Sepulvado v. Argonaut Underwriters Insurance Co.

111 So. 2d 178, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 892
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 3, 1959
DocketNo. 8986
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 111 So. 2d 178 (Sepulvado v. Argonaut Underwriters Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sepulvado v. Argonaut Underwriters Insurance Co., 111 So. 2d 178, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 892 (La. Ct. App. 1959).

Opinion

GLADNEY, Judge.

The defendants, Argonaut Underwriters Insurance Company and Ed Jones, Jr., have appealed from a judgment increasing the weekly payment of workmen’s compensation from $15 to $26.33 to plaintiff, Jeff Sepulvado. Appellee has answered the appeal asking that the amount be fixed at $35 and to cast Ed Jones, Jr., solidarily liable for compensation along with his insurer.

In the trial court the sole defensive issue asserted was the amount of compensation to which Jeff Sepulvado was entitled. It involved a determination from conflicting evidence of the employee’s daily wage, and was presented to the judge a quo first in a plea of prematurity, and again on the trial of the case on its merits.

[179]*179Jeff Sepulvado was employed by James Glover to cut pulpwood for compensation for which he was paid at the rate of $3 per cord. While engaged in performing such work on October 19, 1956, he was injured by a falling tree which caused disabling injuries to his back. James Glover was a subcontractor for Ed Jones, Jr., who was insured by Argonaut Underwriters Insurance Company.

The burden of making satisfactory proof of the daily wage for the purpose of fixing weekly compensation payment rests with the plaintiff. Burks v. Central Surety & Insurance Company, La.App., 1942, 6 So.2d 45; Rutherford v. Frost Lumber Industries, Inc., La.App., 1952, 57 So.2d 914.

The term “wages” is defined in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, LSA-R.S. 23:1021(11) to mean the daily rate of pay at which the service rendered by the injured employee is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury. It is now well settled through repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of this state that the Workmen’s Compensation Act was intended to insure an employee against the loss or diminution of earning capacity and compensation benefits should be based upon the number of days the workman could have been employed had he not been injured. The test, therefore, which is now employed, is the ability of the employee to work. Rylander v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 1933, 177 La. 716, 149 So. 434; Calhoon v. Meridian Lumber Company, 1934, 180 La. 343, 156 So. 412; Jarrell v. Travelers Insurance Company, 1950, 218 La. 531, 50 So.2d 22; Troquille v. Lacaze’s Estate, 1953, 222 La. 611, 63 So.2d 139; Caddo Contracting Company v. Johnson, 1953, 222 La. 796, 64 So.2d 177; Carrington v. Consolidated Underwriters, 1956, 230 La. 939, 89 So.2d 399. The effect of these decisions has been to recognize the six day week as a constant factor which must be used in calculating weekly compensation benefits. This rule must be applied regardless of the number of days the employee works for the particular employer by whom he is employed at the time of his injury.

In order to arrive at a basis of the employee’s daily rate of pay when some difficulty is experienced in ascertaining the employee’s daily wage, usually a conclusion is arrived at by a division of the total earnings over some representative period by the number of the days worked; but where the period worked is too short to afford a fair basis for computing earnings, in order to reach an equitable result, it may be necessary to use the representative daily wage paid a wage earner doing the same work. Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law and Practice, Malone, p. 443, notes 69 and 70 with reference to case authorities.

An employee paid on a per unit basis not infrequently encounters differences in his daily earnings. This can result from many factors which affect the amount of his output or production. Thus, in the case of an employee, such as plaintiff in this case, who worked in the woods assisted by a helper, and who used a power saw, his daily wage depended on the number of hours he worked, the condition of the timber, his or his helper’s skill in the use of a power tool, the ability to employ his available time, the number of hours per day he worked, the condition of his health, or other circumstances.

On October 8, 1956, Sepulvado, accompanied by his son, Arvin, began to cut pulpwood and received wages for working four days of the week commencing with October 8th, and for either three or four days of the following week. James Glover transported Jeff and Arvin Sepulvado to their place of work and kept account of the amount of cords cut by the father and son who worked as a team, alternating in the use of the saw and axe.

James Glover was a man of most limited education. He received the per cord measurements for each employee from a representative of the principal contractor and delivered these slips to his wife who record[180]*180ed the figures in a book which she kept and used as a basis for payments to Jeff Sepul-vado for a week’s work. Payments were usually made in cash.

Soon after the injury of Jeff Sepulvado was reported, Lawrence L. Watkins, an insurance investigator for Crawford & Company, sought to learn the correct daily wage of the injured employee, and consulted James and Mrs. Glover, from whom he obtained information as to wages or earnings which resulted in weekly compensation payments of $15.05, which were promptly made as was payment of all accrued medical expense. Some sixteen months following the accident suit was instituted by plaintiff alleging entitlement to weekly compensation of $35. On the trial of the plea of prematurity and on the merits of the case, James Glover testified to his opinion that Jeff and Arvin Sepulvado as a team could cut an average of about four and one-half cords per day if they would work a full day. This production would entitle them to $13.50 daily wages for their services.

Jeff Sepulvado stated he did not know how much he earned during his employment by James Glover. His testimony indicates that he was hopelessly confused as to dates and other pertinent information. Nor did any of the witnesses produced on his behalf afford the court any assistance in arriving at the actual daily wage earned by Jeff Sepulvado.

The most serious contentions of appellee before this court may be summarized as: (1) “The best and only evidence as to the amount of wood cut * * * is the testimony of Mr. James Glover, his boss, and Jeff Sepulvado”; (2) Forasmuch as Arvin Sepulvado was not an employee of Glover, but only a gratuitous assistant to his father, the total wages earned by the two constitute the earned wages of the appellee; (3) That Jeff Sepulvado testified where he worked over an eight hour day all week his wages wottld be approximately $90 per week; and (4) Testimony of Mrs. Glover and Watkins as to the entries in Mrs. Glover's book are conflicting and do not disclose accurately the daily earnings of appellee. Appellants assert the testimony of Mrs. Glover predicated on entries in a book kept by her, and which data Watkins used as a basis for weekly compensation payments that were accepted without complaint for sixteen months, shows the exact earnings of Jeff and Arvin Sepulvado, whose total earnings must be divided by two in order to find the earnings of the injured employee.

We are of the opinion two of ap-pellee’s contentions may be immediately rejected. The testimony of Jeff Sepulvado is of no assistance to the court. Secondly, we find, resting our conclusion upon the authorities hereinabove referred to, the ability of the employee to work which is an important factor in fixing his earnings, cannot include the labor of Arvin Sepul-vado. Appellee testified he did not know how much wood the team cut, and gave Arvin, who gratuitously worked with him, only a few dollars spending money each week.

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111 So. 2d 178, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 892, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sepulvado-v-argonaut-underwriters-insurance-co-lactapp-1959.