Serie H. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 # 2 |# 3 | # 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 SERIE H., No. SACV 24-2777-AGR 10 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND V. ORDER 12 13 14| FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social 15S | Security, 16 7 Defendant. 18 19 Plaintiff" filed this action on December 23, 2024. The parties filed 20 briefs on the disputed issues. The court has taken the matter under 21 submission without oral argument. 22 Having reviewed the entire file, the court affirms the decision of the 23 |Commissioner. 24 |———_—_——_——————_. 1! Plaintiff's name has been partially redacted in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration 26 |and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 27 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to proceed before the 0g magistrate judge. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 7).

1 I. 2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 3 Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and 4 supplemental security income on May 21, 2015, and alleged an onset date 5 of April 1, 2013. Administrative Record (“AR”) 16, 248-52, 253-61. The 6 applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 160-64, 7 167-72. After a hearing on November 14, 2017, an Administrative Law 8 Judge (“ALJ”) issued an unfavorable decision on January 24, 2018. AR 12- 9 38, 39-76. The Appeals Council denied review on January 10, 2019. AR 1- 10 6. 11 On August 18, 2020, this Court remanded the matter to the 12 Commissioner for further proceedings. AR 905-13. On remand, a different 13 ALJ held a second hearing at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert 14 testified. AR 826-66. The ALJ denied benefits on August 15, 2023, and the 15 Appeals Council denied review on October 31, 2024. AR 789-96, 797-825. 16 This action followed. 17 II. 18 STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court has authority to review the 20 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 21 474 (2019). The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by 22 substantial evidence, or if it is based upon the application of improper legal 23 standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 24 curiam). 25 “Substantial evidence” means “‘more than a mere scintilla.’” Biestek v. 26 Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citation omitted). “It means – and means 27 only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 28 adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (citation omitted). In determining 1 w hether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision, 2 t he court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering 3 a dverse as well as supporting evid ence. When the evidence is susceptible 4 to more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer to the 5 Commissioner’s decision. Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 6 2016). 7 III. 8 DISCUSSION 9 A. Disability 10 A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, 11 “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity 12 that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his 13 age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 14 substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Barnhart v. 15 Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-22 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 16 B. The ALJ’s Findings 17 The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirement 18 through March 31, 2017. AR 802. Following the five-step sequential 19 analysis applicable to disability determinations, Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 20 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006),3 the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe 21 impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, chronic pain 22 syndrome, diabetic peripheral neuropathy, right shoulder impingement 23 syndrome, status-post left carpal tunnel release, and obesity. AR 803. 24 Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or medically equal the severity of a listed 25 26 3 The five-step sequential analysis examines whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity, whether the claimant’s impairment is severe, whether 27 the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work, and whether the claimant is able to do any 28 1 i mpairment. AR 806. 2 The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 3 ( “RFC”) to perform less than the fu ll range of light work. She could lift and/or 4 carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. She could sit, 5 stand and/or walk for six hours out of an eight-hour workday with normal 6 breaks. She could perform postural activities occasionally. She could not 7 crawl and could not climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds. She could not work 8 at unprotected heights and could not drive a motor vehicle. She could 9 frequently reach overhead with the right upper extremity and could 10 frequently perform fine and gross manipulation bilaterally. AR 806-7. 11 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work 12 as an accounting clerk. AR 813. Alternatively, the ALJ found that there are 13 jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she could 14 perform, such as cashier II, price marker, and hotel clerk. AR 814-15. 15 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability 16 since April 1, 2013, the alleged onset date, through August 15, 2023, the 17 date of the ALJ’s decision. AR 815. 18 C. Residual Functional Capacity 19 The RFC assessment measures the claimant’s capacity to engage in 20 basic work activities. Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471 (1986); Burch 21 v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). The RFC is a determination 22 of “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” 23 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). Although the RFC assessment 24 is ultimately the ALJ’s responsibility, it must be supported by substantial 25 evidence. Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th 26 Cir. 2015); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 The ALJ must “set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary 28 support for his interpretation of the medical evidence.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 1 F .3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999). 2 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s RFC assessment on two grounds. First, 3 s he argues that the ALJ’s finding th at she could perform frequent 4 manipulative activities was based on the ALJ’s own lay interpretation of the 5 medical evidence rather than on a supporting medical opinion. Second, she 6 contends that the ALJ’s determination that she could stand and walk for six 7 hours in an eight-hour workday was inconsistent with the medical evidence 8 of record. As discussed below, neither argument warrants remand. 9 1. Manipulative Limitations 10 The ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff could perform frequent fine 11 and gross manipulation bilaterally. In formulating the RFC, the ALJ 12 considered the objective medical evidence in the record, treatment history, 13 and medical opinion evidence related to Plaintiff’s upper-extremity 14 limitations. 15 Plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS). In 16 May 2017, electromyography and nerve conduction velocity (“EMG/NCV”) 17 testing revealed severe CTS on the left and moderate CTS on the right, as 18 well as left ulnar neuropathy at the elbow. AR 777. Plaintiff underwent left 19 carpal tunnel release surgery in July 2017, after which her left-sided 20 symptoms completely resolved. AR 772, 833. In the years that followed, 21 Plaintiff made intermittent complaints of right-hand pain, but the record does 22 not reflect ongoing treatment, referrals, or additional diagnostic testing 23 related to CTS. AR 771, 777. Orthopedic examinations in 2020 and 2023 24 made little mention of upper-extremity complaints or abnormalities. AR 25 1332-56, 1406-15, 2355. The only subsequent objective evaluation of 26 Plaintiff’s CTS occurred at the October 2022 consultative examination, which 27 found no evidence of CTS. AR 1480. Tinel’s and Phalen’s signs were 28 negative, and Plaintiff demonstrated intact strength with normal muscle tone 1 a nd bulk in both hands. AR 1479-80. Although grip strength on the right 2 w as slightly reduced, the examiner attributed that finding to likely 3 s ubmaximal effort. AR 1480. The examiner concluded that Plaintiff had no 4 manipulative limitations. AR 1481. State Agency medical consultants 5 likewise concluded that Plaintiff had no manipulative limitations.4 AR 104, 6 129. Considering the totality of this evidence, the ALJ reasonably concluded 7 that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform frequent manipulation 8 bilaterally. AR 806-13. 9 Plaintiff nevertheless argues that the RFC is erroneous because it 10 does not correspond to a specific medical opinion. This argument is 11 unpersuasive. The RFC determination is an administrative finding reserved 12 to the Commissioner, and it need not precisely mirror the language of a 13 medical opinion so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. See 14 Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006 (noting RFC is ALJ’s responsibility); Estep v. 15 Colvin, 2016 WL 6988698, at *9 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“[A]n ALJ may synthesize 16 and translate assessed limitations into an RFC assessment … without 17 repeating each functional limitation verbatim in the RFC assessment or 18 hypothetical.”). 19 To the extent Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly relied on his own 20 lay interpretation of the medical evidence in assessing the RFC, that 21 argument likewise fails. Plaintiff identifies no ambiguity, inconsistency, or 22 evidentiary gap that triggered the ALJ’s duty to further develop the record 23 and obtain additional medical opinion, nor does she point to any objective 24 evidence supporting greater manipulative limitations that those assessed. 25 See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2011) (duty to 26

27 4 Plaintiff’s treating physician assessed more restrictive manipulative limitations. AR 768. But the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons to reject that opinion, and 28 1 d evelop record arises only when evidence is ambiguous or inadequate). 2 U pon independent review of the record, the court notes that the only 3 o bjective evidence of CTS not expr essly reviewed by a medical expert was 4 the May 2017 EMG/NCV study showing moderate right-sided CTS. The 5 record contains years of subsequent medical evidence reflecting no 6 additional treatment or objective abnormalities related to CTS, as well as a 7 normal upper-extremity physical examination by the consultative examiner in 8 2022. Under these circumstances, the evidence was not so ambiguous or 9 incomplete as to require further development of the record. See Farlow v. 10 Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 488 (9th Cir. 2022) (recognizing ALJs are capable, at 11 some level, of independently reviewing and forming conclusions about 12 medical evidence). Plaintiff has not shown error. 13 2. Standing/Walking Limitations 14 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that she could stand and/or walk 15 for six hours in an eight-hour workday was inconsistent with the medical 16 evidence relating to her knee impairment and obesity, and that she should 17 have been limited to sedentary work. Even assuming the ALJ erred in 18 assessing Plaintiff’s standing and walking capacity, any such error was 19 harmless. The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work 20 as an accounting clerk, which is sedentary work both as generally performed 21 and as actually performed. AR 813. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff were 22 limited to sedentary work, the ALJ still would have found her not disabled. 23 See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting harmless 24 error principles apply in Social Security context); see also Gopher v. Colvin, 25 572 Fed. Appx. 478, 479 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding harmless error when 26 claimant could do sedentary work despite erroneous standing/walking 27 assessment). 28 1 ORDER 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is 3 | affirmed and that judgment be entered for Defendant. 4 5

DATED: December 30, 2025 8 ALICIA G. ROSENBERG 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28