Sergio Rendon v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
This text of Sergio Rendon v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Sergio Rendon v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Sergio Rendon, No. CV-22-00570-PHX-JAT
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 14 Defendant. 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Sergio Rendon’s Motion for Attorney Fees 16 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and Memorandum in support thereof. (Docs. 23, 24). The 17 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) filed a response 18 indicating it “neither supports nor opposes counsel’s request.” (Doc. 25 at 2). The Court 19 now rules. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 The Commissioner initially denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, and Plaintiff filed 22 this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. 1 at 2, 4). The 23 parties filed a Stipulated Motion to Voluntarily Remand the case for further proceedings, 24 and stipulated that Plaintiff be awarded $4,722.50 under the Equal Access to Justice Act 25 (“EAJA”). (Doc. 18; Doc. 21). Pursuant to those stipulations, the Court: (1) reversed the 26 Commissioner’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, and (2) awarded Plaintiff 27 $4,722.50 in fees. (Doc. 19; Doc. 20 (Clerk of the Court entered judgment); Doc. 22). 28 On remand, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found Plaintiff was entitled to 1 Social Security disability benefits beginning in March 2020. (Doc. 24-1 at 5). The 2 Commissioner issued a Notice of Award stating that $29,000.25 had been withheld for 3 payment of attorney fees. (Doc. 24-1 at 7 (stating that the Commissioner “usually 4 withhold[s] 25 percent of past-due benefits” and had withheld $29,000.25)). According to 5 Plaintiff’s counsel, counsel that represented Plaintiff before the agency petitioned for a fee 6 of administrative services under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) in the amount of $8,200, leaving 7 $20,800.25 for potential attorney fees. (Doc. 24 at 2).1 8 Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks a fee award of $14,200.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9 1406(b). (Doc. 24 at 1). 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A court entering judgment in favor of a Social Security claimant represented by 12 counsel “may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 13 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 14 claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Though “[t]he 15 statute does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is 16 reasonable,” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009), the Supreme Court 17 has made clear that the first step is to respect “the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 18 agreements,” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 793 (2002). A court may deviate 19 downward from a requested fee award “if the attorney provided substandard representation 20 or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Crawford, 586 F.3d 21 at 1151. “Because the [Commissioner] has no direct interest” in how the award is 22 apportioned between client and counsel, district courts must independently “assure that the 23 reasonableness of the fee is established.” Id. at 1149. 24 In determining whether fees sought under § 406(b) are reasonable, the Court 25 considers the contingent-fee agreement, the character of the attorney’s representation, and 26 the achieved result. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Although not controlling, courts may also
27 1 Plaintiff’s counsel does not provide documentation to support this statement, but the Commissioner does not dispute it. Accordingly, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s counsel’s 28 representation and assumes such documentation is available for review if this fact is ever disputed. 1 consider the number of hours spent representing the claimant and the attorney’s normal 2 hourly billing rate for non-contingent-fee cases in determining reasonableness. Id. at 808– 3 09. Finally, if a claimant’s attorney receives fees under both the EAJA and § 406(b), the 4 attorney must “refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Id. at 796 (citation 5 omitted). 6 III. DISCUSSION 7 Applying the Gisbrecht factors, the Court finds that the requested fee is reasonable. 8 Plaintiff contracted to pay 25 percent of the past-due benefits on a contingent fee basis for 9 work performed by Plaintiff’s counsel in this action, and the fee requested is in fact less 10 than 25 percent of the past-due benefits. (Doc. 24-2 at 1; Doc. 24 at 1). Plaintiff’s counsel’s 11 itemization of services indicates 20.1 hours of services rendered. (Doc. 24-3 at 3). 12 Plaintiff’s counsel requests an hourly rate of $706.46 per hour ($14,200.00/20.1 hours), 13 (Doc. 24 at 6), which is in line with effective hourly rates previously approved in this 14 Circuit. See Young v. Colvin, No. CV-11-538-PHX-SMM, 2014 WL 590335, at *2 (D. 15 Ariz. Feb. 14, 2014) (citing Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153) (noting approval of effective 16 hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902). 17 On the instant record, there is no indication of any substandard performance by 18 Plaintiff’s counsel. There is also no indication of substandard performance or undue delay 19 in prosecuting Plaintiff’s case. Indeed, through Plaintiff’s counsel’s efforts, Plaintiff was 20 awarded all benefits for which Plaintiff applied. Thus, upon consideration of the Gisbrecht 21 reasonableness factors, in addition to the risk involved in the contingency fee arrangement 22 in this case, the Court concludes that a fee award of $14,200.00 is reasonable and will 23 approve an award in this amount. 24 Because Plaintiff’s counsel “must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller 25 fee [between the attorney fees payable under both the EAJA and § 406(b)],” Gisbrecht, 26 535 U.S. at 796, the Court will order Plaintiff’s counsel to refund the $4,722.50 EAJA 27 award to Plaintiff upon Plaintiff’s counsel’s receipt of the attorney fees awarded by this 28 Order. 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), (Doc. 23), is GRANTED in the amount of $14,200.00. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel shall, after receipt of the 6|| above-awarded fee, refund to Plaintiff the fee previously awarded under the EAJA, in the amount of $4,722.50. 8 Dated this 28th day of October, 2025. 9
11 12 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
-4-
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Sergio Rendon v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sergio-rendon-v-commissioner-of-social-security-administration-azd-2025.