Serafin v. Brown

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJuly 11, 2023
Docket4:22-cv-00467
StatusUnknown

This text of Serafin v. Brown (Serafin v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Serafin v. Brown, (N.D. Ohio 2023).

Opinion

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

RONALD K. SERAFIN, ) ) CASE NO. 4:22-CV-0467 Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON ) THOMAS D. BROWN, et al., ) ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION Defendants. ) AND ORDER ) [Resolving ECF No. 93]

Pending before the Court is Defendants Thomas D. Brown and Schneider National Carriers, Inc.’s. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.1 ECF No. 93. The matter has now been fully briefed. Having reviewed the record, including the parties’ briefs, exhibits, and applicable law, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. I. Background On December 18, 2019, Plaintiff and Defendant Brown were both driving tractor- trailers on the Interstate-80 highway in Ohio when Defendant Brown’s tractor-trailer struck Plaintiff’s tractor-trailer. Defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc. was Defendant Brown’s employer at the time of this incident. As a result of this accident, Plaintiff suffered

1 Defendants did not accompany their dispositive motion with a statement certifying that they submitted a written request for judgment or dismissal to opposing counsel as required by the Court’s Case Management Conference Plan/Order. See ECF No. 46 at PageID #: 98. The parties also failed to submit a joint stipulation of uncontested facts or a joint notice stating that there are no stipulated facts as mandated by the Case Management Conference Plan/Order. See ECF No. 46 at PageID #: 98. multiple injuries which were treated through numerous surgical procedures and physical therapy sessions over the course of the next few years. See ECF No. 98 at PageID #: 969– 71. Since March 2020, Plaintiff has undergone surgical procedures to his shoulders, knees, lumbar spine, and cervical spine. See ECF No. 93 at PageID #: 875; ECF No. 98 at PageID

#: 969–70. Plaintiff brought multiple negligence claims against all Defendants.2 See ECF No. 1. Defendants subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the Court’s determination that Ohio’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages should apply in this case. Plaintiff filed an opposition arguing that he falls under one of the statutory exceptions to the imposition of such a damages cap. ECF No. 98. Defendants filed a reply in support of their position. ECF No. 99. II. Standard of Review Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) instructs courts to grant summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other words, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, [the Court will enter summary judgment] against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is “material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit.

2 Defendants Thomas D. Brown and Schneider National Carriers, Inc. are the only remaining defendants in this matter. All other defendants have been dismissed upon reaching settlement agreements with Plaintiff. The parties jointly stipulated to a partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s Count III claims against Defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc. for negligent hiring, screening, training, supervising, and retention. See ECF No. 96. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). In determining whether a factual issue is “genuine,” the Court assesses whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find that the non- moving party is entitled to a verdict. Id. To survive summary judgment, “the non-moving party must ‘do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Baker v. City of Trenton, 936 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings to designate specific facts found in the record that demonstrate genuine issues for trial, which may include affidavits, declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also KSA Enterprises, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 761 F. App'x 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2019). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for the

purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Mfg., LLC, 725 F.3d 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). In analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Lossia v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 895 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2017)). III. Discussion Defendants move the Court to impose Ohio’s statutory cap on the amount of noneconomic damages in this case pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.18(B)(2), arguing that Plaintiff does not qualify for either of the statutory exceptions to Ohio’s noneconomic

damages cap. Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.18(B)(2) provides that in a tort action, “the court must limit recovery to the greater of (1) $250,000 or (2) three times the economic damages up to a maximum of $350,000, or $500,000 per single occurrence.” Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 2007-Ohio-6948, ¶ 28, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 474, 880 N.E.2d 420, 430 (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.18(B)(2)). Although Ohio maintains a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in tort actions, Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.18

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Scott v. Harris
550 U.S. 372 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Everett Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Manufacturing
725 F.3d 608 (Sixth Circuit, 2013)
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson
2007 Ohio 6948 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2007)
Debbie Latits v. Lowell Phillips
878 F.3d 541 (Sixth Circuit, 2017)
James Lossia, Jr. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc.
895 F.3d 423 (Sixth Circuit, 2018)
Heather Baker v. City of Trenton
936 F.3d 523 (Sixth Circuit, 2019)

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Serafin v. Brown, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/serafin-v-brown-ohnd-2023.