Sevier v. Gleason

32 Haw. 387, 1932 Haw. LEXIS 22
CourtHawaii Supreme Court
DecidedApril 25, 1932
DocketNo. 1986.
StatusPublished

This text of 32 Haw. 387 (Sevier v. Gleason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hawaii Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sevier v. Gleason, 32 Haw. 387, 1932 Haw. LEXIS 22 (haw 1932).

Opinion

OPINION OP THE COURT BY

BANKS, J.

This is a suit for an injunction, brought by Colonel Granville Sevier, an officer in the United States Army, to restrain the coroner of the City and County of Honolulu from executing his expressed determination to order an autopsy to be performed on the body of the petitioner’s deceased wife. It was stipulated between the parties that the coroner’s intention to order the autopsy would be held in suspense pending a final determination of the case and therefore no restraining order was issued. After a full investigation and the taking of much testimony the *388 circuit judge denied the injunction and the matter is here on appeal.

Mrs. Sevier died in Honolulu, at Tripler General Hospital, on the 27th day of August, 1928, and her remains were on the following day placed in a vault in Nuuanu Cemetery, Honolulu, where they now lie. The law under which the coroner claims the right to act is contained in section 3941, R. L. 1925, the pertinent paragraphs of which are as follows: “As soon as any coroner shall have notice of the death of any person within his jurisdiction, supposed to have come to death by poisoning, violence, or in any suspicious manner, he shall forthwith issue his summons to six good and lawful men of the district where the death may have occurred, or in which the dead body may have been found or is at the time lying, to appear before him at the time and place expressed in the warrant, and there to inquire upon the view of the body of the deceased, when, how, and by what means he came to his death. In all cases of sudden death the coroner shall inquire into the cause, and in his discretion may cause an inquest to be held even if he is not satisfied that there are suspicious circumstances attending the death.”

We find no substantial evidence in the record that Mrs. Sevier came to her death suddenly, as that term is used in the statute. It is apparent from the evidence that she had long prior to her death been in ill health, developing at intervals symptoms of increasing gravity which necessitated hospitalization and medical treatment. On July 4,1928, she was finally placed in Tripler General Hospital where she was constantly under medical observation and treatment, and where she eventually died on August 27, 1928. There is no evidence that the end came unexpectedly and without warning. On the contrary, it is shown by at least one of her physicians that he antici *389 pated that her demise would come much earlier than it did. Under these circumstances it can hardly be said that Mrs. Sevier’s death was so unheralded and unexpected as to be classified as sudden. The coroner must therefore look to the preceding clause of the statute for his authority to hold the contemplated autopsy. That is to say, in order to justify an autopsy it must reasonably appear from all the evidence that Mrs. Sevier came to her death “by poisoning, violence, or in any suspicious manner.” There is no suggestion that she came to her death by violence nor is there any suggestion of any suspicion other than that poison was the proximate cause of her death. It is not necessary that the coroner himself should have formed the belief or the suspicion that Mrs. Sevier died from poisoning. He need only have reached the conclusion in the light of all the circumstances and the information submitted to him that a reasonable man might form such a suspicion.

In Coty v. Baughman, 210 N. W. (S. D.) 348, 349, the court said: ""Appellant contends he had a right to perform his autopsy by virtue of his office of coroner regardless of the consent or objection of the parents. The statute provides the coroner is authorized to hold an inquest "upon the dead bodies of such persons only as are supposed to have died by unlawful means.’ Section 10179, R. C. 1919. It will be noticed that the right of the coroner to hold an inquest is limited to such persons only as are supposed to have died by unlawful means. The phrase, "supposed to have died by unlawful means,’ does not give to the coroner an unlimited, captious, or arbitrary power to hold inquests. "The duty of a coroner to hold an inquest rests on sound reason, on that reason which is the life of the law. It is not a power to be exercised capriciously and arbitrarily against all reason.’ County of Lancaster v. Mishler, 100 Pa. 624, 45 Am. Rep. *390 402; section. 3871, and section 3874, subd. 2, R. C. 1919.”

In the case of County of Lancaster v. Mishler, 100 Pa. St. 624, 627, it was said: “The duty of a coroner to hold an inquest rests on sound reason, on that reason which is the life of the law. It is not a power to be exercised capriciously and arbitrarily against all reason. The object of an inquest is to seek information, and obtain and secure evidence, in case of death by violence or other undue means. If there be reasonable ground to suspect it was so caused, it becomes the duty of the coroner to act. If he has no ground for suspecting that the death was not a natural one, it is a perversion of the whole spirit of the law to compel the county to pay him for such services. In this case the inquest found the decedent came to his death ‘from a paralytic stroke.’ Nay, more, if under the facts offered in evidence a coroner may hold an inquest, he may in his discretion at the expense of the county order a post mortem examination, whereby those bound to the deceased by the nearest and most tender ties may have their feeling lacerated, in every case of natural death. The idea is preposterous and abhorrent to all finer emotions of human nature.”

The restraint laid by the law upon the discretionary power of a coroner to hold an inquest and subject a lifeless body to an autopsy, involving as it often does exposure of the corpse to public gaze and its partial dismemberment, is based on the horror which all civilized people have of dragging from their hallowed resting place those upon whom death has laid its inexorable hand. It is also based upon the deep respect which society has for the tender feelings of those bereaved ones to whom the departed was attached in life, and whose grief would be rendered more poignant by the dissection and profane manipulations that are incidental to an adequate autopsy. These sentiments are too greatly revered to be disregarded *391 unless it is reasonably apparent that it is necessary to the detection of crime. The law, which is a great human institution and not merely an inflexible dogma, does not permit the capricious and ruthless violation of such sacred emotions. These emotions, however, must yield to the stern requirements of the law that all reasonable means be taken for the detection of crime.

On September 18, 1928, Captain W. C. Whitmore, a medical officer in the United States Army, filed in the bureau of vital statistics at Honolulu a standard certificate of the death of Marion D. Sevier. This certificate shows that the deceased came to her death August 27, 1928, at the Tripler General Hospital, Honolulu, and that the cause' of her death was “Cardiac, dilatation, acute (duration) Undetermined Contributory 1. Arteriosclerosis, generalized (Secondary) 2. Nephritis, (a) (duration) Undetermined.” There is nothing in the certificate to indicate that Mrs. Sevier died from any other than natural causes.

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Related

County of Lancaster v. Mishler
100 Pa. 624 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1882)

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Bluebook (online)
32 Haw. 387, 1932 Haw. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sevier-v-gleason-haw-1932.