Sewell v. Nolen Bank

85 So. 375, 204 Ala. 93, 1920 Ala. LEXIS 41
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJanuary 22, 1920
Docket5 Div. 730.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 85 So. 375 (Sewell v. Nolen Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sewell v. Nolen Bank, 85 So. 375, 204 Ala. 93, 1920 Ala. LEXIS 41 (Ala. 1920).

Opinion

BROWN, J.

This bill is by appellant, J. H. Sewell, against Mary E. Nolen, Roy L. Nolen, Leon A. Nolen, Lessie N. Adams, S. J. Nolen, Jr., Marie N. Potts, Helen N. Bell, Thurston H. Nolen, and Jack Nolen, a partnership doing business as the Nolen Bank, in Alexander City, Ala., praying for an accounting, and seeking to redeem from a certain mortgage executed by complainant to the Nolen Bank on the 31st day of January, 1916, for $3,000, in renewal and as additional security for alleged pre-existing debts — constituted largely, if not entirely, of usurious interest.

The answer of the Nolen Bank, the partnership composed of the persons above named, sets up that at the time of the execution of the mortgage the Nolen Bank was owned and being conducted by Roy L. Nolen and S. J. Nolen, Jr., as the survivors of the partnership composed of S. J. Nolen, Sr., now deceased, and Roy L. and S. J. Nolen, Jr.; and that, before the formation of the present partnership, they, in due course and for value, transferred said mortgage and the note thereby secured to Marie N. Potts — and the partnership as now constituted disclaims any interest in or to the mortgage or the debt thereby secured.

The respondent Marie N. Potts by her separate answer, adopting in part the answer of the Nolen Bank, avers that—

“Said promissory note is made payable to the Nolen Bank or bearer, and is a negotiable instrument under the laws of Alabama. This respondent avers that on December 1, 1916, said note was delivered to her for a valuable consideration, to wit, the sum of $3,200 paid on said date; that at the time of the said negotiation of said instrument to this respondent she was a bona fide purchaser for value and had no notice, of said alleged usurious interest included in said instrument; and that the complainant at the time of the filing of the bill of complaint was, and is now, indebted to this respondent in the sum of $3,000, with interest from January 31, 1916.”

She thereupon prays that her 1 answer be taken and considered a cross-bill, and that the mortgage be foreclosed.

On final hearing, on pleadings and proof, the court dismissed the original bill; and holding that the respondent Marie N. Potts *95 was a “bona fide purchaser for value,” of the indebtedness represented by the note and mortgage executed by complainant to the “Nolen Bank” on January 31, 1916, granted relief under her cross-bill and decreed a foreclosure of the mortgage. The purpose of this appeal is to review this decree.

The salient facts developed by the evidence in the case are that, prior to 1908, S. J. Nolen, Sr., now deceased was in the banking, loan, and advancing business in Alexander City, as “S. J. Nolen, Banker,” at which time he changed the style of his business to the “Nolen Bank,” and at some time prior to his death, in May, 1915, associated with him his two sons Boy L. and S. J. Nolen, Jr.; but, as expressed by S. J. Nolen, Jr., testifying as a witness in this case S. J. Nolen, Sr., owned “practically all of it” (the bank) at .the time of his death.

The matters involved in this litigation originated in an advance or loan of $500 by the Nolen Bank to the complainant on the 18th day of January 1908, to secure which complainant and his wife executed to the Nolen Bank a mortgage for $500, “with interest from date,” covering a house and lot in Alexander City and other' property, and on account of which a charge against complainant was entered on the books of the bank for $574.55.

It is not disputed that, on the debt secured by this mortgage, complainant for the years including 1908 and 1915 paid the sum of $62.-50 annually as interest.

On March 1, 1909, the bank made another loan to complainant of $1,572.10, to enable him to pay off a mortgage to the British-American Mortgage Company and one Porch, to secure which complainant and his wife executed to the bank a mortgage for the sum of $1,572.10, “with interest from date.” It is likewise admitted that for the years 1909 to 1915, inclusive, complainant paid annually as interest on this indebtedness $196.50, and that no payments were made or credited on the principal of either mortgage.

During these years complainant and his son were engaged in farming operations, and obtained from the Nolen Bank advances from year to year, securing the same by mortgages on the crops to be grown from year to year, and other personal property. The cotton grown by complainant and his son during these years, after it was gathered and baled, was placed in a warehouse and the warehouse receipts turned over to the bank. The cotton was sold by- the bank, and the proceeds thereof applied from time to time to the payment of interest on the two land mortgages, as well as the principal and interest on the crop mortgages up to and including the crops of 1915. The balance due on these loans and advancements was carried from year to year, and new or additional security given in the form of renewal mortgages. The evidence, we think, clearly tends to the conclusion — and in fact it is not seriously denied — that interest at a rate greater than the legal rate was charged .on these several loans and advancements.

On the 31st day of January, 1916, the unpaid balances, as shown by the books of the bank — on the mortgage of January 18, 1908, $500, and the mortgage of March 1, 1909, $1,-572.10, and the several crop mortgages being combined — amounted to $3,000; and on that date complainant executed to the bank the mortgage against which he seeks relief in this case.

[1] The several mortgages showing on their face that they were given for the principal sums actually advanced as loans “with interest from date,” the appellees contend that this precludes the court from going behind the contract therein expressed, and that parol or extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show that the contract was usurious in its inception. To hold that the usurer, by the mere subterfuge of taking a paper as a security for a loan, which on its face is not usurious, can preclude the borrower — whom it is the purpose of the law to protect — from going behind this subterfuge, and showing the contract is in fact usurious, woum amount to a nullification of the statute. As said by this court in a recent case:

“There is no device or shift on the part of the lender to evade the statute under or behind which the law will look in order to ascertain the real nature of the transaction.” Blue v. First National Bank of Elba, 200 Ala. 129, 75 South. 577; Lewis v. Hickman. 200 Ala. 672, 77 South. 46; 39 Cyc. 1052 (B) 1.

[2] It is not necessary to look to the testimony of the complainant, given as a witness in his own behalf, to determine that the mortgages of January 18, 1908, and of March 1, 1909, were usurious in their inception. “The payment and receipt of usurious interest is prima facie evidence of a prior usurious contract.” Webb on Usury, 482, § 419; 39 Oyc. 1053 (III).

Moreover, the testimony of J. T. Sewell, which is not disputed, clearly established the fact that the agreement between his father and the bank, made with S. J. Nolen, Sr., was to pay 12% per cent, interest on these loans of January 18,1908, and March 1, 1909.

[3]

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Bluebook (online)
85 So. 375, 204 Ala. 93, 1920 Ala. LEXIS 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sewell-v-nolen-bank-ala-1920.