Seymour v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided May 24, 2022·No. 3:21-cv-05213·Unknown

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT TACOMA 8 THOMAS EVANS SEYMOUR, 9 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C21-5213-MAT 10 v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13

14 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff motion for attorney’s fees (Dkt. 27) 15 (Motion) filed pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The 16 Commissioner opposes the Motion in part (Dkt. 28) and requests that fees be reduced. In his reply 17 (Dkt. 29), Plaintiff agrees to a fee reduction of $804.90 and amends his fee request to account for 18 the time spent drafting the reply. 19 Having reviewed and considered the parties’ briefs, and for the reasons discussed below, 20 the Court finds that duplicative amounts and amounts billed for clerical tasks should not be 21 compensated. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion. 23 Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), the Court awards fees and expenses to a 1 prevailing party in a suit against the government “unless the court finds that the position of the 2 United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 3 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

4 Plaintiff initially requested an award of EAJA fees in the amount of $5,649.21, expenses 5 in the amount of $17.58, and costs in the amount of $402.00. Dkt. 27. The Commissioner opposes 6 the Motion in part and requests that the Court exercise its discretion to reduce the initial fee request 7 to $4,427.60. Dkt. 28. The Commissioner does not oppose Plaintiff’s request for expenses and 8 costs. Id. at 6. In response, Plaintiff agrees to a fee reduction of $804.90 for time spent 9 unsuccessfully pursuing arguments under Seila Law1 and further amends his fee request to include 10 $913.67 for time spent drafting the reply. Dkt. 29, at 4–5. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s amended request 11 seeks attorney fees in the amount of $5,757.98. Id. at 5. 12 Where attorneys’ fees are available, the district court must determine what constitutes a 13 reasonable attorneys’ fee. See Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir.

14 2012). The Court applies the principles established for determining a reasonable fee award set 15 forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), and other cases interpreting 42 U.S.C. 16 § 1988. See id. Under Hensley, the Court may exclude from the fee calculation hours that were not 17 “reasonably expended.” 461 U.S. at 434. “[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing 18 entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended.” Id. at 437. If the 19 government disputes the reasonableness of the fee, it “has a burden of rebuttal that requires 20 submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the 21 hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates v. 22

23 1 Because Plaintiff has withdrawn his request for fees for time spent pursuing arguments under Seila Law, the Court does not reach the merits of this request. 1 Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court has an independent duty to review 2 the submitted itemized log of hours to determine the reasonableness of hours requested in each 3 case. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 436–37. However, “a district court can impose a reduction of

4 up to 10 percent—a ‘haircut’—based purely on the exercise of its discretion and without more 5 specific explanation.” Costa, 690 F.3d at 1136 (citing Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 6 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008)). 7 1. Duplication of Effort 8 The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s fee request should be reduced by $239.29 to 9 exclude time spent by attorneys Melissa DelGuercio (.8 hours) for reviewing drafts of the opening 10 and reply briefs prepared by another attorney and Edward Wicklund (.3 hours) for assessing the 11 Commissioner’s response brief, which time the Commissioner argues was duplicative of effort. 12 Dkt. 28, at 3–4. Plaintiff argues that collaboration between attorneys is not unreasonable and that 13 different attorneys reviewed the brief for different purposes. Dkt. 29, at 2. The Court agrees that it

14 is not unreasonable for a draft to undergo peer review. Here, however, Plaintiff billed not only for 15 Melissa DelGuercio to review and edit the draft opening brief and reply brief (.8 hours) but also 16 for Maren Bam to review and edit the draft briefs a second time (.5 hours). See Motion Ex. B, at 17 2. Although Plaintiff argues in briefing that the attorneys reviewed the briefs for different purposes, 18 Plaintiff’s attorney time log describes both attorneys performing essentially the same function. See 19 Neil v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 495 Fed. App’x 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2012) (a district court is 20 within its discretion to reduce fees where time entries are “vague and inadequately explained”). 21 Therefore, the Court reduces the fee request by .6 hours of attorney time ($130.52) to exclude 22 unreasonable duplication of attorney time spent reviewing and editing the draft briefs. 23 Plaintiff further argues that .3 hours spent by Edward Wickland, a senior attorney, 1 reviewing and assessing Defendant’s response is not duplicative. Dkt. 29, at 2. Plaintiff’s attorney 2 time log does not describe any other attorney performing essentially the same function as 3 Mr. Wickland in reviewing the response brief and assigning a writer to assess the reply. See Motion

4 Ex. B, at 2. Courts should generally defer to the “winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to 5 how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Moreno, 535 F.3d at 1112. Because the 6 Commissioner has failed to show that the time spent by Mr. Wickland was duplicative, the Court 7 declines to exclude .3 hours of attorney time from Plaintiff’s fee request. 8 2. Clerical Tasks 9 The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s fee request should be reduced by $195.00 to 10 exclude time spent by paralegals performing clerical tasks. Dkt. 28, at 4–5. Specifically, the 11 Commissioner argues that time spent reviewing and processing the files from the referral source 12 (.6 hours), discussing IFP assessment and filing fees with the client (.2 hours), preparing and 13 reviewing a retainer agreement and other representative documents for client signing (.9 hours),

14 preparing service packets (.6 hours), filing proof of service with the court (.2 hours), and emailing 15 with opposing counsel regarding briefing deadlines (.1 hours) are clerical tasks that should not be 16 billed under EAJA. Id. 17 The Court may reduce attorney’s fees “for purely clerical tasks.” Neil, 495 Fed. App’x at 18 847; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989) (holding an attorney may not 19 seek fees for purely clerical tasks at an attorney rate); Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th 20 Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (holding clerical and organizational tasks “should have been 21 subsumed in firm overhead rather than billed at paralegal rates”). Here, the Court finds several of 22 the challenged paralegal time to be not purely clerical in nature.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Seymour v. Commissioner of Social Security, (W.D. Wash. 2022).

Seymour v. Commissioner of Social Security (Seymour v. Commissioner of Social Security) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Missouri v. Jenkins Ex Rel. Agyei
491 U.S. 274 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Nadarajah v. Holder
569 F.3d 906 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Gates v. Deukmejian
987 F.2d 1392 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)