1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 RICHARD SEPULVEDA, 10 Case No. 23-cv-02368-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 12 MOTION TO DISMISS ESAM MANSOUR KOBAREE, et al., 13 Defendants. 14
15 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff Richard Sepulveda filed this disability discrimination suit under federal and state 18 law against the owners and operators of Sky Market, located in Oakland. In the Complaint, 19 Plaintiff states he “suffers from lumbar disc disease and degenerative arthritis,” and that he must 20 use a walker because he is “limited in the use of his legs.” Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 6. He avers that 21 Sky Market is not in compliance with laws requiring the business to be accessible to persons with 22 physical disabilities, such that his rights to full and equal access have been denied. Defendants 23 have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims, urging the Court to decline supplemental 24 jurisdiction over those claims. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. This motion is suitable for 25 disposition without oral argument, Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and it is granted for the reasons stated below. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 Where a federal court has original jurisdiction over a claim, the court may exercise 1 they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A claim is considered part 2 of the same “case or controversy” as a federal claim when the claims “derive from a common 3 nucleus of operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in 4 one judicial proceeding.” Trs. of the Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. v. Desert 5 Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal 6 quotation marks omitted). A district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction in several 7 situations, including where, “in exceptional circumstances, there are underlying reasons for 8 declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Under § 1367(c)(4), the district court must first 9 “articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional,” Exec. Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. 10 Dist. Ct., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Cal. Dep’t of Water 11 Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). Second, the court must consider what 12 course of action “best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which 13 underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 14 156, 172–73 (1997). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021), 17 and Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022), Defendants argue that this case presents 18 “exceptional circumstances” such that supplemental jurisdiction should not be exercised. Those 19 cases both held that district courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction over California disability 20 discrimination claims brought in conjunction with claims under the Americans with Disabilities 21 Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. This is because of California’s recently enacted 22 procedural requirements that apply to so-called “high-frequency litigants” bringing disability 23 discrimination suits. These include “heightened pleading requirements and a substantial up-front 24 filing fee.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1216 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 1206–07 (discussing legislative 25 history of these reforms). Because these requirements apply only in state court, the Ninth Circuit 26 observed that federal courts’ exercise of supplemental jurisdiction threatened substantially to 27 “thwart California’s carefully crafted reforms . . . and to deprive state courts of their critical role in 1 effectuating the policies underlying those reforms.” Id. at 1213. Since Arroyo, district courts have 2 frequently declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought under California’s 3 Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq., and Disabled Persons Act, 4 Cal. Civ. Code § 54 et seq. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Dabb Liquor Inc., No. 22-cv-00485-JLT-SKO, 5 2023 WL 2946898, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 6 WL 3304147 (May 8, 2023); Gastelum v. TJX Cos., Inc., No. 21-cv-06714-VKD, 2023 WL 7 2224432, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2023); Maldonado v. Ramirez, No. 23-cv-00632-SVW-PVC, 8 2023 WL 2628692, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2023); Johnson v. Constantia Capital, Ltd., No. 9 22-cv-01456-RS, 2022 WL 3925290, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2022); Garcia v. Maciel, No. 21- 10 cv-03743-JCS, 2022 WL 395316, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2022). 11 Plaintiff is no doubt familiar with this legal backdrop, as numerous courts have dismissed 12 his state law claims on this basis. See Sepulveda v. Guo, No. 22-cv-04208-HSG, 2023 WL 13 2480741, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2023); Sepulveda v. Cai., No. 22-cv-06471-JSC, 2023 WL 14 137470, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023); Sepulveda v. Ole’s Waffle Shop, No. 20-cv-00400-DMR, 15 2022 WL 1137085, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2022); cf. Sepulveda v. Gazali, No. 22-cv-01899- 16 VC, 2022 WL 3348588, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2022) (ordering Plaintiff to show cause why 17 Unruh Act claim should not be dismissed).1 By failing to oppose Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff 18 provides no reason why this case should be treated any differently. Plaintiff concedes he is a high- 19 frequency litigant, Compl. ¶ 70, such that he would be subject to California’s additional 20 procedural requirements. Granted, Plaintiff appears to have met several of those pleading 21 requirements in his Complaint, at least in a cursory manner. He includes, for instance, the reason 22 he was in “the geographic area of the defendant’s business,” the dates he visited, and why he 23
24 1 Plaintiff’s counsel should similarly be aware of this context. In addition to representing Plaintiff in each of the cases cited here, he has (a) represented other plaintiffs in cases that also declined to 25 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act claims, and (b) successfully moved to dismiss a plaintiff’s Unruh Act claims in a case in which the court invoked the same reasoning Defendants 26 rely on here. See Robinson v. Four Bells Market & Liquor, Inc., No. 23-cv-00549-TSH, 2023 WL 4747375 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2023); Garcia v. Pena, No. 22-cv-00158-CRB, 2022 WL 1136794, at 27 *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2022). 1 “desired to access” Sky Market. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.50(a)(4)(A); see Compl. ¶¶ 12, 70. 2 Whether these averments would satisfy a California court, however, is unclear. Further, bringing 3 the case in federal court still permits Plaintiff to evade California’s increased filing fee. These 4 procedural requirements thus constitute “exceptional circumstances” that suggest supplemental 5 jurisdiction should not be exercised here. See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211. That this logic also applies 6 to many other cases, including the many others brought by Plaintiff, is of no consequence. Vo, 49 7 F.4th at 1173.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 RICHARD SEPULVEDA, 10 Case No. 23-cv-02368-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 12 MOTION TO DISMISS ESAM MANSOUR KOBAREE, et al., 13 Defendants. 14
15 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff Richard Sepulveda filed this disability discrimination suit under federal and state 18 law against the owners and operators of Sky Market, located in Oakland. In the Complaint, 19 Plaintiff states he “suffers from lumbar disc disease and degenerative arthritis,” and that he must 20 use a walker because he is “limited in the use of his legs.” Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 6. He avers that 21 Sky Market is not in compliance with laws requiring the business to be accessible to persons with 22 physical disabilities, such that his rights to full and equal access have been denied. Defendants 23 have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims, urging the Court to decline supplemental 24 jurisdiction over those claims. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. This motion is suitable for 25 disposition without oral argument, Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and it is granted for the reasons stated below. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 Where a federal court has original jurisdiction over a claim, the court may exercise 1 they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A claim is considered part 2 of the same “case or controversy” as a federal claim when the claims “derive from a common 3 nucleus of operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in 4 one judicial proceeding.” Trs. of the Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. v. Desert 5 Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal 6 quotation marks omitted). A district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction in several 7 situations, including where, “in exceptional circumstances, there are underlying reasons for 8 declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Under § 1367(c)(4), the district court must first 9 “articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional,” Exec. Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. 10 Dist. Ct., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Cal. Dep’t of Water 11 Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). Second, the court must consider what 12 course of action “best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which 13 underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 14 156, 172–73 (1997). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021), 17 and Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022), Defendants argue that this case presents 18 “exceptional circumstances” such that supplemental jurisdiction should not be exercised. Those 19 cases both held that district courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction over California disability 20 discrimination claims brought in conjunction with claims under the Americans with Disabilities 21 Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. This is because of California’s recently enacted 22 procedural requirements that apply to so-called “high-frequency litigants” bringing disability 23 discrimination suits. These include “heightened pleading requirements and a substantial up-front 24 filing fee.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1216 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 1206–07 (discussing legislative 25 history of these reforms). Because these requirements apply only in state court, the Ninth Circuit 26 observed that federal courts’ exercise of supplemental jurisdiction threatened substantially to 27 “thwart California’s carefully crafted reforms . . . and to deprive state courts of their critical role in 1 effectuating the policies underlying those reforms.” Id. at 1213. Since Arroyo, district courts have 2 frequently declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought under California’s 3 Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq., and Disabled Persons Act, 4 Cal. Civ. Code § 54 et seq. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Dabb Liquor Inc., No. 22-cv-00485-JLT-SKO, 5 2023 WL 2946898, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 6 WL 3304147 (May 8, 2023); Gastelum v. TJX Cos., Inc., No. 21-cv-06714-VKD, 2023 WL 7 2224432, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2023); Maldonado v. Ramirez, No. 23-cv-00632-SVW-PVC, 8 2023 WL 2628692, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2023); Johnson v. Constantia Capital, Ltd., No. 9 22-cv-01456-RS, 2022 WL 3925290, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2022); Garcia v. Maciel, No. 21- 10 cv-03743-JCS, 2022 WL 395316, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2022). 11 Plaintiff is no doubt familiar with this legal backdrop, as numerous courts have dismissed 12 his state law claims on this basis. See Sepulveda v. Guo, No. 22-cv-04208-HSG, 2023 WL 13 2480741, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2023); Sepulveda v. Cai., No. 22-cv-06471-JSC, 2023 WL 14 137470, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023); Sepulveda v. Ole’s Waffle Shop, No. 20-cv-00400-DMR, 15 2022 WL 1137085, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2022); cf. Sepulveda v. Gazali, No. 22-cv-01899- 16 VC, 2022 WL 3348588, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2022) (ordering Plaintiff to show cause why 17 Unruh Act claim should not be dismissed).1 By failing to oppose Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff 18 provides no reason why this case should be treated any differently. Plaintiff concedes he is a high- 19 frequency litigant, Compl. ¶ 70, such that he would be subject to California’s additional 20 procedural requirements. Granted, Plaintiff appears to have met several of those pleading 21 requirements in his Complaint, at least in a cursory manner. He includes, for instance, the reason 22 he was in “the geographic area of the defendant’s business,” the dates he visited, and why he 23
24 1 Plaintiff’s counsel should similarly be aware of this context. In addition to representing Plaintiff in each of the cases cited here, he has (a) represented other plaintiffs in cases that also declined to 25 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act claims, and (b) successfully moved to dismiss a plaintiff’s Unruh Act claims in a case in which the court invoked the same reasoning Defendants 26 rely on here. See Robinson v. Four Bells Market & Liquor, Inc., No. 23-cv-00549-TSH, 2023 WL 4747375 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2023); Garcia v. Pena, No. 22-cv-00158-CRB, 2022 WL 1136794, at 27 *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2022). 1 “desired to access” Sky Market. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.50(a)(4)(A); see Compl. ¶¶ 12, 70. 2 Whether these averments would satisfy a California court, however, is unclear. Further, bringing 3 the case in federal court still permits Plaintiff to evade California’s increased filing fee. These 4 procedural requirements thus constitute “exceptional circumstances” that suggest supplemental 5 jurisdiction should not be exercised here. See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211. That this logic also applies 6 to many other cases, including the many others brought by Plaintiff, is of no consequence. Vo, 49 7 F.4th at 1173. In addition, “this case is in its early stages and the merits have not yet been 8 litigated,” making dismissal appropriate in light of the values of judicial economy, convenience, 9 comity, and fairness. Sepulveda, 2023 WL 137470, at *2. 10 Finally, while Defendants’ argument focuses mainly on Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claims, it 11 should be noted that Plaintiff includes a claim for relief — brought under Cal. Health & Safety 12 Code § 19955 — that is not expressly subject to the same enhanced procedural requirements as his 13 third and fourth claims. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.50(a); Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52. While no 14 California court appears to have offered an interpretation of the relevant provisions, federal courts 15 have observed that the procedural requirements are not limited only to specifically enumerated 16 code sections. See Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1) (“‘Construction-related accessibility claim’ means 17 any civil claim in a civil action with respect to a place of public accommodation, including, but 18 not limited to, a claim brought under [Cal. Civ. Code] Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55 . . . .” (emphasis 19 added)). On this reasoning, these courts have concluded that claims under § 19955 are 20 “construction-related accessibility claims” subject to the same procedural requirements as Unruh 21 Act and Disabled Person Act claims. See Block v. Salem, No. 22-cv-01596-JLT-BAM, 2023 WL 22 2588002, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2023); Gilbert v. Singh, No. 21-cv-01338-AWI-HBK, 2023 23 WL 2239335, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023). This reasoning is persuasive, and thus the second 24 claim for relief is also subject to dismissal. 25 IV. CONCLUSION 26 The partial motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff’s state law claims for relief (claims 2 27 through 4 of the Complaint) are dismissed, without prejudice to refiling these claims in state court. 1 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 4 || Dated: August 4, 2023 5 RICHARD SEEBORG 6 Chief United States District Judge 4 8 9 10 11 a 12
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Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS CASE No. 23-cv-02368-RS