Sepulveda v. Talavera Cocina Mexicana

District Court, N.D. California·Decided February 5, 2025·No. 3:23-cv-04536·Unknown

Opinion

RICHARD SEPULVEDA, Case No. 23-cv-04536-PHK

Plaintiff, FURTHER ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE v. Re: Dkts. 38, 39, and 40

TALAVERA COCINA MEXICANA, et al., Defendants.

On September 1, 2023, Plaintiff Richard Sepulveda filed the instant Complaint in this action against Defendants Talavera Cocina Mexicana and Brodsky Family Properties, LLC (collectively “Defendants”). [Dkt. 1]. On October 6, 2023, Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint. [Dkt. 8]. The Answer was filed by Attorney Andrew Gabriel, who thereby entered appearance in this case for both Defendants. Id. Per the Court’s procedures, the Parties were thereafter tasked with several deadlines set by the Scheduling Order. [Dkt. 4]. After this case was reassigned from Chief Magistrate Judge Ryu to the undersigned on October 26, 2023, the Court issued a Text Order requiring the Parties to continue their duties under the initial Scheduling Order. Dkt. 16 (“All dates set in the Initial Case Management Scheduling Order, dkt. 4, have not been vacated due to the reassignment, dkt. 12. As such, the Parties are still under the Initial Case Management Scheduling Order.”). On May 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a status report which indicated that in March 2024 Defendants’ counsel, Andrew Gabriel, had been badly injured in a shooting. [Dkt. 20 at 1]. Plaintiff phone call on February 23, 2023. Id. at 1–2. In light of the status report, the Court set an in-person status conference for June 10, 2024. [Dkt. 21]. At the status conference, counsel for Plaintiff entered an appearance. [Dkt. 24]. Defendants’ counsel did not appear. Id. The “Court provided notice that court staff received correspondence from Defense counsel’s staff regarding non-appearance of Defense counsel due to a medical emergency.” Id. In light of the non-appearance and posture of the case, the Court ordered both Parties to file a joint status report by July 1, 2024, and the Court scheduled a further status conference for July 8, 2024. Id. The status conference was subsequently reset to July 16, 2024. [Dkt. 26]. At the July 16 status conference, both Parties appeared (including attorney Gabriel appearing for the Defendants), and after discussion with counsel for the Parties, the Court ordered the Parties to submit a joint status report on the status of the case and mediation by August 2, 2024. [Dkt. 27]. That August 2 status report indicated that “[t]he parties have agreed to conduct the mediation in this matter with the assistance of the court-appointed mediator[.]” [Dkt. 29]. The ADR phone conference held on October 14, 2024, did not lead to the resolution of the case. [Dkt. 35]. Given that lack of resolution, the Court scheduled the Initial Case Management Conference for December 3, 2024. [Dkts. 36, 37]. On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a status report which stated that, on October 21, 2024, Defendants’ counsel indicated to Plaintiff, via email, that he might be withdrawing as counsel for the Defendants in this case. [Dkt. 38]. Additionally, the status report stated that Plaintiff received no further communication from Attorney Gabriel after October 21, 2024. Id. At no time has Attorney Gabriel filed any motion with the Court seeking to withdraw as counsel for the Defendants in this case, nor has any substitution of counsel for the Defendants ever been filed. The Court held the Initial Case Management Conference on December 3, 2024, where Plaintiff appeared, but Defendants’ counsel did not appear. [Dkt. 39]. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause as to Attorney Gabriel’s non-appearance at the Initial Case Management Conference. Id. The Court ordered Attorney Gabriel to respond to the Order to Show Cause in writing by December 27, 2024, and the Court set the Order to Show Cause hearing for January 21, 2025. Show Cause (and has failed to file any response at all, as of the date of this Order). On January 10, 2025, Court staff sent a courtesy email to Attorney Gabriel’s email address of record reminding him that the deadline to respond to the Court’s December 3 Order to Show Cause had passed. Attorney Gabriel never responded to that email. On January 21, 2025, the Court held the hearing on the Order to Show Cause and Attorney Gabriel again failed to attend this noticed hearing. [Dkt. 40]. On the morning of and prior to the January 21, 2025, Order to Show Cause hearing, Court staff telephoned Attorney Gabriel at his telephone number of record as a courtesy to determine why he had not arrived at the Court and why he had not checked in for the hearing. Attorney Gabriel’s staff indicated that Attorney Gabriel was in another unspecified hearing in another unidentified case and would not join this Court’s hearing on the Order to Show Cause. As of the date of this Order, Attorney Gabriel has not filed any response to the Court’s December 3, 2024, Order to Show Cause, has not filed any response to the January 10, 2025, courtesy email, has not filed any response to Plaintiff’s November 27, 2024, status report, has not filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Defendants, and has not filed a substitution of counsel for Defendants. Courts may impose sanctions against an attorney personally. Smith v. Humboldt Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. Corr. Facility, No. 24-CV-01035-PHK, 2025 WL 41926, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2025). A court has a duty to supervise the conduct of attorneys appearing before it. Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983)). Whether to impose sanctions is subject to the Court’s sound discretion. Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 367 (9th Cir. 1996). “For a sanction to be validly imposed, the conduct in question must be sanctionable under the authority relied on.” Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 490 (9th Cir. 1988). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) provides that, on its own motion, “the court may issue any just orders . . . if a party or its attorney: . . . (C) fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.” Since the purpose of the rule is “to encourage forceful judicial management,” courts have broad discretion to sanction attorneys and Solutions, LLC v. Lyons, 2012 WL 7801695, at *3 (D. Nev. Sep. 18, 2012) (citing Sherman v. United States, 801 F.2d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Civil L.R. 3-9 (“Sanctions (including default or dismissal) may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.”). Moreover, federal courts have inherent power to impose monetary or other sanctions in order to control the conduct of the proceedings, protect the “orderly administration of justice,” and to maintain “the authority and dignity of the court.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764–67 (1980) (citations omitted). As discussed in the factual summary above, Attorney Gabriel has repeatedly failed to comply with his duties to abide by Court-imposed schedules and Court Orders. Attorney Gabriel has never explained his failure to communicate with Plaintiff’s counsel to conduct the tasks required by the initial Scheduling Order. Attorney Gabriel has never responded to either of Plaintiff’s status reports indicating his failures to communicate and his failures to defend this case. Attorney Gabriel has never explained why he failed to appear at the noticed Initial Case Management Conference. Attorney Gabriel never responded to the Court’s December 3 Orde

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