CATHELL, Judge.
On April 16-21, 1998, petitioner, James Sessoms, was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on a seven-count indictment alleging rape, assault, assault with intent to rape, and sexual offenses. At the close of the State’s case, the trial court granted defense counsel’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of assault with intent to rape, but denied it as to the remaining charges. The jury convicted petitioner of a third-degree sexual offense, acquitted him of the remaining charges, and the court imposed a ten-year sentence. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed his conviction in an unreported deci[277]*277sion. He presents two questions, for which we have granted a writ of certiorari:
1. Does the test for admitting other crimes evidence enunciated in [State v. Faulkner], 314 Md. 630, 552 A.2d 896 (1989), apply when such evidence is not offered against the defendant, but in order to establish a defense?
2. Is a missing witness inference, the basis of which is speculation, properly argued to the jury when no missing witness instruction is generated by the evidence?
I. Facts
The facts in this case are somewhat convoluted. Tracy Dillon testified that at approximately 7:30 p.m. on December 24, 1996, she was walking through an alley en route to a store to purchase a lottery ticket. She emerged from the alley on Baltimore Street where she encountered a man she later identified as petitioner, who attacked her from behind, dragged her into an alley, and raped her twice at knife point. Her assailant then released her and she ran home. Before reaching her house, Tracy Dillon saw her brother, Kelly Dillon and a companion, Antonio Shields, on the corner of Lexington and Amity Streets.
Kelly Dillon testified that when he observed his sister approach he noticed that she was crying and dirty, with leaves in her hair and blood on her hands. After Tracy Dillon told her brother what had happened, she, Kelly Dillon, and Antonio Shields began searching the neighborhood for the perpetrator. Upon locating petitioner on the corner of Fayette and Schroeder Streets, the three of them confronted him. Petitioner allegedly stated, “I didn’t do nothing to her,” to which Kelly Dillon responded, “[W]e didn’t said you did.” Tracy Dillon smelled petitioner to confirm that his cologne was the same as her attacker’s. Kelly Dillon noticed dirt and debris on petitioner’s clothes and then compared the aromas of Tracy Dillon and petitioner. Determining that the scents matched, Kelly Dillon and Antonio Shields then severely beat petitioner into a state of semi-consciousness.
[278]*278Officer Edward Marshall testified that when he responded to the complaint he found a hysterical Tracy Dillon standing about fifteen feet from petitioner, who was now laying unconscious in the street. By the time he arrived on the scene, Kelly Dillon and Antonio Shields had already fled, apparently because Kelly Dillon believed there was a warrant out for his arrest. Tracy Dillon remained and informed Officer Marshall that petitioner had raped her and that petitioner had just been assaulted by two unknown men. The officers accompanied Tracy Dillon to the scene of the alleged rape and recovered her scarf and money; however, a search conducted to find the knife was unsuccessful. Tracy Dillon was then transported to Mercy Hospital.
Nurse Sharon Will, who was received as an expert in sexual assault forensic examination, testified that she examined Tracy Dillon at Mercy Hospital. She informed the trial court that Tracy Dillon’s coat had debris on it, her shirt and pants were stained, her pants soiled and her underwear was stained with blood. A sexual examination was performed and although no semen was found, the exam revealed abrasions on Tracy Dillon’s neck and left elbow, and lacerations in her anal-genital region, which Nurse Will stated were consistent with non-consensual sex. Additionally, Tracy Dillon admitted to Nurse Will that she knew who had attacked petitioner, but refused to reveal their names.
At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts of the indictment. The trial court granted defense counsel’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of assault with intent to rape, but denied it as to the remaining charges.
Testifying on his own behalf, petitioner denied touching Tracy Dillon in any way. He told the jury that on the evening of December 24, 1996, he was walking down Baltimore Street to purchase two lottery tickets, cigarettes, and vodka. He was approached by two men, one of whom claimed that petitioner had robbed his sister of $40.00. After petitioner denied it, the two men attacked him, beating him until he was unconscious. [279]*279Petitioner’s next memory was of regaining consciousness in University Hospital on December 25, 1996, with his girlfriend, Paulette Alderman, waiting by his hospital bed. Petitioner claims that while she was visiting, he was permitted by police to retrieve several items from the pants he had been wearing the night he was attacked. He planned to give her the contents of the pockets for safekeeping. During this inspection, petitioner noticed that two $5.00 bills and two lottery tickets, which he had in his possession prior to his being attacked, were missing.
Immediately preceding opening statements, the State raised a motion in limine to exclude evidence of an allegation that Kelly Dillon had robbed Tyrone Pitman early in the morning of December 25, 1996, just a few hours after the alleged attack on his sister, Tracy Dillon, and the beating of petitioner, and in the same general vicinity. Defense counsel argued at the hearing on the motion that Tracy Dillon had fabricated the rape charges to cover up the fact that her brother had robbed and beaten petitioner. In support of this theory of the case, defense counsel wanted to introduce evidence that when Officer Francis Shipp was driving Tracy Dillon home at approximately 2:45 a.m. on December 25, 1996, Tracy Dillon saw and identified Kelly Dillon as her brother to the officer. Just moments later, Tyrone Pitman ran up to the police car and informed Officer Shipp that he had just been robbed by “that man,” referring to Kelly Dillon.1 Upon hearing Mr. Pitman’s accusation, Tracy Dillon responded, “I ain’t saying it is my brother or isn’t my brother.” Petitioner contends that evidence that Mr. Pitman was robbed by Kelly Dillon within hours of Tracy Dillon’s rape and petitioner’s beating was relevant, particularly when coupled with Tracy Dillon’s incon[280]*280sistent statements concerning her brother’s identity, and petitioner’s claim of a robbery and his missing money and lottery tickets. This information was all related to petitioner’s defense that he was a victim of a robbery at the hands of Kelly Dillon and that Tracy Dillon had falsely accused him of rape to cover for her brother’s involvement in the robbery and assault on petitioner and the robbery of Pitman.
The trial judge ruled to exclude the evidence of the Pitman robbery based on the following rationale:
But Pm not going to allow the very, very prejudicial testimony of some stranger running up to the car saying, that guy robbed me, and the stranger saying, and that guy was the victim’s brother, Pm not going to allow that....
... [A]s I understand the rules of evidence, I must decide whether that information is more prejudicial than probative. As I would have to make that decision, if this were an allegation of robbery, and if I allow other past allegations of robbery, because if the jury hears that, the jury presumes that he’s a robber. Pattern of robbery. I don’t think that this is any less prejudicial, the particular point that somebody ran up to the car and said, that guy just robbed me or tried to rob me. Okay. I think its more prejudicial than probative.
As a result, defense counsel was permitted to ask Tracy Dillon only about her initial identification of her brother to Officer Shipp and her subsequent recanting statement, “I ain’t saying it is my brother or isn’t my brother”; however, defense counsel was precluded from eliciting the context in which these inconsistent statements were made, i.e., in response to Mr. Pitman’s complaint that he had just been robbed by Kelly Dillon.
During closing arguments, the State argued, over objection, that petitioner’s claim that he was robbed was uncorroborated and untrue. Defense counsel never called petitioner’s girlfriend, Paulette Alderman, to testify and the court allowed the State to argue that she was a missing witness and to argue an [281]*281inference that, because she did not testify, her testimony would have been detrimental to petitioner’s case.
The jury convicted petitioner of a third-degree sexual offense and acquitted him of the remaining charges. The court imposed a ten-year sentence immediately following the verdict. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals on three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of other crimes of a witness; (2) whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to make certain remarks during closing argument; and (3) whether petitioner’s conviction was barred by the principles of double jeopardy. The Court of Special Appeals found no error and affirmed the judgments of the circuit court. As we have indicated, we granted a writ of certiorari.
We hold that the test for admitting other crimes evidence in criminal proceedings enunciated by Faulkner2 does not apply to crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by anyone other than the defendant. The other crimes evidence rule is a court-created standard designed to ensure that a defendant is tried for the crime for which he or she is on trial and to prevent a conviction based on reputation or propensity to commit crimes, rather than the facts of the present case. Because this rule is premised upon protecting an accused from undue prejudice, it does not apply to exclude acts committed by other people, such as an act committed by a witness who later testifies in the criminal proceedings. Because we answer petitioner’s first question in the negative and accordingly [282]*282vacate the erroneous decision of the trial court, it is unnecessary for us to address petitioner’s remaining question.3
II. Other Crimes Evidence
The Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 12 S.Ct. 292, 35 L.Ed. 1077 (1892), established the legal standard known as the other crimes evidence rule. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized the harm that the introduction of evidence can have against defendants in a criminal trial:
[Evidence of other crimes] were collateral to the issue to be tried.... Proof of them only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from the real issue, and to produce the impression that they were wretches whose lives were of no value to the community, and who were not entitled to the full benefit of the rules prescribed by law for the trial of human beings charged with crime involving the punishment of death.... [W]e are constrained to hold that ... those rules were not observed at the trial below. However depraved in character, and however full of crime their past lives may have been, the defendants were entitled to be tried upon competent evidence, and only for the offense charged.
Id. at 457-58, 12 S.Ct. at 295, 35 L.Ed. 1077. The rationale behind such a rule is self-explanatory. As one judge has said:
If I know a man has broken into my house and stolen my goods, I am for that reason more ready to believe him guilty of breaking into my neighbor’s house and committing the same crime there. We do not trust our property with a notorious thief. We cannot help suspecting a man of evil life and infamous character sooner than one who is known to be free from every taint of dishonesty or crime. We [283]*283naturally recoil with fear and loathing from a known murderer, and watch his conduct as we would the motions of a beast of prey.... This is human nature — the teaching of human experience.
State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 300 (1876) (Ladd, J., concurring).
Prior to these holdings and others, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts was allowed into courtroom proceedings apparently without limitation. Courts began excluding such evidence based on three principles: (1) the strong tendency to find the accused guilty of the charge merely because of his or her history of committing such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn the accused not because of guilt, but because he or she escaped punishment from previous offenses; and (3) the injustice of unfair surprise. See 1A John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 58.2, at 1215 (Tillers rev.1983). None of these policies pertain to parties other than the defendant.
A. Maryland Caselaw
This Court has had many opportunities to interpret the other crimes evidence rule and has consistently held that, in a criminal proceeding, it is a standard limited to acts committed by a defendant. We have never extended the use of this rule beyond the scope of a criminal defendant and we refuse to do so today. Most recently we said
that this rule means that evidence that the defendant committed other crimes or bad acts is not admissible unless it has special relevance....
The rationale underlying the exclusion of other crimes evidence is that a jury, confronted with evidence that a defendant committed another crime, may utilize improperly the evidence to conclude that the defendant is a “bad person” and, therefore, should be convicted of the charges for which he is on trial.
Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 316, 317, 718 A.2d 588, 592, 593 (1998) (emphasis added); see State v. Taylor, 347 Md. 363, 368, 369, 701 A.2d 389, 392, 392 (1997) (“Evidence of other [284]*284crimes or other bad acts committed by the accused is not admissible unless it has special relevance.... Underlying this rule is the concern that the jury will use the other crimes evidence to convict and punish the defendant for having a criminal disposition or to infer that he is more likely to have committed the crime for which he is on trial.” (emphasis added)); Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 560, 693 A.2d 781, 798 (1997) (noting that evidence of other crimes generally is inadmissible because it indicates that the accused probably committed the crime for which he or she is on trial); Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602, 630, 645 A.2d 22, 35 (1994) (“We have frequently enunciated the general rule that evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal acts may not be introduced to prove guilt of the offense for which the defendant is on trial.” (emphasis added)); Faulkner, 314 Md. at 633, 552 A.2d at 897 (“Generally, ‘evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal acts may not be introduced to prove that he is guilty of the offense for which he is on trial.’ Evidence of other crimes may tend to confuse the jurors, predispose them to a belief in the defendant’s guilt, or prejudice their minds against the defendant.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329, 333, 465 A.2d 1166, 1168 (1983))); Straughn, 297 Md. at 333, 465 A.2d at 1168-69 (“There are two reasons for the rule. First, if a jury considers a defendant’s prior criminal activity, it may decide to convict and punish him for having a criminal disposition. Second, a jury might infer that because the defendant has committed crimes in the past, he is more likely to have committed the crime for which he is being tried.” (emphasis added)); State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 238, 395 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1979) (“As a general rule, it is error to admit evidence of other offenses independent of the particular crime charged. The reason for the rule is obvious; such evidence may merely show bad character, improperly prejudice the jury, or unfairly surprise the accused in his defense at trial.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473, 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978) (“[Ejvidence which tends to show that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, [285]*285even one of the same type, is inadmissible.” (emphasis added)); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976) (“The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly elsewhere, is that in a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same type, is irrelevant and inadmissible.” (emphasis added)), quoted in McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 612, 375 A.2d 551, 556 (1977).
Every indication from the Maryland case law is that, in criminal proceedings, the other crimes evidence exclusionary rule is limited to crimes, wrongs, and acts committed by the defendant. This interpretation is bolstered by the intent behind this rule to ensure that an accused gets a fair trial free from undue prejudice and bias based on his or her past criminal history. To extend this rule of exclusion to parties other than the defendant broadens it beyond the type of prejudice that this rule was designed to prevent. In the case sub judice, evidence of other crimes committed by a witness may serve to impeach that witness’s testimony but it does not result in an unfair trial wherein a defendant may be punished for prior behavior. Clearly, this is not the type of prejudice that the other crimes evidence standard was designed to protect.
B. Maryland Rule 5-404(b)
Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, “Evidence,” became effective on July 1, 1994. Maryland Rule 5-404(b) served to codify the other crimes evidence rule expressed in Maryland caselaw and was derived from Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404(b). Maryland Rule 5-404 states:
(a) Character evidence generally. (1) In general. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
[286]*286(A) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of an accused offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(B) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(C) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness with regard to credibility, as provided in Rules 5-607, 5-608, and 5-609.
(2) Definitions. For purposes of subsections (a)(1)(A) and (B) of this Rule, “accused” means a defendant in a criminal case and a child alleged to be delinquent in an action in juvenile court, and for purposes of subsection (a)(1)(B), “crime” includes a delinquent act as defined by Code, Courts Article, § 3-801.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Maryland Rule 5-404(a) distinguishes the use of character evidence based on whether the character at issue is of the accused, the victim, or a witness. The State argues that because Maryland Rule 5-404(a) makes this classification, Rule 5-404(b), which uses the general term “person,” indicates that the Court of Appeals and the Rules Committee intended for this rule to apply to persons other than the defendant. We reject this argument.
In Wynn, 351 Md. 307, 718 A.2d 588, we had to consider the other crimes evidence standard outlined in Maryland caselaw in congruence with Maryland Rule 5-404(b). In that case we said, “Maryland Rule 5-404(b) ... excludes from introduction [287]*287at trial evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts to prove the character of the defendant in order to show that he or she acted in conformity with that character with regard to the offense with which he or she is charged.” Id. at 312, 718 A.2d at 590 (emphasis added). To expand the scope of this rule to include persons other than the defendant would turn the purpose of this rule on its head. Evidence of a witness’s past bad behavior, when the witness is not the defendant, does not imply that the defendant possesses a propensity to commit crime or a specific type of crime.
Because Maryland Rule 5 — 404(b) is derived from FRE 404(b), an analysis of how the federal courts have handled this issue is helpful. “We have indicated that [where the important language is the same], this Court will find persuasive the decisions of the Federal Courts construing the provisions of the Federal Rule from which the language of the Maryland Rule is taken.” Edmonds v. Lupton, 253 Md. 93, 99, 252 A.2d 71, 74 (1969); see Elmer v. State, 353 Md. 1, 11, 724 A.2d 625, 629 (1999) (noting that when a federal evidence rule contains the same language as a Maryland evidence rule, the Court may look to the former when interpreting the latter) (citing Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 716, 668 A.2d 8, 13-14 (1995)); Metropolitan Mortgage Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 27, 415 A.2d 582, 583 (1980) (same). “The courts of this State, however, are not bound by the holdings of a federal district court or of a federal circuit court of appeals.” Gayety Books, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 279 Md. 206, 213, 369 A.2d 581, 585 (1977).
Looking to the federal courts, we have found that our interpretation of Maryland Rule 5-404(b) is supported by a majority of federal court interpretations of FRE 404(b) on this issue. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has said:
[W]e believe the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant offers similar acts evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as when a prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword. The prosecution, in the Anglo-American tradition, [288]*288may not ordinarily offer evidence of a defendant’s prior wrongdoing for the purpose of persuading the jury that the defendant has a propensity for crime and is therefore likely to have committed the offense for which he stands trial. 1A Wigmore, Evidence § 58.2 (Tillers rev.1983). As Dean Wig-more points out, the evidence “is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but because it has too much.” Id. at 1212. Presumably, the “too much” argument means that a guilty person, and, of far more serious concern, an innocent person, may be convicted primarily because of the jury’s willingness to assume his present guilt from his prior misdeed. Wigmore also identifies objections based on the risk that the jury will convict because the defendant may not have been punished for his prior offenses and the injustice of requiring the defendant to defend against a series of accusations. Id. at 1215. These possibilities of prejudice must be assessed even in cases where the prosecutor offers similar acts evidence, not to prove the character of the accused, but to prove one of the permissible subsidiary facts listed in Rule 404(b), such as intent or plan, United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir.1980). However, risks of prejudice are normally absent when the defendant offers similar acts evidence of a third party to prove some fact pertinent to the defense. See People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 803, 103 S.Ct. 25, 74 L.Ed.2d 41 (1982); State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 388 A.2d 587 (1978). In such cases the only issue arising under Rule 404(b) is whether the evidence is relevant to the existence or non-existence of some fact pertinent to the defense.
United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911-12 (2d Cir.1984) (footnote omitted); see also United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 736 (1st Cir.1991) (referring to the co-defendants’ attempt to exclude another defendant’s prior crimes: “Objections based on Rule 404(b) may be raised only by the person whose ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts’ are attempted to be revealed.”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 955, 112 S.Ct. 2301, 119 L.Ed.2d 224 (1992); United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, [289]*2891404 (3d Cir.1991) (“ ‘It is well established that a defendant may use similar “other crimes” evidence defensively if in reason it tends, alone or with other evidence, to negate his guilt of the crime charged against him.’” (quoting State v. Williams, 214 N.J.Super. 12, 20, 518 A.2d 234, 238 (App.Div.1986))); United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir.) (“In [a] conspiracy case, evidence of crimes, wrongs or acts by coconspirators is admissible and such proof ordinarily does not raise any Rule 404(b) question.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 543, 107 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989); United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (11th Cir.) (“Rule 404(b) deals only with acts committed by the defendant himself, not with crimes committed by other members of the conspiracy. The purpose of the rule is to prevent the jury from considering evidence that the defendant has, at other times, committed bad acts to convict him of the charged offense.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3192, 105 L.Ed.2d 701 (1989); United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 583 (1st Cir.) (“Rule 404(b) does not exclude evidence of prior crimes of persons other than the defendant.”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989, 108 S.Ct. 510, 98 L.Ed.2d 508 (1987); United States v. Sepulveda, 710 F.2d 188, 189 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that admission of evidence pursuant to FRE 404(b) deals only with acts by the defendant individually); United States v. Morano, 697 F.2d 923, 926 (11th Cir.1983) (“Rule 404(b) does not specifically apply to exclude this evidence because it involves an extraneous offense committed by someone other than the defendant. The evidence was not introduced ‘to show that the defendant has a criminal disposition and that he can be expected to act in conformity therewith,’ so the policies underlying Rule 404(b) are inapplicable.”); 4 United States v. Edwards, 696 F.2d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir.) (noting that FRE 404(b) is not applicable to offenses not [290]*290committed by defendant), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 108 S.Ct. 1884, 76 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983); United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1333 (5th Cir.1981) (“When ... the extrinsic offense was not committed by the defendant, the evidence will not tend to show that the defendant has a criminal disposition and that he can be expected to act in conformity therewith. When the evidence will not impugn the defendant’s character, the policies underlying Rule 404(b) are inapplicable. It would seem, therefore, that when extrinsic offense evidence is sought to be introduced ... in order to trigger the application of Rule 404(b) there must be an allegation that the extrinsic offense was committed by the defendant.”); United States v. Bates, 600 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir.1979) (noting that FRE 404(b) does not apply to acts and backgrounds of co-conspirators because they are not evidence of crimes committed by the defendant individually); United States v. Kelley, 545 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir.1976) (explaining that FRE 404(b) applies only to evidence concerning other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts of an accused in a criminal proceeding), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 1555, 51 L.Ed.2d 777 (1977).5
Several states have made similar interpretations of then-other crimes evidence statutes. Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919 (“[T]he test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must [be] decide[d] ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“[W]hen offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563, 467 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1984) (“When a defendant offers exculpatory evidence ... prejudice ceases to be a factor, and relevance should function as the admissibility standard.”); Garfole, 76 N.J. at 452-53, 388 A.2d at 591 (“[W]hen the defendant is offering [other crimes evidence] [291]*291exculpatorily, prejudice to the defendant is no longer a factor, and simple relevance to guilt or innocence should suffice as the standard of admissibility, since ordinarily ... an accused is entitled to advance in his defense any evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt or buttress his innocence of the charge made.”); State v. Dreher, 302 N.J.Super. 408, 456-57, 695 A.2d 672, 695 (App.Div.) (“ ‘[0]ther crimes’ evidence about a State’s witness is often admitted when offered by criminal defendants for exculpatory reasons.”), cert. denied, 152 N.J. 10, 702 A.2d 349 (1997); Williams, 214 N.J.Super. at 20, 518 A.2d at 238 (“It is well established that a defendant may use similar ‘other crimes’ evidence defensively if in reason it tends, alone or with other evidence, to negate his guilt of the crime charged against him.”).
The majority rule for the interpretation of FRE 404(b) and of individual states other crimes evidence statutes, is that when evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by a third party is proffered by the defendant, the risks of prejudice against the defendant normally are not present. Thus, such evidence does not fall under the exclusionary provision of Rule 404(b). We hold that the same interpretation shall be given to Maryland Rule 5-404(b).
Evidence that Mr. Pitman was robbed by Kelly Dillon within hours of Tracy Dillon’s alleged rape and petitioner’s beating may have been relevant to petitioner’s defense, particularly when coupled with Tracy Dillon’s inconsistent statements concerning her brother’s identity and petitioner’s missing money and lottery tickets. This information was all related to petitioner’s defense that he was the victim of a robbery at the hands of Kelly Dillon and that Tracy Dillon had falsely accused him of rape to cover for her brother’s involvement in the Pitman robbery and the assault and robbery of petitioner.
Although the evidence petitioner wanted to present did not directly point towards someone else committing the crime, it does provide a theory of the case that attempts to exculpate him. He alleges that he was approached, attacked, rendered [292]*292unconscious, and awoke to a charge of rape. His evidence— (1) that one of the men who assaulted him had committed a robbery the night of the assault; (2) that this man was the brother of the alleged rape victim; (3) that the alleged rape victim lied as to the identity of her brother in an effort to conceal his criminal activity; and (4) that petitioner was missing two five dollar bills and two lottery tickets when he woke up in the hospital — paints a different story than the one presented by the State. Petitioner was denied an opportunity to fully present this theory of the case and fully mount a defense to the accusations against him. The refusal to allow evidence of Tyrone Pitman’s accusation against one of the State’s key witnesses was based on the trial judge’s erroneous interpretation of the law of other crimes evidence. It should not have been suppressed on other crimes evidence grounds.
C. Impeachment of Witnesses
Additionally, the heart of petitioner’s argument was that both Tracy and Kelly Dillon lied to conceal criminal activity committed by Kelly Dillon. Independent of our analysis of other crimes evidence, the evidence of Tracy Dillon’s reaction to Mr. Pitman’s statement was admissible on cross-examination because it was probative of her motive to lie. Petitioner should also have been allowed to bring in this evidence in order to impeach the credibility of Dillon. Maryland Rule 5 — 616(b)(3) states:
Extrinsic evidence of bias, prejudice, interest, or other motive to testify falsely may be admitted whether or not the witness has been examined about the impeaching fact and has failed to admit it.
Under Maryland law, a witness may be impeached by cross-examination to show that the witness previously made inconsistent statements. “To impeach a witness by a prior inconsistent statement, a proper foundation must be laid. When using a previously made oral statement for impeachment, the cross-examiner must inform the witness of the time and place the statement was made, the person to whom it was made, and its substance.” Bane v. State, 73 Md.App. 135, 155, 533 A.2d 309, [293]*293319 (1987) (citations omitted); see also Hankins v. State, 80 Md.App. 647, 657, 565 A.2d 686, 691 (1989). Implied in this rule of law is that the facts and circumstances surrounding the inconsistent statements need to be made known to the trier of fact. This is because a trier of fact is not obliged to believe all that it hears, Phelps v. Goldberg, 270 Md. 694, 705, 313 A.2d 683, 689 (1974), and is free to believe only a portion of the evidence of each side, Racine v. Wheeler, 245 Md. 139, 144, 225 A.2d 444, 447 (1967) (citing Maryland Chem. Co. v. Monn, 241 Md. 127, 215 A.2d 731 (1966)). Stated otherwise, it may believe or disbelieve, credit or disregard, any evidence introduced, and a reviewing court may not decide on appeal how much weight must be given to each item of evidence. Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Schruefer, 34 Md.App. 706, 725, 369 A.2d 118, 129 (1977). Without knowledge of the facts surrounding Tracy Dillon’s inconsistent statements the trier of fact in the case sub judice had no opportunity to assess her credibility.
In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the United States Supreme Court recognized that
[cjross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.... [T]he cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness. One way of discrediting the witness is to introduce evidence of a prior criminal conviction of that witness.... A more particular attack on the witness’ credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is “always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.”
Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (quoting 3A Wigmore, supra, § 940, at 775 (Chadbourn rev.1970)). Pursuant to this rationale, petitioner should have been allowed to [294]*294introduce the surrounding facts and circumstances concerning Tracy Dillon’s inconsistent statements and introduce his theory of the case. The proffered evidence certainly was probative of both Tracy and Kelly Dillon’s motive to testify falsely. If petitioner’s version of the story was true, clearly Tracy and Kelly Dillon had bias, prejudice, interest, or other motive to testify falsely.
Petitioner’s theory of the case is that he was robbed and beaten by Kelly Dillon, and, in an effort to protect her brother, Tracy Dillon fabricated the charge of rape. Considerable weight is added to this defense when Tracy Dillon’s inconsistent statements to police about the identity of the men who attacked petitioner are coupled with the proffered evidence that on the same night, in the same general area, Kelly Dillon committed another robbery and Tracy Dillon lied about her brother’s identity with respect to that crime. Because the basis of petitioner’s defense rests on Tracy and Kelly Dillon’s credibility, the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the Pitman robbery that was clearly admissible under Maryland Rule 5 — 616(b)(3).
III. Conclusion
We hold that the test for admitting other crimes evidence in criminal proceedings enunciated in Faulkner generally does not apply to crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by someone other than a criminal defendant. The other crimes evidence rule is a court-created standard designed to ensure that a defendant is tried for the crime for which he or she is on trial and to prevent a conviction based on reputation or propensity to commit crimes, rather than the facts of the case. Because this rule is premised upon protecting an accused from undue prejudice, it does not apply'to exclude other crimes evidence involving alleged actions by others testifying in the criminal proceedings. This is especially so when the evidence is crucial to the defense in a criminal proceeding and concerns impeachment of a witness with a possible prejudice, bias, interest, or motive to falsely testify. Accordingly, we reverse the decision [295]*295of the Court of Special Appeals and vacate the judgment of the circuit court.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.
RODOWSKY, RAKER, and WILNER, JJ., dissent.