Sfr Invs. Pool 1, Llc v. Bank Of New York Mellon

• Court: Nevada Supreme Court
• Decided: May 20, 2022
• Docket: 79290
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, A No. 79290 NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

Appellant,

VS.

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, F/K/A Fr ILE } BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE,

IN TRUST FOR REGISTERED HOLDERS OF CWABS, INC., ASSET- BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-IM3, A/K/A THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, F/K/A THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWABS, IN. ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-IM3,

Respondent.

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is an appeal from a district court final judgment in a judicial foreclosure and quiet title action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, Judge.! The district court granted judgment for respondent, concluding that the first deed of trust survived the HOA’s 2013 foreclosure sale. As the basis for its conclusion, the district court found that respondent’s agent

(Miles Bauer) tendered the superpriority portion of the HOA’s lien such that

1Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal.

Supreme Court OF Nevapa

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the deed of trust was not extinguished by the foreclosure sale. In so doing, the district court determined that respondent was not time-barred from asserting its tender “claim” because respondent referenced the tender in its January 20, 2015, interrogatory responses and filed an amended complaint asserting a quiet title claim on January 21, 2015, such that appellant was sufficiently apprised of the tender “claim” within any applicable limitations period.

After briefing in this appeal was completed, we decided U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Properties, Inc., 1388 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 503 P.3d 299 (2022), wherein we held that NRS 11.220’s four-year limitations period governs a deed of trust beneficiary’s quiet title claim in situations such as in this case. Thus, under Thunder Properties, respondent's 2015 quiet title claim was timely under any conceivable accrual date of NRS 11.220’s limitations period. See id. at 306 (“[T]he statute of limitations should not run against a lienholder until it has something closely analogous to ‘notice of disturbed possession,’ such as repudiation of the lien.” (quoting Berberich v. Bank of Am., N.A., 136 Nev. 93, 97, 460 P.3d 440, 443 (2020))). Consequently, the district court correctly determined that respondent's quiet title claim was timely.2 See Holcomb Condos. Homeowners’ Ass'n v. Stewart Venture, LLC, 129 Nev. 181, 186-87, 300 P.38d 124, 128 (2013) (“[T]he application of the statute of limitations is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.”); Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Cir., 128 Nev. 246, 253, 277 P.3d 458, 463 (2012) (“The appropriate accrual date for the statute

of limitations is a question of law only if the facts are uncontroverted.”

2Insofar as appellant suggests that respondent needed to specifically plead “tender” as a “claim” in its complaint or reference “tender” therein, we are not persuaded, at least under the facts of this case.

(internal alteration and quotation marks omitted)). In light of the foregoing, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.?

Parraguirre

pAotc8, wd.

Hardesty

cc: Hon. Eric Johnson, District Judge Eleissa C. Lavelle, Settlement Judge Hanks Law Group Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP/Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk

3The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.

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