SERGEY SAFAROV VS. MARK NEWTON (LT-5877-13, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 10, 2017
• Docket: A-2270-13T1
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2270-13T1

SERGEY SAFAROV,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARK NEWTON a/k/a M. MICHAEL NEWTON,1

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________________

Submitted March 29, 2017 – Decided May 10, 2017

Before Judges Manahan and Lisa.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Essex County, Docket No. LT-5877-13.

Mark Newton, appellant pro se.

Neil J. Dworkin, attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Mark Newton, in this landlord-tenant action,

appeals from the entry of a judgment of possession. We affirm.

1 Defendant's name is Mark Newton. The name Michael is a nickname from birth originating from a parental agreement. Accordingly, defendant is known as both Mark Newton and Michael Newton. Defendant was a tenant of plaintiff, Sergey Safarov, pursuant

to a written lease. The agreed-upon rent was $850 a month. The

lease provided for a month-to-month tenancy. When defendant failed

to pay the rent for several months, plaintiff filed an eviction

action seeking a judgment of possession.2

Thereafter, the complaint was dismissed due to plaintiff's

failure to appear. Plaintiff sought reinstatement based upon lack

of notice which was granted by the judge without participation by

defendant. After a contentious trial, the judge granted a judgment

for possession in favor of plaintiff for nonpayment of rent.

Defendant sought an emergent stay with this court after the

Law Division judge denied his application seeking that relief. We

denied the stay. The Supreme Court granted a stay and remanded

the matter to this court for a determination of the motion. During

the pendency of the motion, the Law Division judge supplemented

his decision per Rule 2:5-6(c) and noted that despite defendant's

claim of plaintiff's non-compliance with the registration

compliance per N.J.S.A. 46:8-29, plaintiff failed to provide

proof. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 46:8-33 (non-entry of judgment of

possession for failure to comply with registration and continuance

2It was originally claimed that defendant owed five months' rent. However, at the time of trial, plaintiff agreed to base the action on nonpayment of three months' rent.

2 A-2270-13T1 of summary disposition action for up to ninety days or until

compliance), the judge held the action should have been stayed.

As such, the action was stayed to allow plaintiff the opportunity

to provide proof of compliance with the registration requirement.

After plaintiff submitted proof of compliance to this court,

the case was re-listed for a hearing. After an adjournment, based

upon defendant's non-appearance, the hearing resulted in the entry

of judgment of possession. Thereafter, defendant sought stays from

this court and the Supreme Court, which were denied.

A warrant of removal was executed on May 14, 2013. The judge

stayed the execution of the warrant until May 20 at noon, at which

time defendant vacated the premises.

Defendant raises several arguments on appeal which we

conclude lack sufficient merit to warrant an extended discussion

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the

following.

Our review of a trial court's final determination in a non-

jury case is limited. We will not disturb the judge's factual

findings and legal conclusions unless convinced they are so

unsupported by, or inconsistent with, the competent, relevant and

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.

Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011);

3 A-2270-13T1 Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474,

484 (1974). Having considered the record in light of that

standard, we discern no basis to disturb the judge's findings and

legal conclusions.

The summary dispossess statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-51 to -61, was

designed to provide landlords with a quick and simple remedy for

possession. Carr v. Johnson, 211 N.J. Super. 341, 347 (App. Div.

1986). It was also designed to secure enforcement of a tenant's

rental obligation in actions for nonpayment of rent, Hous. Auth.

of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 281 (1994). To that end,

a tenant can secure a termination of the action by depositing the

rent at any time before the end of the court day on which judgment

is entered. Stanger v. Ridgeway, 171 N.J. Super. 466, 473 (App.

Div. 1979).

The Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12,

however, limits the grounds for which residential tenants may be

evicted in a summary dispossess proceeding. Jurisdiction to grant

the remedy requires a showing that one of the statutory grounds

of good cause for eviction exists. Little, supra, 135 N.J. at 281

(citing Levine v. Seidel, 128 N.J. Super. 225, 229 (App. Div.),

certif. denied, 65 N.J. 570 (1974)). A tenant's failure to pay

rent is one of the enumerated good causes for eviction. N.J.S.A.

4 A-2270-13T1 2A:18-61.1(a). Here, it is undisputed defendant failed to pay

rent for three months.

We are satisfied the trial judge carefully considered the

many arguments defendant raised during the trial. Defendant,

despite his poor behavior and disrespectful conduct to the judge,

was allowed a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims and

was provided with an opportunity to pay the rent due.3

Affirmed.

3 Although the issue of mootness was not raised on appeal, had we been called upon to address the issue, we would have concluded that the relief sought herein is moot due to the eviction. Mootness occurs "when the original issue presented has been resolved, at least concerning the parties who initiated the litigation." Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. Super. 203, 219 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Betancourt v. Trinity Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2010)). Thus, "[a]n issue is 'moot' when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy." Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006).

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