LOUGHRY, Justice.'
The petitioner, Robért E. Barrat, an attorney practicing primarily in the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit of West Virginia, invokes this Court’s original jurisdiction
by seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the -respondents, Nancy A Dalby, Esq., Kirk H. Bott-ner, Esq., and David P. Skillman, Esq., the mental hygiene commissioners of the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit, from appointing.legal counsel for alleged protected persons in actions instituted under the West Virginia Guardianship and Conservatorship Act
(“Guardianship and Conservatorship Act” or “Act”). In support of his request for relief,
the petitioner asserts that West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) (2014) mandates that circuit courts, rather than mental hygiene commissioners, make such appointments. Upon our consideration of the parties’ arguments, as well as our review of the statutory provisions in the Guardianship and Conservator-ship Act, we conclude that the petitioner has demonstrated the requisite basis for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
I.Facts
The facts of this case are essentially uncontested and succinct. The petitioner states that the respondent mental hygiene commissioners have appointed attorney James B. Rich, III, as legal counsel for the alleged protected person in most, if not all, of the proceedings instituted under the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act in the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit over the last few years. The petitioner avers that he and approximately twenty other lawyers in the judicial circuit would be willing to accept such appointments. The respondent mental hygiene commissioners concede they have routinely appointed Mr. Rich as legal counsel for the alleged protected person based upon then-past experience with his work in such proceedings. Our decision in this case is not impelled by which lawyex-s are being appointed for the alleged protected person in such proceedings, but whether the mental hygiene commissioners have the necessary authority to make such appointments under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a).
II.Standard for Issuance of Writ of Prohibition
Mental hygiene commissioners are attorneys who are appointed by the circuit court to act as judicial officers
in certain mental health-related proceedings.
The petitioner seeks to prohibit the respondent mental hygiene commissioners from appointing legal counsel for the alleged protected person under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a). Because these commissioners act in a judicial capacity, we apply our well-established standard for relief in prohibition: “ ‘Prohibition will lie to prohibit a judge from exceeding his legitimate powers.’ Syl. Pt. 2,
State ex rel. Winter v. MacQueen,
161 W.Va. 30, 239 S.E.2d 660 (1977).” Syl. Pt. 1,
State ex rel. J.C. v. Mazzone,
235 W.Va. 151, 772 S.E.2d 336 (2015). In determining whether the mental hygiene commissioners are exceeding their legitimate powers by appointing legal counsel under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a), our review is plenary. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a
de novo
standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1,
Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L.,
194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). With these precepts in mind, we proceed to determine whether a writ of prohibition should issue.
III.Discussion
West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) provides, in part, that “[í ]
he court shall appoint legal counsel
for the alleged protected person to make recommendations to the court that are in the best interests of the alleged protected person.”
id (emphasis added). The petitioner argues that this statutory provision clearly mandates that the circuit court — not the mental hygiene commissioner — is charged with the duty to appoint legal counsel. He further asserts that guardianship/conservatorship proceedings appear to be “eligible proceedings” under the Public
Defender Services Act.
The petitioner contends that the circuit court should establish a panel of local lawyers to receive appointments to act on behalf of the alleged protected persons in such proceedings and, once established,
the court should distribute such appointments among all lawyers on the panel. Lastly, citing Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
the petitioner argues that the respondents’ practice of appointing the same lawyer to perform all of. this particular court-appointed work could have the appearance of impropriety.
The. respondent mental hygiene commissioners assert that the definition of “eligible proceedings”, in the Public Defender Services Act
does not include proceedings instituted under the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act. As they correctly observe, the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act has its own provision for the appointment of legal counsel for the alleged protected person.
See
W.Va.Code § 44A-2-7(a). Maintaining that mental hygiene commissioners are authorized to act in the place of circuit courts under the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, the respondents assert that their concurrent authority extends to the appointment of legal counsel for the alleged protected person. Arguing that the word “court” in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) can mean either the circuit court judge or the mental hygiene commissioner,
they note that either the court or the mental hygiene commissioner may appoint legal counsel in'proceedings involving the involuntary commitment of persons to state mental health facilities.
See
W.Va.Code § 27-5-4(h) (2013). Expounding upon the need for the appointing authority to have discretion in appointing legal counsel to assure that a protected person’s due process rights are being met, the respondents recite the twenty-one statutory responsibilities of appointed counsel in proceedings brought under the Act.
. In determining whether- mental hygiene commissioners have authority under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) to appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected person, we observe that, since its enactment in 1994, we have referred to West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) in only two prior decisions. There is a passing reference to this statute in
State ex rel. Shamblin v. Collier,
191 W.Va. 349, 355, 445 S.E.2d 736, 742 (1994), in the context of the newly enacted Guardianship and Conservatorship .Act. Later, in
In re Dandy,
224 W.Va.
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LOUGHRY, Justice.'
The petitioner, Robért E. Barrat, an attorney practicing primarily in the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit of West Virginia, invokes this Court’s original jurisdiction
by seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the -respondents, Nancy A Dalby, Esq., Kirk H. Bott-ner, Esq., and David P. Skillman, Esq., the mental hygiene commissioners of the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit, from appointing.legal counsel for alleged protected persons in actions instituted under the West Virginia Guardianship and Conservatorship Act
(“Guardianship and Conservatorship Act” or “Act”). In support of his request for relief,
the petitioner asserts that West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) (2014) mandates that circuit courts, rather than mental hygiene commissioners, make such appointments. Upon our consideration of the parties’ arguments, as well as our review of the statutory provisions in the Guardianship and Conservator-ship Act, we conclude that the petitioner has demonstrated the requisite basis for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
I.Facts
The facts of this case are essentially uncontested and succinct. The petitioner states that the respondent mental hygiene commissioners have appointed attorney James B. Rich, III, as legal counsel for the alleged protected person in most, if not all, of the proceedings instituted under the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act in the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit over the last few years. The petitioner avers that he and approximately twenty other lawyers in the judicial circuit would be willing to accept such appointments. The respondent mental hygiene commissioners concede they have routinely appointed Mr. Rich as legal counsel for the alleged protected person based upon then-past experience with his work in such proceedings. Our decision in this case is not impelled by which lawyex-s are being appointed for the alleged protected person in such proceedings, but whether the mental hygiene commissioners have the necessary authority to make such appointments under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a).
II.Standard for Issuance of Writ of Prohibition
Mental hygiene commissioners are attorneys who are appointed by the circuit court to act as judicial officers
in certain mental health-related proceedings.
The petitioner seeks to prohibit the respondent mental hygiene commissioners from appointing legal counsel for the alleged protected person under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a). Because these commissioners act in a judicial capacity, we apply our well-established standard for relief in prohibition: “ ‘Prohibition will lie to prohibit a judge from exceeding his legitimate powers.’ Syl. Pt. 2,
State ex rel. Winter v. MacQueen,
161 W.Va. 30, 239 S.E.2d 660 (1977).” Syl. Pt. 1,
State ex rel. J.C. v. Mazzone,
235 W.Va. 151, 772 S.E.2d 336 (2015). In determining whether the mental hygiene commissioners are exceeding their legitimate powers by appointing legal counsel under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a), our review is plenary. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a
de novo
standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1,
Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L.,
194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). With these precepts in mind, we proceed to determine whether a writ of prohibition should issue.
III.Discussion
West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) provides, in part, that “[í ]
he court shall appoint legal counsel
for the alleged protected person to make recommendations to the court that are in the best interests of the alleged protected person.”
id (emphasis added). The petitioner argues that this statutory provision clearly mandates that the circuit court — not the mental hygiene commissioner — is charged with the duty to appoint legal counsel. He further asserts that guardianship/conservatorship proceedings appear to be “eligible proceedings” under the Public
Defender Services Act.
The petitioner contends that the circuit court should establish a panel of local lawyers to receive appointments to act on behalf of the alleged protected persons in such proceedings and, once established,
the court should distribute such appointments among all lawyers on the panel. Lastly, citing Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
the petitioner argues that the respondents’ practice of appointing the same lawyer to perform all of. this particular court-appointed work could have the appearance of impropriety.
The. respondent mental hygiene commissioners assert that the definition of “eligible proceedings”, in the Public Defender Services Act
does not include proceedings instituted under the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act. As they correctly observe, the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act has its own provision for the appointment of legal counsel for the alleged protected person.
See
W.Va.Code § 44A-2-7(a). Maintaining that mental hygiene commissioners are authorized to act in the place of circuit courts under the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, the respondents assert that their concurrent authority extends to the appointment of legal counsel for the alleged protected person. Arguing that the word “court” in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) can mean either the circuit court judge or the mental hygiene commissioner,
they note that either the court or the mental hygiene commissioner may appoint legal counsel in'proceedings involving the involuntary commitment of persons to state mental health facilities.
See
W.Va.Code § 27-5-4(h) (2013). Expounding upon the need for the appointing authority to have discretion in appointing legal counsel to assure that a protected person’s due process rights are being met, the respondents recite the twenty-one statutory responsibilities of appointed counsel in proceedings brought under the Act.
. In determining whether- mental hygiene commissioners have authority under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) to appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected person, we observe that, since its enactment in 1994, we have referred to West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) in only two prior decisions. There is a passing reference to this statute in
State ex rel. Shamblin v. Collier,
191 W.Va. 349, 355, 445 S.E.2d 736, 742 (1994), in the context of the newly enacted Guardianship and Conservatorship .Act. Later, in
In re Dandy,
224 W.Va. 105, 680 S.E.2d 120 (2009), we stated that West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a)
“requires the circuit court to appoint counsel
for an alleged- protected person[.]”
Dandy,
224 W.Va., at 110, 680 S.E.2d at 125. Because -the issue in
Dandy
did not involve whether a mental hygiene commissioner has authority to appoint legal counsel under this particular statute, we did not address the issue presently before us.
In analyzing the appointing authority provided in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a), we are guided by the precept that
“ ‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’ ”
Martin v. Randolph County Board of Education,
195 W.Va. 297, 312, 465 S.E.2d 399, 414 (1995),
quoting Connect
icut Nat’l Bank v, Germain,
603 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391, 397 (1992).
Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dept.,
195 W.Va. 573, 586, 466 S.E.2d 424, 437 (1995);
see also Stinson v. Com.,
396 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Ky.2013) (internal citations omitted) (“The plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what the legislature intended.”);
Haile v. State,
431 Md. 448, 66 A.3d 600, 611 (2013) (stating that in ascertaining actual intent of Legislature court will look to plain language under theory that “Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.”);
State v. Rama,
298 N.J.Super. 339, 689 A.2d 776, 777 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1997) (“[W]e are not to presume that the Legislature intended something other than what it-expressed by its plain language.”);
Fox v. Fox,
61 Va.App. 185, 734 S.E.2d 662, 667 (2012) (“We look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, and' presume that the legislature' chose, with care, the words -it used when it 'enacted the relevant statute”).
King v. West Virginia’s Choice, Inc.,
234 W.Va. 440, 444, 766 S.E.2d 387, 391 (2014). The statutory language under consideration plainly pimvides that “[f ]
he court shall appoint legal counsel
for the alleged protected person to make recommendations to the court that are in the best interests of the alleged protected person.” W.Va.Code § 44A-2-7(a). The court’s appointment of counsel mandated in subsection (a) is echoed in subsection (e) of this statute:
A person
appointed by the court as counsel
for a nonindigent alleged protected person shall inform
the court or the mental hygiene commissioner
of his or her hourly rate at the onset of the case and seek approval of his or her fee for the case by submitting it to
the court or the mental ■hygiene commissioner
for approval....
W.Va. Code §‘ 44A-2-7(e). This language clearly contemplates that once the court appoints counsel under subsection (a), if the alleged protected person is not indigent, counsel can approach either the court
or
the mental hygiene commissioner regarding his or her hourly rate/fee.
See also
W.Va.Code §' 44A-l-13(c) (emphasis added) (“Attorneys appointed to represent individuals under this article shall be paid a reasonable rate of compensation from the [protected person’s] estate,
as approved by the circuit court,
or, in the event
the court
determines that the estate is devoid of funds for the payment of such fees, the attorney shall be paid at a rate prescribed by and from funds allocated by the supreme court of appeals.”). Similar to the statute under consideration, West Virginia Code § 44A-4-6(c) -mandates that
“the óourt shall appoint legal counsel
for the protected person” when a petition for termination, revocation or modification of guardianship or conservatorship is filed.
Id.
(emphasis added).
For purposes of our .analysis, we must also consider the other provisions in the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act unrelated to the appointment and compensation of legal counsel. As this Court first articulated more than a century ago:
“A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with, the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law ofwhich it is intended to form a part; it being-presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consis
tent therewith.” Syllabus Point 5,
State v. Snyder,
64 W.Va. 669, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).
Syl. Pt. 5,
Community Antenna Serv., Inc. v. Charter Commc’ns VI, LLC,
227 W.Va. 595, 712 S.E.2d 504 (2011). Indeed, "
[statutes which relate, to the same persons or things, or 'to the same class' of persons or things, or statutes which have a common purpose will 'be regarded in
pari materia
to assure recognition and implementation of the legislative -intent. Accordingly, a court should not limit its consideration to any- single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but rather review the act or statute in its entirety' to ascertain legislative -intent properly.
Syl. Pt. 5,
Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co.,
159 W.Va. 14, 217 S.E.2d 907 (1975). A review of the Act’s other provisions clearly demonstrates' that the Legislature has differentiated 'between those instances when the circuit court is to act, as opposed to those occasions when either the court or the mental hygiene commissioner is permitted to act.
As with the statutory authority regarding the appointment of counsel, thé circuit court is authorized to hear the petition for the appointment .of a guardian or conservator.
See
W.Va.Code § 44A-2-9(a). Although the court “may designate) the mental hygiene eopimissioner in the circuit to serve as the trier of fact at the hearing on the' petition!, ]”,
the statute further provides that “the court” must be the trier’of fact when the proceeding involves a missing person, and “[o]nly the court may enter an order appointing a guardian or conservator.”
Id.; accord
W.Va.Code § 44A-2-10. Other provisions of the 'Guardianship and Conservatorship Act set forth the circumstances where either the court
or
a mental hygiene commissioner may act.
See
W.Va.Code •§ 44A-1-14 (“The court
or
mental hygiene commissioner may ... issue temporary protective orders_”) (emphasis added); W.Va.Code § 44A-2-5 (providing either court or mental hygiene eom-missioner may authorize third-party upon good cause shown to inspect 'and copy otherwise confidential court file of guardianship/eonservatorship proceeding); W.Va. Code- § 44A-2-13a (“The mental hygiene commissioner
or
the court shall prepare- an order ... directing the' appointees to complete the mandatory education and post any required bond....”) (emphasis added); W.Va.Code § 44A-2-15(c) (“The court or mental hygiene commissioner may conduct hearings on subsequent petitions filed pursuant to this chapter.”) (emphasis added). Similar instances appear throughout the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act.
Although the respondents acknowledge the differentiations made between the court and 'the mental hygiene commissioner throughout the Act, they nonetheless argue that -the word “court” in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) is merely a “shorthand reference” and that the appointment of legal counsel can be made by either the court or a mental hygiene commissioner. As discussed above, however, the Legislature has plainly specified the instances when either the court
or
the mental hygiene commissioner may act. Clearly, it could have acted consonantly in West Virginia Gcide § 44A-2-7(a) concerning the appointment' of legal- counsel for the alleged protected person. Because it did -not, and because we are guided by the presumption that the Legislature ■“ ‘says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there!,]’ ”
.
we
are compelled to .disagree with the respondents’ position- on this issue.
' Additionally,' we find no support for the respondents’ position from the provisions of West Virginia Code § 27-5-4(h) (2013).
This statute provides that either the court' or the mental hygiene commissioner may appoint legal counsel for a person who is the subject of an-involuntary commitment proceeding. While one might be tempted to conclude that because the Legislature provid.ed mental hygiene commissioners with the authority to appoint in involuntary commit
ment proceedings, it implicitly did the same in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a). However, we “presume! ] that the legislators who drafted and passed [West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) ] were familiar with all existing law,”
including West Virginia Code § 27-5 — 4(h). Further, while “ ‘[statutes which relate to the same persons or things, or to the same class of- persons or things ... will be regarded in
pari materia
to assure recognition , and implementation of the legislative intent[,]’ ”
we cannot ignore the plain language in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) providing that “[t]he court shall appoint legal counsel[.]”
Id.
Moreover, when the Legislature enacted the Guardianship and Conserva-torship Act in 1994, it was presumptively aware that West Virginia Code §
27-6-4(h)
allows for either the court or the mental hygiene commissioner to appoint counsel. The Legislature was also aware that the legislation creating the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act repealed West Virginia Code § 27-11-1 (1992), which provided in subsection (b) that the “county commission ... shall appoint a competent attorney ... as guardian ad litem for the purposes of representing the interest of the [alleged incompetent] individual_”
Id.
Armed with this awareness, the Legislature could have provided alternative authority in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) so as to allow either the court
or
the mental hygiene commissioner to appoint legal counsel. Critically, it did not.
Notwithstanding the extensive
grant of
authority to mental hygiene commissioners under the Act, if the Legislature had intended mental hygiene commissioners to be on .an equivalent basis with the circuit court for all purposes, there would be evidence of such intent. For example, we would expect to find a legislative definition or catch-all provision in the Act which provides that the word “court” shall also mean a mental hygiene commissioner absent an express contraindication. Because there is no such definition or provision, we are left with an Act that not only differentiates between when the court is to act, as opposed to when either the court or a mental hygiene commissioner may act, but one that. also, includes a. specific statutory mandate that “the court” appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected person. W-Va. Code § 44A-2-7(a).. Having omitted mental hygiene commissioners from this particular statutory mandate, “we are obliged
not to add to statutes
something the Legislature purposely omitted,”
Banker v. Banker,
196 W.Va. 535, 547, 474 S.E.2d 465, 477 (1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Based on all of the above, we conclude that the Legislature said what it meant and meant .what it said — that “[£ ]
he court shall appoint legal counsel
for the alleged protected person[.]” W.Va,Code § 44A-2-7(a);
see also King,
234 W.Va. at 444, 766 S.E.2d at 391 (citations omitted) (“‘courts must presume that a legislature says iñ a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there,’ ”). Accordingly, we now hold that the provisions of West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) (2014) require the circuit court to appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected person in proceedings instituted under the West Virginia Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, Because the Legislature has not'extended this appointing authority to mental hygiene commissioners, we find that the respondents have “ ‘exceeded] [them] legitimate powers’”
by appointing legal counsel for alleged protected persons under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a).
IV. Conclusion
Having determined that the. petitioner is entitled to relief in prohibition, we grant the writ.
Writ granted.