Sepulveda v. Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedNovember 15, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-00332
StatusUnknown

This text of Sepulveda v. Social Security Administration (Sepulveda v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sepulveda v. Social Security Administration, (D. Nev. 2022).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * 4 ELIZABETH SEPULVEDA, Case No. 3:21-cv-00332-CLB 5 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE 6 v. 7 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 8 Defendant. 9 10 On August 2, 2021, Plaintiff Elizabeth Sepulveda (“Sepulveda”) initiated this action, 11 which involves judicial review of an administrative action by the Secretary of Health and 12 Human Services, denying her claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. 13 (ECF No. 1.) On December 22, 2021, this Court ordered Sepulveda to file an opening brief 14 on or before January 21, 2022, (ECF No. 17), which she did not do. Thus, on July 27, 15 2022, the Court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and 16 Local Rule 41-1 for Want of Prosecution, notifying Sepulveda that she should file her 17 opening brief by September 19, 2022, or her case would be dismissed. (ECF No. 18.) On 18 September 13, 2022, Sepulveda filed a motion to extend time to file an opening brief, (ECF 19 No. 21), which the Court granted. (ECF No. 22.) The Court cautioned Sepulveda that no 20 further extensions of time would be granted and that the failure to file an opening brief on 21 or before Monday, November 14, 2022, would result in this action being dismissed for 22 want of prosecution pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and LR 41-1. (Id.) To date, Sepulveda 23 has failed to file an opening brief or otherwise prosecute this action. 24 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise 25 of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a 26 case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). 27 A Court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an 28 action, failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See Ghazali v. 1 Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); 2 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply 3 with an order requiring amendment of complaint); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 4 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 5 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 6 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 7 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and failure to comply 8 with local rules). 9 In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, failure to obey 10 a court order, or failure to comply with local rules, the Court must consider several factors: 11 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 12 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 13 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. 14 Thompson, 782 F.2d at 831; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423-24; Malone, 833 F.2d at 130; 15 Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61; Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53. 16 Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) governs the involuntary 17 dismissal of a plaintiff's claim for failure to prosecute. Involuntary dismissal is within the 18 discretion of the Court. Bishop v. Lewis, 155 F.3d 1094, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court 19 may dismiss for failure to prosecute sua sponte under certain circumstances. Hells 20 Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005). 21 See, e.g., Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Rule has long 22 been interpreted to permit courts to dismiss actions sua sponte for a plaintiff's failure to 23 prosecute or comply with the rules of civil procedure or court's orders.” (citing Link v. 24 Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed. 734 (1962))); O'Rourke 25 Bros. Inc. v. Nesbitt Burns, Inc., 201 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2000). 26 LR 41-1 provides that all civil actions pending in this Court for more than 270 days 27 without any proceeding of record having been taken may, after notice, be dismissed for 28 want of prosecution by the Court sua sponte or by motion. 1 Here, Sepulveda was given notice that if she failed to file an opening brief or 2 || otherwise prosecute the action on or before November 14, 2022, her case would be 3 || dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and LR 41-1. (ECF 4 || No. 22.) Thus, Sepulveda has failed to comply with the Court’s orders and has failed to 5 || prosecute her case. Under these circumstances dismissal of this case pursuant to Fed. R. 6 || Civ. P. 41(b) and LR 41-1 is appropriate. 7 Additionally, the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate based upon the factors 8 || outlined in Ghazali v. Moran, supra. Specifically, the Court finds that the first two factors, 9 || the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the Court’s interest in 10 || managing the docket, weigh in favor of dismissal. The third factor, risk of prejudice to 11 || Defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a presumption of injury arises from 12 || the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the Court or 13 || prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The 14 || fourth factor—public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 15 || outweighed by the factors in favor of dismissal discussed herein. Finally, a Court's warning 16 || to a party that his failure to obey the Court’s order will result in dismissal satisfies the 17 || “consideration of alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; Malone, 833 F.2d at 18 || 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed on July 27, 19 || 2022 and subsequent order granting an extension on September 14, 2022, expressly 20 || stated that Sepulveda’s failure to file an opening brief or otherwise prosecute this action 21 || would result in dismissal of the action. (ECF Nos. 18, 22.) Thus, Sepulveda had adequate 22 || warning that dismissal would result from her noncompliance with the Court’s order and for 23 || want of prosecution.

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Sepulveda v. Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sepulveda-v-social-security-administration-nvd-2022.