1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 RICHARD SEPULVEDA, an No. 2:24-cv-3060 WBS AC individual, 13 Plaintiff, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: v. DEFENDANT EL PUESTO EG, LLC’S 15 MOTION TO DISMISS ROSA MADERA LLC, doing business 16 as Rosa Madera Sabores de Mexico; EL PUESTO EG, LLC, doing 17 business as El Puesto Cocina and Lounge; and EUREKA DEVELOPMENT 18 COMPANY LLC; 19 Defendants. 20 21 ----oo0oo---- 22 23 Plaintiff Richard Sepulveda (“plaintiff”) brought this 24 action against defendant El Puesto EG, LLC (“defendant”), doing 25 business as Rosa Madera Sabores de Mexico, and co-defendant 26 Eureka Development Company LLC (“co-defendant”), alleging (1) 27 violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 28 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12181-82, 12188, 12203; (2) denial of full 1 and equal access to public facilities, Cal. Health & Safety Code 2 §§ 19955-56; (3) violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh 3 Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-52; and (4) violations of 4 California’s Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”), id. §§ 54, 54.1, 5 54.3. (See Compl. ¶¶ 18-71 (Docket No. 1).)1 6 Defendant now moves to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint 7 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of 8 subject-matter jurisdiction. (See Def.’s Notice of Mot. & Mot. 9 to Dismiss (Docket No. 12).) 10 “If the court determines at any time that it lacks 11 subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” 12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Under Article III of the 13 Constitution, the court may only adjudicate “cases” and 14 “controversies.” See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (cleaned up). 15 Standing pertains to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 16 under Article III and may be challenged in a motion to dismiss 17 under Rule 12(b)(1), which defendant has done here. See White 18 v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2000). 19 Article III standing requires that a plaintiff show 20 “(i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, 21 particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was 22 likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would 23 likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. 24 1 Rosa Madera Sabores de Mexico is defendant’s 25 restaurant. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3-8.) Co-defendant is a commercial landlord which owns the restaurant’s premises and has not moved 26 to dismiss the complaint. (Id.) The parties do not mention 27 “Rosa Madera LLC” or “El Puesto Cocina and Lounge” except in passing. 28 1 Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423-24 (2021). Plaintiff bears the burden 2 of demonstrating that he has standing. See id. at 430-31. When 3 the “case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must ‘clearly 4 . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each element” of standing. 5 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338-39 (2016) (omission in 6 original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975)). 7 “Under the ADA, when a disabled person encounters an 8 accessibility barrier violating its provisions, it is not 9 necessary for standing purposes that the barrier completely 10 preclude the plaintiff from entering or using the facility in any 11 way.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946-47 12 (9th Cir. 2011). “Rather, the barrier need only interfere with 13 the plaintiff’s ‘full and equal enjoyment’ of the facility.” Id. 14 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). The ADA Accessibility Guidelines 15 (“ADAAG”) “establish[] the technical standards required for ‘full 16 and equal enjoyment.’”2 Id. at 947-48. 17 To suffer an injury in fact for purposes of Article III 18 standing, plaintiff need only “encounter[] or become aware of 19 alleged ADA violations that deter his patronage of or otherwise 20 interfere with his access to a place of public accommodation.” 21 Id. Plaintiff’s suit must be “limited to barriers related to his 22 particular disability.” Id. An ADA barrier exists when there is 23 a violation of the ADAAG. Id. 24 Because plaintiff has “lumbar disc disease and 25
26 2 “The ADAAG were promulgated by the United States Access Board and establish a national standard for minimum levels of 27 accessibility in all new facilities or the remodeling of existing facilities.” See Kraus, 2018 WL 3388554, at *1-2 & n.1 (citing 28 Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947-48 & n.5). 1 degenerative arthritis,” he is substantially limited in his 2 ability to walk and “must use a walker” for mobility, and 3 “sometimes must sit in his walker as if it were a wheelchair.”. 4 (See Compl. ¶ 6.) 5 Co-defendant owns the business complex at 7521 West 6 Stockton Boulevard, Sacramento, CA, where the restaurant is 7 located. (Id. ¶¶ 1-3.) This business complex, including the 8 restaurant, is a public accommodation. (Id. ¶¶ 3-17.) On July 9 7, 2024, plaintiff visited the restaurant and alleges that he 10 encountered certain physical barriers to his access to the 11 restaurant. (Id. ¶ 12.) As a result, plaintiff alleges that he 12 was and continues to be deterred from visiting the restaurant but 13 plans to return to it once the barriers are redressed. (Id. ¶¶ 14 5-14.) 15 Plaintiff alleges that he encountered at least the 16 following ADA barriers at the restaurant which relate to his 17 disability: First, plaintiff alleges that defendant’s “restrooms 18 were not accessible for users of walkers.” (Id. ¶ 4(a).) In 19 particular, the restrooms’ “sinks did not have enough space for 20 legs or feet underneath.” (Id.) Second, plaintiff alleges that 21 “dining seating was not accessible to users of walkers, 22 consisting of tables that did not possess the required 23 characteristics, including space under [the] table for 24 plaintiff’s legs” when he sits in the walker. (Id. ¶ 4(b).) The 25 ADAAG provides, in relevant part, certain rules pertaining to the 26 minimum space required to accommodate plaintiff’s legs and feet. 27 See 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191 App. B § 306. 28 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s allegations are 1 conclusory because he merely states that the sink and table were 2 difficult to use. (See Docket No. 12-1 at 7-10.) Defendant 3 raises a good point. Plaintiff is what could tactfully be called 4 a frequent filer of ADA claims. A quick review of the court 5 records indicates that he and his attorney have filed 171 cases 6 in the Northern District of California and in the last 18 months 7 have filed 20 cases in this court. The court mentions this not 8 because there is any prohibition against frequent filers. To the 9 contrary, the law seems to favor such practice in ADA cases. The 10 court mentions it only to point out that since plaintiff and his 11 attorney have gone through this process so many times, they ought 12 to be able to be more specific in their allegations. 13 Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s dining tables and 14 restroom sink do not comply with the ADAAG because his legs do 15 not fit under them when sitting in his walker, which deters him 16 from returning to its restaurant. (See Compl.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 RICHARD SEPULVEDA, an No. 2:24-cv-3060 WBS AC individual, 13 Plaintiff, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: v. DEFENDANT EL PUESTO EG, LLC’S 15 MOTION TO DISMISS ROSA MADERA LLC, doing business 16 as Rosa Madera Sabores de Mexico; EL PUESTO EG, LLC, doing 17 business as El Puesto Cocina and Lounge; and EUREKA DEVELOPMENT 18 COMPANY LLC; 19 Defendants. 20 21 ----oo0oo---- 22 23 Plaintiff Richard Sepulveda (“plaintiff”) brought this 24 action against defendant El Puesto EG, LLC (“defendant”), doing 25 business as Rosa Madera Sabores de Mexico, and co-defendant 26 Eureka Development Company LLC (“co-defendant”), alleging (1) 27 violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 28 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12181-82, 12188, 12203; (2) denial of full 1 and equal access to public facilities, Cal. Health & Safety Code 2 §§ 19955-56; (3) violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh 3 Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-52; and (4) violations of 4 California’s Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”), id. §§ 54, 54.1, 5 54.3. (See Compl. ¶¶ 18-71 (Docket No. 1).)1 6 Defendant now moves to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint 7 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of 8 subject-matter jurisdiction. (See Def.’s Notice of Mot. & Mot. 9 to Dismiss (Docket No. 12).) 10 “If the court determines at any time that it lacks 11 subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” 12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Under Article III of the 13 Constitution, the court may only adjudicate “cases” and 14 “controversies.” See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (cleaned up). 15 Standing pertains to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 16 under Article III and may be challenged in a motion to dismiss 17 under Rule 12(b)(1), which defendant has done here. See White 18 v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2000). 19 Article III standing requires that a plaintiff show 20 “(i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, 21 particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was 22 likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would 23 likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. 24 1 Rosa Madera Sabores de Mexico is defendant’s 25 restaurant. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3-8.) Co-defendant is a commercial landlord which owns the restaurant’s premises and has not moved 26 to dismiss the complaint. (Id.) The parties do not mention 27 “Rosa Madera LLC” or “El Puesto Cocina and Lounge” except in passing. 28 1 Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423-24 (2021). Plaintiff bears the burden 2 of demonstrating that he has standing. See id. at 430-31. When 3 the “case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must ‘clearly 4 . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each element” of standing. 5 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338-39 (2016) (omission in 6 original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975)). 7 “Under the ADA, when a disabled person encounters an 8 accessibility barrier violating its provisions, it is not 9 necessary for standing purposes that the barrier completely 10 preclude the plaintiff from entering or using the facility in any 11 way.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946-47 12 (9th Cir. 2011). “Rather, the barrier need only interfere with 13 the plaintiff’s ‘full and equal enjoyment’ of the facility.” Id. 14 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). The ADA Accessibility Guidelines 15 (“ADAAG”) “establish[] the technical standards required for ‘full 16 and equal enjoyment.’”2 Id. at 947-48. 17 To suffer an injury in fact for purposes of Article III 18 standing, plaintiff need only “encounter[] or become aware of 19 alleged ADA violations that deter his patronage of or otherwise 20 interfere with his access to a place of public accommodation.” 21 Id. Plaintiff’s suit must be “limited to barriers related to his 22 particular disability.” Id. An ADA barrier exists when there is 23 a violation of the ADAAG. Id. 24 Because plaintiff has “lumbar disc disease and 25
26 2 “The ADAAG were promulgated by the United States Access Board and establish a national standard for minimum levels of 27 accessibility in all new facilities or the remodeling of existing facilities.” See Kraus, 2018 WL 3388554, at *1-2 & n.1 (citing 28 Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947-48 & n.5). 1 degenerative arthritis,” he is substantially limited in his 2 ability to walk and “must use a walker” for mobility, and 3 “sometimes must sit in his walker as if it were a wheelchair.”. 4 (See Compl. ¶ 6.) 5 Co-defendant owns the business complex at 7521 West 6 Stockton Boulevard, Sacramento, CA, where the restaurant is 7 located. (Id. ¶¶ 1-3.) This business complex, including the 8 restaurant, is a public accommodation. (Id. ¶¶ 3-17.) On July 9 7, 2024, plaintiff visited the restaurant and alleges that he 10 encountered certain physical barriers to his access to the 11 restaurant. (Id. ¶ 12.) As a result, plaintiff alleges that he 12 was and continues to be deterred from visiting the restaurant but 13 plans to return to it once the barriers are redressed. (Id. ¶¶ 14 5-14.) 15 Plaintiff alleges that he encountered at least the 16 following ADA barriers at the restaurant which relate to his 17 disability: First, plaintiff alleges that defendant’s “restrooms 18 were not accessible for users of walkers.” (Id. ¶ 4(a).) In 19 particular, the restrooms’ “sinks did not have enough space for 20 legs or feet underneath.” (Id.) Second, plaintiff alleges that 21 “dining seating was not accessible to users of walkers, 22 consisting of tables that did not possess the required 23 characteristics, including space under [the] table for 24 plaintiff’s legs” when he sits in the walker. (Id. ¶ 4(b).) The 25 ADAAG provides, in relevant part, certain rules pertaining to the 26 minimum space required to accommodate plaintiff’s legs and feet. 27 See 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191 App. B § 306. 28 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s allegations are 1 conclusory because he merely states that the sink and table were 2 difficult to use. (See Docket No. 12-1 at 7-10.) Defendant 3 raises a good point. Plaintiff is what could tactfully be called 4 a frequent filer of ADA claims. A quick review of the court 5 records indicates that he and his attorney have filed 171 cases 6 in the Northern District of California and in the last 18 months 7 have filed 20 cases in this court. The court mentions this not 8 because there is any prohibition against frequent filers. To the 9 contrary, the law seems to favor such practice in ADA cases. The 10 court mentions it only to point out that since plaintiff and his 11 attorney have gone through this process so many times, they ought 12 to be able to be more specific in their allegations. 13 Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s dining tables and 14 restroom sink do not comply with the ADAAG because his legs do 15 not fit under them when sitting in his walker, which deters him 16 from returning to its restaurant. (See Compl. ¶¶ 4-15.) While 17 plaintiff does not have to allege facts showing why or how he was 18 unable to use the sink, or what type of walker he used such that 19 he needed to roll his knees and toes under it, it would certainly 20 make it easier for the defendant and the court to understand his 21 claim if he did. Instead, the law requires only that plaintiff 22 plead that the restaurant’s facilities are noncompliant with the 23 ADAAG as they pertain to his disability. See Barnes v. AKM Foods 24 Inc., No. 2:22-cv-311 WBS CKD, 2022 WL 3229832, at *2-3 (E.D. 25 Cal. Aug. 10, 2022) (denying motion to dismiss on same ground for 26 similar reason). The allegations of the complaint sufficiently 27 28 1 do so.3 Accordingly, plaintiff has standing on his federal 2 claim. 3 Plaintiff also has standing to bring his state law 4 claims because he alleges that he encountered accessibility 5 barriers at the restaurant in violation of the ADA. See, e.g., 6 Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f) (“A violation of the right of any 7 individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 8 1990 shall also constitute a violation of [the Unruh Act].”). 9 “The ADA, CDPA, Unruh Act, and California Health and Safety Code 10 all address essentially the same rights of being free from 11 discrimination based on physical disability and having full 12 access to accommodations generally available to the public.” 13 Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05CV1216, 2005 WL 3477841, 14 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2005) (cleaned up). Accordingly, the 15 requirements of standing are satisfied as to all of plaintiff’s 16 state law claims, which are his second, third, and fourth claims. 17 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 18 dismiss (Docket No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.4 19 3 The complaint could be said to serve as a model of 20 vague language aimed at stating just enough factual matter to survive a motion to dismiss, but nothing more. Were the court to 21 grant the motion to dismiss, it would have to give plaintiff 22 leave to amend the complaint, which would only further accrue attorneys’ fees. 23 4 Defendant requests that the court decline to exercise 24 supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. (See Docket No. 12-1 at 10-12 (citing Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 25 1202, 1209-13 (9th Cir. 2021).) The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that frequent filers of disability access suits 26 similar to the instant action may favor federal over state courts 27 and reversed the lower court for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over disability-related claims arising 28 under state law. See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1209-13. Because the nee enn meen ee nnn nnn nn nen nn on nn NO tieow A, hh 1 | Dated: May 29, 2025 Pi he Vi (eh 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 court finds that plaintiff has standing to bring his ADA claim, it DENIES defendant’s request. See Kraus v. Sonoma K, LLC, No. 28 | 2:18-cv-682 WBS EFB, 2018 WL 3388554, at *2 &n.3.