Serafin Martinez Solorio v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 5, 2025
• Docket: 07-24-00224-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00223-CR No. 07-24-00224-CR

SERAFIN MARTINEZ SOLORIO, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 222nd District Court Deaf Smith County, Texas Trial Court No. CR-2021H-112, CR-2023F-108, Honorable Roland D. Saul, Presiding

August 5, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Serafin Martinez Solorio, appeals from the revocation of his community

supervision in two cases. After pleading guilty to bail jumping and possession of a

controlled substance, he received probated sentences conditioned on completing a

substance abuse treatment program. When he failed to successfully complete the

program, the trial court revoked his community supervision. We modify the judgment to

correct duplicate fees and delete improper attorney’s fees and affirm as modified. BACKGROUND

Appellant pleaded guilty to bail jumping and failure to appear,1 a third-degree

felony, and possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone,2 a second-degree

felony. In August 2023, the trial court accepted Appellant’s plea and sentenced him to

ten years of confinement for each offense, each probated for ten years with community

supervision. The sentence also imposed a $3,000 fine for the possession of a controlled

substance conviction. As a condition of community supervision, the trial court required

Appellant to “serve a term of confinement and treatment in a Substance Abuse Felony

Punishment Facility (SAFPF) as per attachment.” The attachment specified:

As a condition of Community Supervision, the offender is required to serve a term of confinement and treatment in a Substance Abuse Treatment Facility under this section, abiding by all rules and regulations of said program for a term of not less than 90 days or more than one (1) year. Upon release, the offender is required to participate in a drug or alcohol abuse continuum of care treatment plan as developed by the Texas Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, abiding by all rules and regulations of said treatment plan until discharged by the staff of the continuum of care program.

Six months later, the State moved to revoke Appellant’s community supervision in

both cases, alleging he “failed to serve a term of confinement and treatment in a [SAFPF],

in violation of Article 17(H) of the conditions of community supervision.” At the revocation

hearing, Appellant orally pleaded true and acknowledged violating the facility’s rules

“numerous times” without successfully completing the SAFPF program. The trial court

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.10(f).

2 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134.

2 revoked Appellant’s community supervision and sentenced him to ten years of

confinement on each offense. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision under an abuse

of discretion standard. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);

Green v. State, Nos. 07-19-00411-CR, 07-19-00412-CR, 07-19-00413-CR, 2021 Tex.

App. LEXIS 5589, at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 14, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). A single violation of the terms of community supervision

supports revocation. Green, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 5589, at *7–8.

Revocation of Community Supervision

By his first issue, Appellant argues the State’s motion to revoke alleged only that

he “failed to serve a term of confinement and treatment in a Substance Abuse Felony

Punishment Facility,” when the evidence shows he unquestionably did “serve a

term . . . one that was at least long enough for him to break the rules and be discharged.”

According to Appellant, his plea of true cannot support revocation when the record

“indisputably contradicts” the sole allegation in the State’s motion.

Context fills in the remaining detail. The State’s motion alleges Appellant failed to

serve the required term “in violation of Article 17(H) of the conditions of community

supervision.” This language incorporates by reference the specific terms of his

community supervision, which required him to serve “a term of not less than 90 days or

3 more than one (1) year” while “abiding by all rules and regulations of said program.” A

defendant cannot avoid revocation by parsing the State’s language when the motion

provides fair notice of the violated condition. See Labelle v. State, 720 S.W.2d 101, 104

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (adopting fair notice standard for revocation motions

and providing defendant an opportunity to challenge the motion on grounds of insufficient

notice).

Generally, “a plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of

community supervision.” Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

While Appellant correctly notes that some courts have found substantive defects can

overcome a plea of true, those cases involve allegations that are demonstrably false.

Here, Appellant’s own admissions establish he violated his community supervision terms.

He acknowledged he did not successfully complete SAFPF and violated facility rules

“numerous times.” The trial court could reasonably find this failure encompassed both

the duration and rule-compliance aspects of the condition. “Moreover, any defects

regarding sufficiency of the allegations in a motion to revoke must be raised at trial; failure

to object at that time waives the sufficiency of the notice provided by the motion on

appeal.” Labelle, 692 S.W.2d at 105 n.2. Appellant did not timely complain about lack of

sufficient notice.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s community

supervision. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

4 Imposition of Fine

Appellant complains the trial court erred by including a $3,000 fine in its judgment

despite not orally pronouncing it at the revocation hearing. We disagree.

When a defendant is placed on probation, “the imposition of sentence is

suspended”—the punishment has been assessed, but the court postpones ordering its

execution. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 2(2)(B). Imposition may be

suspended in whole or in part. Here, the trial court suspended imposition of the

imprisonment but not the fine. Paying the $3,000 fine was one of the conditions of

Appellant’s community supervision. From that moment, Appellant was obligated to pay

the fine as part of his sentence. Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Crim. App.

1998) (en banc); Davis v. State, 977 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.).

Upon revocation, the trial court imposed the previously suspended imprisonment but did

not need to re-pronounce the fine that had already been imposed and made part of the

original sentence. See Coffey, 979 S.W.2d at 329.

Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on the record. Although the

Clerk’s Record shows the $3,000 fine was included in the order at the initial plea hearing,

we lack the Reporter’s Record from that hearing. Thus, Appellant cannot demonstrate

the trial court failed to orally pronounce the fine at the plea hearing.

Appellant’s second issue is overruled.

5 Fees, Court Costs, & Attorney’s Fees

By his remaining issues, Appellant raises three related complaints: (1) the bill of

costs erroneously charges duplicate fees, (2) the judgment assesses attorney’s fees

despite his indigent status, and (3) he was improperly charged a time payment fee before

the appellate mandate issued.

The State argues Appellant waived these complaints through his initial plea

agreement waiving “the right to an indigency hearing on fees, fines and court costs

including attorney’s fees, probation fees and other fees and agree[d] to this assessment.”

We disagree with the State. Although Appellant’s plea included this language, no actual

fee assessment appears in the record before his plea, nor did the trial court make any

finding regarding Appellant’s indigent status. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

26.05(g); Johnson v. State, 386 S.W.3d 347, 353–54 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.)

(“Once a criminal defendant has been found to be indigent, we presume he remains

indigent for the remainder of the proceedings unless a material change in his financial

resources occurs.”); Pruitt v. State, 646 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, no

pet.) (“Generally, a defendant may challenge the imposition of court costs for the first time

on direct appeal when, . . . those costs are not imposed in open court and the judgment

does not contain an itemization of the costs imposed.”).

(1) Duplicate Fees

Appellant points to multiple bills of costs issued at different times. Both cases

contain several bills: one from immediately after his initial plea, another showing

additional fees from the revocation, and one case includes an itemized bill combining

6 original plea and revocation costs. Appellant did not object to the fees when originally

assessed in his original guilty pleas. An appellant cannot raise on appeal from probation

revocation any claim he could have brought on appeal from the original community

supervision imposition. Wiley v. State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We

hold that Appellant waived complaints regarding fee duplication in his initial pleas.

However, the revocation-related bills reveal fee discrepancies between Appellant’s

original plea and revocation hearing. In trial case CR-2021H-112, the original plea bill

totaled $480.00, while the post-revocation bill shows a charge of $3,515.00 in total

assessments, including the $3,000 fine, plus $85.00 for “executing capias, warrant, etc.”

We disregard the fine for purposes of examining which costs and fees are proper. That

presents $515.00 in costs from the original plea, which is $35.00 more than the original

$480.00. We therefore order the bill of costs to be modified in CR-2021H-112 to omit this

duplicate $35.00 fee. See Pruitt, 646 S.W.3d at 884.

In connection with Appellant’s pleas in CR-2023F-108, we find an initial bill of costs

for $405.00. As noted above, there was no timely appeal at the time Appellant pleaded

guilty. For the revocation, the bill of costs adds $85.00 for executing capias, warrant, and

precept. But the bill of costs in case -112 already includes an $85 charge for these

services. Per Code of Criminal Procedure article 102.073, the court may assess court

costs or fees only once in a single criminal action in which a defendant is convicted of two

or more offenses of multiple counts of the same offense. We therefore order the bill of

costs in case -108 to be modified to delete the $85.00 charge for executing the capias,

warrant, and precept. See id. (“single criminal action” refers to a single trial or plea with

7 allegations and evidence of more than one offense, even if presented under separate

cause numbers).

(2) Court-Appointed Attorney’s Fees

Appellant argues the trial court erred by ordering him to pay attorney’s fees despite

his indigent status without making any contrary determination. We agree. Nothing

demonstrates the trial court found Appellant no longer indigent, nor does any evidence

support such a finding. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g); Johnson, 386

S.W.3d at 353–54.

Because Appellant was previously found indigent, he is presumed to remain so

absent a material change in his financial resources. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

26.04(p); Johnson, 386 S.W.3d at 353–54. The trial court erred by assessing court-

appointed attorney’s fees. We sustain this issue and will modify the judgment to delete

the attorney’s fees assessment. See Johnson, 386 S.W.3d at 353–54.

(3) Time Payment Fee

Appellant complains about a $15 “time payment fee” assessment. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.030(a). He argues the assessment is improper because

payment of fines, court costs, and restitution is suspended during appeal, precluding the

time payment fee’s assessment. See Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018).

8 However, the fee was charged in both cases at the time of his original plea,

indicating it stems from his original fee assessment rather than the revocation. Because

the fee was part of the original judgment, its accrual was not stayed by this appeal.

CONCLUSION

We modify the bill of costs in CR-2021H-112 by deleting one of the three $35.00

fees for “SERVING WRIT Art. 102.011,” and affirm the remainder. We modify bill of costs

in CR-2023F-108 by deleting the $85.00 fee for “Executing Capias, Warrant, etc. &

Precept” as duplicate of the fees charged in CR-2021H-112. We modify the judgment to

delete the attorney’s fees assessment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment revoking

Appellant’s community service, imposing a $3,000 fine, and adopting the bills of costs as

modified.

Lawrence M. Doss Justice

Do not publish.