Sergio Tandoc v. Board of Trustees, Etc.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: January 7, 2026
• Docket: A-3554-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3554-23

SERGIO TANDOC,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

Respondent-Respondent. __________________________

Argued December 16, 2025 – Decided January 7, 2026

Before Judges Susswein and Chase.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, PFRS No. xx8271.

Thomas A. Cushane (Cushane, Attorney at Law, S.P.) argued the cause for appellant.

Thomas R. Hower, Staff Attorney, argued the cause for respondent (Thomas R. Hower, on the brief.)

PER CURIAM Sergio Tandoc appeals from a final agency decision by the Board of

Trustees ("Board") of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System denying his

application for accidental disability benefits. We affirm.

I.

Tandoc served as a Cinnaminson Township police officer for eighteen

years. On November 15, 2017, during Tandoc's regularly scheduled patrol shift,

Cinnaminson Police received information regarding a vehicle that had been

stolen the night before. Officers were informed that the victim's nephew had

stolen the vehicle and was exhibiting suicidal ideation.

While stopped at a traffic light, Tandoc saw the stolen vehicle in a

neighboring lane. He verified the vehicle's make, model, and registration and

notified dispatch that he intended to initiate a car stop. When the light turned

green, the vehicle sped away at high rate of speed, refusing to stop even after

Tandoc activated his emergency lights. A high-speed pursuit ensued, with the

stolen vehicle traveling approximately sixty to seventy miles per hour and

almost crashing multiple times.

As the pursuit continued, Tandoc was joined by another officer.

Eventually, the stolen vehicle turned onto Route 130 South, entered the shoulder

to avoid traffic, and sped through a red light. At the next intersection, the vehicle

A-3554-23 2 abruptly veered right, crashed into a telephone pole, bounced off, and collided

into the rear of a tractor trailer. The car became lodged underneath the trailer.

Tandoc approached the passenger's side while his colleague approached

on the driver's side. Tandoc identified two unconscious occupants—a male

driver and a teenage female passenger. He broke the passenger side window

with his baton and, after discerning a weak pulse, cut her seatbelt. However,

because the dashboard was pinning the passenger in, Tandoc was unable to

remove her from the vehicle. He then stepped back to allow the EMTs to do

their job, but the passenger was pronounced dead at the scene.

Immediately thereafter, Tandoc told his superior officers that he felt

responsible for the young girl's death and later testified "[i]f I never saw the

vehicle[,] they never would have ran and she would still be alive today." With

his employer's assistance, Tandoc filed for workers' compensation.

While out of work, Tandoc began seeing a psychologist, Michael Collis,

Ph.D. Tandoc testified he was experiencing depression, anxiety, frustration,

nightmares, moodiness, sleeplessness, and anger. Assessments conducted by

Dr. Collis indicate that Tandoc was suffering from severe depression, anxiety,

and post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). Over the course of twenty-five

sessions—between November 30, 2017, and July 24, 2018—Dr. Collis noted

A-3554-23 3 Tandoc's progress in treatment as "limited" or "unchanged" after every session.

When Tandoc's workers' compensation treatment ran out, he was discharged

from Dr. Collis's care; however, Tandoc did not feel comfortable resuming

police work.

Tandoc then received three additional evaluations: (1) John McGowan,

Ph.D., in February 2018, diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and

depressive symptomology; (2) Michael Glass, M.D., in April 2019, diagnosed

PTSD that "will never be resolved sufficiently[;]" and (3) Robin Kay, Ph.D., in

June 2019, who Tandoc had previously been seeing for mental-health issues

prior to the incident, diagnosed PTSD. Further, in July 2019, Tandoc was seen

by the Board's psychologist Daniel LoPreto, Ph.D., who concurred with the

diagnosis of PTSD and concluded Tandoc was totally and permanently disabled.

Dr. LoPreto opined that Tandoc's disability was preexisting and exacerbated by

the incident.

Tandoc never returned to work in any capacity and applied for accidental

disability benefits in October 2018. The Board denied Tandoc's application for

accidental disability and instead awarded him ordinary disability. 1 As the basis

1 For context, accidental disability benefits provide two-thirds of annual compensation whereas ordinary disability provides for approximately forty

A-3554-23 4 for denial, the Board found that the incident was not "objectively capable of

causing a reasonable person in similar circumstances to suffer a disabling mental

injury[.]"

In March 2020, the Board approved Tandoc's request for an appeal and

this matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested

case. An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing on four non-

consecutive days and issued an initial decision denying Tandoc's application for

accidental disability. The ALJ found Tandoc had PTSD as a direct result of the

incident and was totally and permanently disabled; however, failed to meet the

objective standard for a terrifying or horror-inducing event. Thus, the ALJ

denied Tandoc's application for failure to satisfy the Patterson2 standard. On

June 11, 2024, the Board issued a final agency decision adopting the ALJ's initial

decision and denying Tandoc's application for accidental disability.

This appeal follows.

percent. See Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 193 n.2 (2007). 2 Patterson v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29 (2008). A-3554-23 5 II.

"Our review of administrative action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of Trs.,

Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re Herrmann, 192

N.J. 19, 27 (2007)); see also Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.,

143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995); McKnight v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 476 N.J. Super.

154, 162 (App. Div. 2023). "An agency's determination on the merits 'will be

sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Saccone v. Bd. of Trs.,

Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo, 206 N.J.

at 27).

We are mindful that, even insofar as we may have reached a different

result, substantial deference is afforded to an Agency's interpretation of a statute

it is charged with enforcing. Richardson, 192 N.J. at 196; see also Kasper v.

Bd. of Trs., of the Teacher's Pension & Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564, 580-81

(2000). Importantly, "[s]uch deference has been specifically extended to state

agencies that administer pension statutes." Piatt v. Bd. of Trs., Police &

Firemen's Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015). As such, our

review of an agency's decision is generally limited to:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies . . . ; (2) whether the record

A-3554-23 6 contains substantial evidence to support the [agency's] findings . . . ; and (3) whether[,] in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Allstars Auto Group, Inc. v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2007)) (alteration in original).]

III.

The Board determined Tandoc did not qualify for accidental disability

benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7. In relevant part, the statute reads:

(1) Upon the written application by a member in service, by one acting in his behalf or by his employer any member may be retired on an accidental disability retirement allowance; provided, that the medical board, after a medical examination of such member, shall certify that the member is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties and that such disability was not the result of the member's willful negligence and that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duty and of any other available duty in the department which his employer is willing to assign to him.

[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1).]

Therefore, to obtain accidental disability benefits, an applicant has the burden

of proving:

A-3554-23 7 1. that [they] are permanently and totally disabled;

2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is

a. identifiable as to time and place,

b. undesigned and unexpected, and

c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of a pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);

3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of [their] regular or assigned duties;

4. that the disability was not the result of [their] willful negligence; and

5. that [they are] mentally or physically incapacitated from performing [their] usual or any other duty.

[Richardson, 192 N.J. at 212-13.]

Moreover, our Supreme Court has clarified that where an application for

accidental disability is proffered on the basis of an injury "precipitated by an

exclusively mental stressor[,]" as here, the applicant must first prove: (1) that

the disability "result[ed] from direct personal experience of a terrifying or

horror-inducing event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury,

or a similarly serious threat to the physical integrity of the [applicant] or another

person[;]" and (2) the incident asserted as the basis for accidental disability

benefits must be "objectively capable of causing a reasonable person in similar

A-3554-23 8 circumstances to suffer a disabling mental injury." Patterson, 194 N.J. at 50;

see also Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 612 (1993) (emphasizing

that an objective standard focuses the analysis on the character of an event and

not an individual's reaction to the event). Thus, in cases regarding applications

for accidental disability based on a purely psychological disability, "Patterson

is the threshold that must be met for further inquiry to be warranted" and once

Patterson is satisfied, then "Richardson comes into play." Russo, 206 N.J. at 32.

Tandoc's contention that incidents involving deaths, in and of themselves,

satisfy the objective standard is unavailing. In Russo, the Supreme Court held

"a qualifying traumatic event is, in itself, objectively capable of causing a

reasonable person to suffer permanent mental injury." Russo, 206 N.J. at 18-19.

However, Tandoc's reliance on Russo is misplaced. It cannot be gleaned from

Russo that incidents involving deaths are per se terrifying or horror -inducing;

instead, Russo establishes a three-prong test: (1) a terrifying or horror-inducing

event; (2) that involves actual or threatened death or serious bodily injury; which

(3) is objectively capable of causing a similarly situated reasonable person to

suffer a disabling mental injury. Russo, 206 N.J. at 30-31. Although the Russo

Court clarified that horror-inducing events can satisfy the objective standard,

A-3554-23 9 the Court did not hold that incidents involving deaths automatically qualify as

horror-inducing.

Citing to Mount v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402

(2018), Tandoc further contends motor vehicle accidents involving fatalities

qualify as terrifying or horror-inducing events. In Mount, an officer who arrived

at a car crash scene where "the car burst into flames[]" and the victim's bodies

"melted . . . into the interior of the vehicle[,]" satisfied the terrifying or horror -

inducing standard. Id. at 427-28 (internal quotations omitted). While we

recognize that Mount is somewhat analogous—insofar as both officers

witnessed a death and were helpless to render aid—the factual circumstances of

Mount, wherein three young women were engulfed in flames, is significantly

more gruesome and horrifying than the facts here. As the ALJ found, the

deceased passenger here "was not bloody or screaming or dismembered."

Tandoc's accidental disability application was denied because,

notwithstanding the Board's finding that the November 15, 2017 incident

resulted in the undisputed manifestation of PTSD, the incident was not capable

of causing the same psychological manifestation in similarly situated police

officers. "[W]e limit accidental disability recovery to stressors sufficient to

inflict a disabling injury when experienced by a reasonable person in similar

A-3554-23 10 circumstances." Patterson, 194 N.J. at 50. In rendering its decision, the Board

relied on the following facts: (1) the deceased passenger was alive when Tandoc

was caring for her at the scene; (2) although Tandoc ordered oxygen for the

deceased, he became uninvolved once paramedics arrived, and she did not die

in his care; and (3) there was no gore or blood at the scene.

In our review, we must remain cognizant of the Legislature's intent to

"make the process more stringent" when the accidental disability criteria were

amended. Department of the Treasury, Division of Pensions and Benefits,

Administrative Code Update—Honorable Service; Disability Retirement, at 4

(Aug. 2016); see also Russo, 206 N.J. at 31 (discussing the objective standard

and stating "[w]e adopted that standard to assure the bona fides of claimed

mental injuries and to ameliorate the problem of subjectivity inherent in mental

claims."). The incident, for as unfortunate as the death of the young woman

undoubtably was, is not distinct from severe motor vehicle accidents, some of

which result in casualties, that officers of this State frequently deal with. As

such, and without facts more substantially analogous to Mount, a fatal accident,

in and of itself, cannot be said to satisfy the objective standard.

We are satisfied that the Board's final determination relied on substantial

credible evidence in the record and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. In view

A-3554-23 11 of the deferential standard of review, we decline to substitute our judgment for

the judgement of the ALJ and Board. Further, because Tandoc failed to satisfy

Patterson, an analysis under Richardson is not warranted.

Affirmed.

A-3554-23 12