Settle v. Arthur

92 S.W.2d 461, 1936 Tex. App. LEXIS 204
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 28, 1936
DocketNo. 2926.
StatusPublished

This text of 92 S.W.2d 461 (Settle v. Arthur) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Settle v. Arthur, 92 S.W.2d 461, 1936 Tex. App. LEXIS 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

O’QUINN, Justice.

Appellee sued appellant and J. L. Mc-Lamore, alleging that they were in the business of selling used cars and on December 5, 1933, had in their possession a certain Chevrolet automobile, 1931 model coach, and held themselves out as the owner of said car, and on said date sold same to him for the sum of $338.96, of which he paid in cash $200, and later paid the balance of $138.96; that-at the time of said sale to him of said car they gave him a bill of sale from the record owner of same, whose name, according to the records, was' A. R. Reynolds, representing to appellee. that they bought said car from said Reynolds, and therefore were the owners of same; that in fact said car was a stolen automobile, which fact was unknown to him at the time of the purchase and was not disclosed to him; that on March 4, 1934, one O. R. Ralston, the real owner of said car, claimed same, asserting that it had been stolen from him on September 27, 1933, and took said car from appellee; that as a result of thus losing said car he was damaged in the sum of $338.96, which he demanded of said defendants, and which they and each of them failed and refused to pay to him. Appellee further alleged that he expended the sum of $102.07 in repairing said car for which he was entitled to recover. He further alleged that the defendants, at the time they sold him said car, knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that it was a stolen car, and prayed for judgment jointly and severally against both defendants for the amount paid for the car and the sum expended for repairs.

The defendant R. C. Settle answered by general demurrer, general denial, and specially denied that he and defendant J. L. McLamore were partners on December 5, 1933, when appellee purchased,the car from J. L. McLamore, and that he (Settle) did not have any interest in said car, and did not give any bill of sale to said car. He further answered that he did not authorize, or have any interest in authorizing, appellee to expend any money for repairing same. He further answered that the only interest he at any time whatsoever had in said automobile sold appellee by the defendant McLamore was a mortgage lien on said car for $138.96 given by appel-lee to J. L. McLamore in the' purchase of said car and assigned by said McLamore to him (Settle). This answer was duly verified.

The case was tried to the court without a jury, and judgment in favor of appel-lee rendered against both defendants, J. L. McLamore and R. C. Settle, jointly and severally, in the sum of $345.89. Settle prosecutes this appeal.

The court filed his findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are:

“Findings of Facts.
“I. I find that the Plaintiff, McKinley Arthur, on the 5th day of December, A. D... 1933, purchased from the' Defend *462 ants, R. C. Settle and J. L. McLamore, a 1931' Model Chevrolet Coach, paying the sum of Three Hundred Twenty-six Dollars ($326.00) for the same.
“II. I further find that both of said Defendants are in-the business of selling used cars and held themselves out to the public, as well as to the Plaintiff, as being the owners of the said automobile in question, and took Plaintiff’s said sum of Three Hundred Twenty-six Dollars ($326.-00) and appropriated the same to their own use and benefit.
“III. I further find that the said automobile was a stolen automobile, which fact was unknown to any of the parties at the time of the purchase of the same and the sale thereof, and that one, O. R. Ralston, was the true owner of said automobile.
“IV. I further find that said true owner, acting by and through the Police Department of the City of Houston, recovered the said automobile from the Plaintiff on the 4th day of March, A. D. 1934.
“V. I Moreover find that Plaintiff has made demand upon the Defendants to return to him the said sum of Three Hundred Twenty-six Dollars ($326.00) which was paid for the said automobile, but that the Defendants have never paid the same or any part thereof to said plaintiff.
“VI. I find as a fact that the said Defendants, R. C. Settle and J. L. McLa-more, as well as a third (3rd) person, one Mr. Dodge, shared the expenses, profits and loss in their conducting of the said business of selling used cars.
“Conclusions of Law.
“I. I conclude that as a matter of law, that said Defendants, R. C. Settle and J. L. McLamore, were partners in the sale of the said automobile in question to Plaintiff, and that since the said automobile proved to be a stolen automobile, which Plaintiff was compelled to return to its true owner, that the said Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff in the sum of Three Hundred Twenty-six Dollars ($326.00), the amount paid by Plaintiff to Defendants for said automobile, for breach of the implied warranty in the sale of said automobile, and I, therefore, find for the' said plaintiff against the said Defendants in the sum of Three Hundred Twenty-six Dollars ($326.00).
"II. I moreover conclude that said Defendant, R. C. Settle, having held himself out to the public, as well as to Plaintiff, as being the owner of the said automobile, is liable to Plaintiff for the said sum of Three Hundred Twenty-six Dollars ($326.00), which Plaintiff paid for said stolen automobile.
“Frank Williford, Jr.,
“Judge.”

It is seen that the judgment is based upon the court’s finding that the defendants J. L. McLamore and R. C. Settle were partners in the business of selling used cars and that appellee purchased the car in question from them as such partners. Settle, by verified answer, denied such partnership, and further denied that he ever had any interest in the car other than as the holder of a chattel mortgage upon same for money loaned by him to McLamore. The burden of proving the partnership was upon appellee. He placed Settle on the stand as his witness. Settle consistently denied any such business relation with McLamore. He testified that he was engaged in the auto-loan finance business; that he was not engaged in the sale of used cars, except when, sometimes, he had to take them over for debt and would have to dispose of them. J. L. McLamore was sworn as a witness for ap-pellee, and he testified that he was engaged in the sale of used cars for himself and by himself; that Settle was not connected with his business, and had nothing to do with same; that Settle was in the finance business, loaning money on cars and taking liens on the cars to secure the payment of the loans; that he (McLamore) borrowed money from Settle at times in financing his business; that he (McLa-more) sold the car to appellee; and that Settle was in no wise concerned or interested in the sale, but that Settle made a loan to him and took a chattel mortgage on the car to secure the payment. R. C. Dodge was sworn as a witness for appel-lee, and testified that he was engaged in the sale of used cars, and that Settle financed him in said business by loaning him money, when needed, taking chattel mortgages on the cars to secure the repayment of the loans. He also testified that Settle sometimes had to repossess cars on which he had loaned money in his finance business, and then sold such cars.

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Bluebook (online)
92 S.W.2d 461, 1936 Tex. App. LEXIS 204, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/settle-v-arthur-texapp-1936.