Sewkarran v. DeBellis

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sewkarran v. DeBellis

11 A.D.3d 446, 782 N.Y.S.2d 466, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11604

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 4, 2004

StatusPublished

This text of 11 A.D.3d 446 (Sewkarran v. DeBellis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sewkarran v. DeBellis, 11 A.D.3d 446, 782 N.Y.S.2d 466, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11604 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, for a declaration that the tax assessment method used by the defendants violates the Fair Housing Act (42 USC § 3601 et seq.), the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Jamieson, J.), entered August 20, 2003, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the tax assessment method used by the defendants does not violate the Fair Housing Act.

The defendants’ established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). In response thereto, the plaintiffs, who relied on a report from a purported expert that lacked any probative value (see Gedney v Atcosta, 5 AD3d 542 [2004]), failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiffs could not rely on their own “self-serving testimony” (Vasquez v Gonzalez, 143 AD2d 413, 414 [1988]) at their depositions to rebut the defendants’ prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the second through fifth causes of action.

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Court should have directed the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the tax assessment method used by the defendants does not violate the Fair Housing Act (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [447]*447[1962], cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]). Santucci, J.P., Luciano, Schmidt and Skelos, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, for a declaration that the tax assessment method used by the defendants violates the Fair Housing Act (42 USC § 3601 et seq.), the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Jamieson, J.), entered August 20, 2003, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the tax assessment method used by the defendants does not violate the Fair Housing Act.

The defendants’ established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). In response thereto, the plaintiffs, who relied on a report from a purported expert that lacked any probative value (see Gedney v Atcosta, 5 AD3d 542 [2004]), failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiffs could not rely on their own “self-serving testimony” (Vasquez v Gonzalez, 143 AD2d 413, 414 [1988]) at their depositions to rebut the defendants’ prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the second through fifth causes of action.

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Court should have directed the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the tax assessment method used by the defendants does not violate the Fair Housing Act (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [447]*447[1962], cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]). Santucci, J.P., Luciano, Schmidt and Skelos, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

11 A.D.3d 446, 782 N.Y.S.2d 466, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11604, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sewkarran-v-debellis-nyappdiv-2004.

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