Settlemyer v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec, LLC

District Court, W.D. North Carolina·Decided December 6, 2021·No. 1:19-cv-00344·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION CIVIL CASE NO. 1:19-cv-00344-MR-WCM

DAVID L. SETTLEMYER and ) JAN SETTLEMYER, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) MEMORANDUM OF vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER ) BORG-WARNER MORSE TEC, ) LLC, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants Eaton Corporation, BWDAC, Inc., ZF Active Safety US Inc., PACCAR, Inc., and Daimler Trucks North America LLC [Docs. 173, 186, 195, 199, 207]. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Plaintiffs David L. Settlemyer and Jan Settlemyer filed this personal injury action on December 12, 2019, against a total of 22 defendants, alleging that Mr. Settlemyer contracted mesothelioma from breathing asbestos dust as an automobile and truck mechanic at Davis Oil Company in Statesville, North Carolina from 1979 through 1994 and at three other jobs. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Settlemyer was exposed to asbestos dust when he and other mechanics serviced the brakes and clutches of various semi-trucks, trailers, and other vehicles at Davis Oil.1 In

their Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert four causes of action: (1) “Negligent Failure to Warn, Defective Design”; (2) “Breach of Implied Warranty”; (3) “Negligence, Negligent Retention and Supervision”; and (4) “Gross

Negligence, Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Conduct,” for which the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages. [Doc. 1 at 4-18]. Over the course of the litigation, the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against several of the named Defendants. [See Docs. 163

(Navistar, Inc.); 170 (Caterpillar Inc.); 251 (Genuine Parts Company); 293 (CRA Trailers, Inc.)]. The remaining Defendants then moved for summary judgment with respect to all the Plaintiffs’ claims. [Docs. 173, 182, 186, 190,

194, 195, 199, 203, 207]. The Plaintiffs, in turn, moved for partial summary

1 The Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Settlemyer was also exposed to asbestos while employed at Clean Air Systems in Statesville, North Carolina from approximately 1994 until 1998; at Dyno Nobel Piedmont Explosives in Olin, North Carolina from 1998 until 2002; and at Purdue Farms in Statesville, North Carolina from approximately 2002 to the present. [Doc. 1: Complaint at ¶ 13]. The Plaintiffs also allege that Mr. Settlemyer was exposed to various asbestos-containing products during non-occupational work in the 1970s, including home and automotive maintenance and repair work. [Id. at ¶ 14]. The Defendants that remain in this action are alleged to be responsible for asbestos- containing products to which Mr. Settlemyer alleges he was exposed to while employed at Davis Oil from 1979 to 1994.

2 judgment on the Defendants’ “affirmative defense” regarding alternate exposure. [Doc. 176].

On November 18, 2021, the Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as well as the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Morse Tec LLC, Carlisle Industrial Brake & Friction, Inc., and

Pneumo Abex, LLC. [First Text-Only Order entered Nov. 18, 2021]. By way of a separate text order, the Court notified the parties that the motions for summary judgment filed by the Defendants Eaton Corporation (“Eaton”); BWDAC, Inc. (“BWDAC”); ZF Active Safety US Inc. (“ZF Active”); PACCAR,

Inc. (“PACCAR”); and Daimler Trucks North America LLC (“DTNA”) were granted and that this written Order would follow. [Second Text-Only Order entered Nov. 18, 2021].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id. 3 The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted). Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Courts “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or

arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkt. Inc. v. J.D. Assoc.’s, LLP, 213 F.3d 174, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). The nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

4 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “‘Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Viewing the parties’ forecasts of evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the following is a recitation of the relevant facts.

The Plaintiff David Settlemyer was diagnosed with pleural mesothelioma in May 2019 at the age of 57. [Preserved Trial Deposition of David L. Settlemyer (“Settlemyer Trial Dep.”) at 9]. Mr. Settlemyer was hired as a mechanic’s helper and mechanic at

Davis Oil Company of Statesville Inc. (“Davis Oil”) in 1979. [Id. at 23-24; 110]. That same year, Mr. Settlemyer briefly left Davis Oil and worked in a dye house mixing chemicals at Beaunit Fabric Corporation. [Id. at 21; 110-

11]. However, he thereafter returned to Davis Oil to serve as a mechanic’s 5 helper, and subsequently became a full mechanic around 1982. [Id. at 110- 11]. He continued to work for Davis Oil until 1994. [Id. at 23].

Mr. Settlemyer was employed by Clean Air Products (a.k.a. Capro Services Inc.) from 1994 to 1997, during which time he removed and installed dust filtration systems in lumberyards, furniture factories, and finishing

rooms, and he welded ductwork. [Id. at 26-27]. During this period, he reportedly worked for approximately one month with tires and small repairs at Homer Prevette, a truck stop.

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