Sevelis v. Unknown Party

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJuly 22, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-00951
StatusUnknown

This text of Sevelis v. Unknown Party (Sevelis v. Unknown Party) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sevelis v. Unknown Party, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Opinion

1 WO JL 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Timothy Scott Sevelis, No. CV 21-00951-PHX-JAT (MTM) 10 Petitioner, 11 v. ORDER 12 Unknown Party, et al., 13 Respondents.

14 15 On June 1, 2021, Petitioner Timothy Scott Sevelis, who is confined in the Central 16 Arizona Florence Correctional Complex (CAFCC), filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. 17 § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody. Petitioner did not pay 18 the $5.00 filing fee or file an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a June 10, 2021 19 Order, the Court dismissed the Petition because it was not filed on the court-approved form 20 and gave Petitioner 30 days to pay the filing fee or file an Application to Proceed and to 21 file an amended petition using the court-approved form included with the Order. 22 On June 14, 2021, Petitioner filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and 23 a letter. In a June 27, 2021 Order, the Court denied the letter and the deficient Application 24 to Proceed and gave Petitioner 30 days to pay the filing fee or file an Application to Proceed 25 In Forma Pauperis (Habeas). 26 On June 21, 2021, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition (Doc. 8), and on July 12, 27 2021, he paid the filing fee. The Court will dismiss the Amended Petition with leave to 28 amend. 1 I. Amended Petition 2 In his Amended Petition, Petitioner names Warden K. Kline as Respondent. 3 Petitioner asserts claims regarding his conditions of confinement. Specifically, Petitioner 4 contends his First Amendment right to freedom of speech was violated when Daniel 5 Beckwith of Dismas Charities, Inc.1 “commandeered” two of Petitioner’s letters that were 6 in the postal outbox, opened them, and read them; his First Amendment right to free 7 exercise of his religion has been violated “multpl[e] times” because he has asked to attend 8 Roman Catholic Church services, apparently outside of the prison, but has been denied 9 permission; his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by seizure of his “authorized” 10 phone, property, and “bodily self” and his detention by the U.S. Marshal’s Service at 11 CAFCC since April 2, 2021; and some unnamed individual committed the federal offense 12 of mail tampering and misuse of government funds, and the criminal charges have been 13 “turned over for prosecution.”2 14 Claims concerning conditions of confinement and violations of constitutional rights 15 during detention are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding; rather, Petitioner must 16 seek relief for such claims in a civil rights proceeding. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 17 749, 750 (2004) (citation omitted); see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004) 18 (“constitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, 19 whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside [the] core [of habeas 20 relief]”); Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 21 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)) (a civil rights action is the proper method to challenge conditions of 22 confinement). The Court will therefore dismiss the Amended Petition with leave to amend. 23 The Court notes that Petitioner appears to be attempting in part to challenge events 24

25 1 Dismas Charities, Inc., operates halfway houses, including a halfway house in 26 Tucson. See https://www.dismas.com/about/ (last visited July 14, 2021). 27 2 According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmate locator, Petitioner is subject to the Phoenix Residential Reentry Management Field Office. See 28 https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search Register Number 72012-408) (last accessed July 15, 2021). According to that site, Petitioner’s release date is September 20, 2021. Id. 1 while he was placed at a Dismas Charities halfway house, prior to being detained at 2 CAFCC. Because Petitioner is no longer housed at the halfway house, it appears that any 3 habeas corpus claim would be rendered moot as to such placement. 4 Further, Petitioner should be aware that to the extent that he is attempting to assert 5 a due process claim with respect to his halfway house placement, the Court must first 6 determine whether a constitutionally protected liberty interest is implicated by any decision 7 concerning Petitioner’s placement in the halfway house. See Lyle v. Sivley, 805 F. Supp. 8 755, 760 (D. Ariz. 1992). “A liberty interest may arise either from the Due Process Clause 9 itself, or from a statute, rule, or regulation. With regard to the Due Process Clause itself, 10 the Supreme Court has held that the transfer of an inmate to a more restrictive environment 11 does not impinge on any constitutionally created liberty interest, even where “severe 12 hardships” to the prisoner result.” Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 & n.7 13 (1983)). Thus, “it is apparent that the Due Process Clause does not give rise to a liberty 14 interest in pre-release treatment.” Id. 15 In addition, the statute governing placement in halfway houses provides, “The 16 Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that a prisoner 17 serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that term (not to 18 exceed 12 months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity 19 to adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such conditions 20 may include a community correctional facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1); see Lyle, 805 F. 21 Supp. at 761. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that “the word ‘shall’ alone 22 is not sufficient [to create a liberty interest]. Rather, the liberty interest is created when the 23 word ‘shall’ is used to mandate certain procedures.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 24 1080, 1098 (9th Cir. 1986). In addition, as the Court in Lyle noted, the word “shall” in 25 section 3624(c) “is immediately followed by the qualifying phrase ‘to the extent 26 practicable.’ Practically speaking, the statutory language leaves much room to maneuver: 27 section 3624 ‘stop[s] short of requiring that a particular result is to be reached upon a 28 finding that the substantive predicates are met.’” 805 F. Supp. at 761 (quoting Kentucky 1 Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1989)). Thus, section 3624(c) does not 2 create a protected liberty interest. Id. If a petitioner does not have a protected liberty 3 interest in placement in a halfway house at all, it follows that he does not have a protected 4 liberty interest in remaining for a particular duration. 5 Alternatively, Petitioner may be attempting to challenge his detention at CAFCC. 6 If so, Petitioner must allege facts to support that such detention violated his constitutional 7 or federal statutory rights. 8 II. Leave to Amend 9 Within 30 days, Petitioner may submit a second amended petition on the court- 10 approved form. The Clerk of Court will mail Petitioner a court-approved form to use for 11 filing a second amended petition. If Petitioner fails to use the court-approved form, the 12 Court may strike the second amended petition and dismiss this action without further notice 13 to Petitioner. 14 Petitioner’s second amended petition should clearly set out each claim Petitioner is 15 making.

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Related

Hewitt v. Helms
459 U.S. 460 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson
490 U.S. 454 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Mitchell v. Esparza
540 U.S. 12 (Supreme Court, 2003)
Nelson v. Campbell
541 U.S. 637 (Supreme Court, 2004)
John Badea v. Harvey Cox
931 F.2d 573 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Moore v. Ingram & Associates, Inc.
805 F. Supp. 7 (D. South Carolina, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
Sevelis v. Unknown Party, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sevelis-v-unknown-party-azd-2021.