. In the end, the Met13 investors lost millions. See LaMons Decl. Ex. 36 (“Third Amended Complaint”) 2. The crux of the DNV Action was that Featherly, Field, their subsidiaries, and several others, perpetrated a fraud on Met13 to induce them into investing in nonproductive wells. C. The Alleged Fraud in the DNV Action The heart of the alleged fraud in the DNV Action concerned due diligence notes prepared by Bayswater Exploration and Production (Bayswater). Months before the deal closed, Field introduced Bayswater as a potential candidate to operate the Shallow Operation in Ohio. DNV V, 2020 WL 2539029, at *2. On June 7, 2011, Lisiak and Featherly accompanied Bayswater on a one-day trip to see the Shallow Operation. See id. Following the trip, Bayswater sent an email to Lisiak indicating that the Shallow Operation did not conform to the upside quantified by previous reports. Id. However, on June 13, 2011, Bayswater separately sent an email to Field containing due diligence notes which detailed Bayswater’s concerns with the operation. /d. These due diligence notes were not sent to Lisiak for several months. /d. When Field eventually sent the notes to Lisiak, several of Bayswater’s specific concerns were removed. /d. Plaintiffs in the DNV Action contended that had they “known of the negative information removed from the trip notes they would not have invested in Met13.” Jd. at *7. This Court granted summary judgment for defendants (Plaintiffs here) finding, in pertinent part, that MEP could not have reasonably relied on the purported omissions from the Bayswater

notes. Id. at *9. The Court found that MEP ignored multiple diligence reports* “indicating that the Shallow Operation was in disrepair,” that the “existing wells were largely nonproducing,” and that the value of the income from the existing wells was negligible “and possibly a liability.” Jd. Due to MEP’s failure to avail itself of this information, this Court held MEP “could not have justifiably relied on alleged misrepresentations and omissions by Defendant Field as a matter of law.” Jd. Ii.

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SGM Holdings LLC v. Andrews, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sgm-holdings-llc-v-andrews-nysd-2023.