Sessions v. County of Columbia

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 23, 2026
• Docket: 24-5284
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT W. SESSIONS, No. 24-5284 D.C. No. 3:23-cv-01108-SI Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

COUNTY OF COLUMBIA, Columbia County Counsel; VICTORIA WALTON, Child Support Enforcement; LONDA NELSON, Columbia County Employee,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

DAWN M. HUNT, Columbia County Chief Legal Counsel, BRIAN PIXLEY, Columbia County Sheriff, ALAN HAEBE, Civil Officer, TERRI ETTER, Document and Evidence Columbia County Sheriff, JEAN MARTWICK, Columbia County Family Law Judge, DAVE PEABODY, Columbia County Sheriff, RHONDA BOYD, Columbia County Sherrif,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 18, 2026**

Before: CALLAHAN, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Robert W. Sessions appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his action alleging violations of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act

(“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo. Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253,

1259 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Sessions

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants disclosed

his information for a purpose not permitted under the DPPA. See 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2724(a) (providing a civil cause of action against “[a] person who knowingly

obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a

purpose not permitted under this chapter”), 2721(b) (permitting disclosure of

personal information for “use by any government agency, including any court or

law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions . . .”); Benavidez v. County of

San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2021) (setting forth elements of a

failure-to-train claim).

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 24-5284 The district court did not abuse its discretion in construing Sessions’s

“objections to magistrate orders” as motions for reconsideration and denying them,

because the orders to which Sessions objected were not issued by a magistrate

judge, and Sessions failed to establish grounds for reconsideration. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72 (governing involvement of magistrate judges in civil matters); Sch. Dist.

No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th

Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)).

Because Sessions did not set forth “specific[] and distinct[]” arguments in

his opening brief regarding how the district court purportedly erred with respect to

any non-DPPA claims or its discovery rulings, we do not consider these issues.

See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003)

(explaining that “we cannot manufacture arguments for an appellant and therefore

we will not consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s

opening brief,” and emphasizing that “[a] bare assertion of an issue does not

preserve a claim” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We do not

consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-5284