Sexton v. Clay Equipment Co.

Supreme Court of Iowa

Sexton v. Clay Equipment Co.

47 N.W.2d 792, 242 Iowa 675, 1951 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 354

CourtSupreme Court of Iowa

DecidedMay 8, 1951

Docket47770

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 47 N.W.2d 792 (Sexton v. Clay Equipment Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Sexton v. Clay Equipment Co., 47 N.W.2d 792, 242 Iowa 675, 1951 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 354 (iowa 1951).

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Opinion

Oliver, J.-

Defendants had appeared by their attorneys prior to June 30, the appearance date. July 25 they filed answer and counterclaim. July 23 plaintiff had moved for default for failure of defendants to move or plead within seven days after the appearance date as required by Rule of Civil Procedure 85. July 27 plaintiff moved to strike defendants’ answer and counterclaim because filed after the motion for default and not timely filed within R. C. P. 85. After a hearing thereon both motions were overruled. The order of the court (Judge Gaffney) recited “substantial justice would not be meted out to defendants” if the Rules of Civil Procedure were strictly adhered to.

R. C. P. 85(f) states, in part: “* * * For good cause, but not ex parte, and upon such terms as the court prescribes, the court may grant a party the right to file a motion, answer or. reply where the time to- file same has expired.”

*677 The quoted provision was placed in the rule in. 1945. The comment states (see Acts of Fifty-first General Assembly, page 339) :

“The change in paragraph (f) was made to avoid miscarriage of justice by giving the court discretion in permitting the filing of motions, answers or replies, thus avoiding the loss of substantial rights through the strict application of an arbitrary'rule of procedure.”

In City of Des Moines v. Barnes, 237 Iowa 6, 20 N.W.2d 895, this court reversed an order denying an application to set aside a default under circumstances similar to those in the case at bar. It will be noted the quoted provision in E. C. P. 85(f) was not in effect when the trial court made the order in the Barnes case. However, in the decision upon appeal, this court pointed to the amendment as indicating the original rule should not be too strictly construed.

In the case at bar the cause of defendants’ failure to plead xiromptly was the-inability of counsel to secure from them the information necessary to prepare the counterclaim. In effect the order granted defendants the right to file the answer and counterclaim eighteen days after the time to file had expired. Eule 85(f) as modified empowered the court to make such an order. We conclude the order did not constitute an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. — Affirmed.

All Justices eoncur.

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Oliver, J.-

Defendants had appeared by their attorneys prior to June 30, the appearance date. July 25 they filed answer and counterclaim. July 23 plaintiff had moved for default for failure of defendants to move or plead within seven days after the appearance date as required by Rule of Civil Procedure 85. July 27 plaintiff moved to strike defendants’ answer and counterclaim because filed after the motion for default and not timely filed within R. C. P. 85. After a hearing thereon both motions were overruled. The order of the court (Judge Gaffney) recited “substantial justice would not be meted out to defendants” if the Rules of Civil Procedure were strictly adhered to.

R. C. P. 85(f) states, in part: “* * * For good cause, but not ex parte, and upon such terms as the court prescribes, the court may grant a party the right to file a motion, answer or. reply where the time to- file same has expired.”

*677 The quoted provision was placed in the rule in. 1945. The comment states (see Acts of Fifty-first General Assembly, page 339) :

“The change in paragraph (f) was made to avoid miscarriage of justice by giving the court discretion in permitting the filing of motions, answers or replies, thus avoiding the loss of substantial rights through the strict application of an arbitrary'rule of procedure.”

In City of Des Moines v. Barnes, 237 Iowa 6, 20 N.W.2d 895, this court reversed an order denying an application to set aside a default under circumstances similar to those in the case at bar. It will be noted the quoted provision in E. C. P. 85(f) was not in effect when the trial court made the order in the Barnes case. However, in the decision upon appeal, this court pointed to the amendment as indicating the original rule should not be too strictly construed.

In the case at bar the cause of defendants’ failure to plead xiromptly was the-inability of counsel to secure from them the information necessary to prepare the counterclaim. In effect the order granted defendants the right to file the answer and counterclaim eighteen days after the time to file had expired. Eule 85(f) as modified empowered the court to make such an order. We conclude the order did not constitute an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. — Affirmed.

All Justices eoncur.

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47 N.W.2d 792, 242 Iowa 675, 1951 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 354, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sexton-v-clay-equipment-co-iowa-1951.

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