Service Electric Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Hazleton

462 F. Supp. 2d 616, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44203, 2005 WL 2020452
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 27, 2005
DocketCiv.A. 3:04-CV-622
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 462 F. Supp. 2d 616 (Service Electric Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Hazleton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Service Electric Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Hazleton, 462 F. Supp. 2d 616, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44203, 2005 WL 2020452 (M.D. Pa. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

CAPUTO, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Service Electric’s Motion For Summary *618 Judgment and Permanent Injunction. (Doc. 38.1.) Plaintiffs motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The motion will be granted insofar as Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the.exclusive.franchise right to operate a cable television system within the municipal boundaries of Defendant City of Hazleton, currently held by Plaintiff, remains valid. The motion will also be granted insofar as Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction preventing Defendant from implementing any franchise that is inconsistent with the exclusivity of the franchise currently held by Plaintiff. The motion will be denied in all other respects. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Service Electric is a Pennsylvania corporation that operates a cable television system within the municipal boundaries of Defendant City of Hazleton. (Doc. 38.2 ¶ 1; Doc. 40 ¶ 1.) On September 14, 1987, Defendant enacted Ordinance No. 87-22, granting an exclusive franchise to Service Electric to operate a cable television system within Defendant’s municipal boundaries. (Doc. 38.2 ¶ 2; Doc. 40 ¶ 2.) Ordinance No. 87-22 provides that: “[w]hen this Ordinance shall have been accepted by the Company, such Ordinance and acceptance shall constitute a contract between [Defendant] and [Plaintiff] for all use, services, and purposes set forth in this Ordinance.” (Doc. 38.2 ¶ 4; Doc. 40 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff accepted Ordinance No. 87-22, and it became a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. (Doc. 38.2 ¶ 5; Doc. 40 ¶2.) This contract remains in effect. (Id.) On May 27, 2004, Defendant granted a non-exclusive franchise to Nu-Net, Inc. (“NuNet”), another cable operator, to operate a cable television system within Defendant’s municipal boundaries. (Doc. 38.2 ¶ 6; Doc. 40 ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff initiated this civil action on March 23, 2004. (Doc. 1.) On August 16, 2004, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 26.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction. (Doc. 38.1.) The matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Crv. P. 56(c). A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue of material fact is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment in which it seeks a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction. While not expressly stated, Plaintiff apparently seeks to have the Court issue a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that: (1) the *619 exclusive franchise right to operate a cable television system within 'Defendant’s municipal boundaries, currently held by Plaintiff, remains valid; and (2) Defendant’s award of a cable television franchise to NuNet was invalid. (Doc. 38.1 at 1.) In addition, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from implementing the cable television franchise improperly granted to NuNet. (Id.)

1) Exclusive Franchise

It is undisputed that when Plaintiff accepted Ordinance No. 87-22, it became a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. (Doc. 38.2 ¶ 5; Doc. 40 ¶ 2.) The parties do not dispute that the contract gave Plaintiff the exclusive right to maintain a cable television system within Defendant’s municipal boundaries. (Doc. 38.2 ¶ 2; Doc. 40 ¶ 2.) However, the parties dispute the effect that the passage of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (“1992 Cable Act”), 47 U.S.C. §§ 521, et seq., had on the contract at issue. Plaintiff argues that despite the passage of the 1992 Cable Act, the exclusivity provision of the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant remains fully enforceable. The Court agrees.

Plaintiff first argues that the 1992 Cable Act does not apply retroactively. Specifically at issue is 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), which states in part:

A franchising authority may award, in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter, 1 or more franchises within its jurisdiction; except that a franchising authority may not grant an exclusive franchise and may not unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive franchise.

In the Memorandum issued on August 16, 2004, the Court held that § 541(a)(1) does not apply retroactively. (Doc. 26 at 5.) In doing so, the Court referred to the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in James Cable Partners v. City of Jamestown, 43 F.3d 277 (6th Cir.1995), wherein it was stated that “[i]f Congress wished section [541(a)(1) ] to invalidate preexisting franchise rights, it could easily have said so.” Id. at 280.

Plaintiff further argues that § 541(a)(1) did not preempt Ordinance No. 87-22. In its previous Memorandum, the Court noted' that the doctrine of preemption only applies if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law. (Doc. 26 at 9.) The Court further noted that because § 541(a)(1) does not apply retroactively, there is no conflict. (Id.) As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in James Cable Partners, “[Section 541(a)(1) ] prohibits only the granting of exclusive contracts, not the enforcement of ones granted previous to its enactment.” James Cable Partners, 43 F.3d at 281. Therefore, § 541(a)(1) did not preempt Ordinance No. 87-22.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the provisions of the contract that anticipate a change in law do not invalidate the exclusivity provision. This too was already decided in the Court’s previous Memorandum. (See Doc.

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462 F. Supp. 2d 616, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44203, 2005 WL 2020452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/service-electric-cablevision-inc-v-city-of-hazleton-pamd-2005.