SEPH ACQUISITIONS, LLC, by and through its authorized member, JOSEPH CHIBUZOR CHIMA v. READYCAP LENDING, LLC

• Court: District Court, D. New Jersey
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-11335
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SEPH ACQUISITIONS, LLC, by and Civil Action No. 24-11335 (JXN) (LDW) through its authorized member, JOSEPH CHIBUZOR CHIMA,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER v.

READYCAP LENDING, LLC,

Defendant.

NEALS, District Judge WHEREAS pro se plaintiff Joseph Chibuzor Chima (“Chima”) initiated this action on December 19, 2024, purporting to assert breach of contract and other claims on behalf of Steph Acquisitions, LLC (“Steph Acquisitions” or “Plaintiff”) against Defendant ReadyCap Lending, LLC (“Defendant”) arising from Defendant’s refusal to accept an “International Bill of Exchange” (“IBOE”)1 in satisfaction of an SBA-backed loan Steph Acquisitions secured from Defendant (see Compl., ECF No. 1); and WHEREAS on February 21, 2025, Magistrate Judge Leda Dunn Wettre (“Judge Wettre”) denied Plaintiff’s request for entry of default after Defendant appeared and moved to dismiss. (See ECF Nos. 4, 7, 9.) In the Order, Judge Wettre explained, among other things, that Steph Acquisitions could not proceed in federal court through a non-attorney representative (see ECF No. 9); and

1 See Harp v. Police & Fire Fed. Credit Union, 23-2577, 2023 WL 5152625, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2023) (noting that “bill of exchange” created by pro se plaintiff is “not a valid financial instrument, and other courts nationwide have rejected such ‘frivolous’ attempts to satisfy a debt through a fictitious ‘bill of exchange’”). WHEREAS, thereafter on March 11, 2025, and in response to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a late opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10), Judge Wettre again advised that a limited liability company may not appear pro se and noted that nothing in the record suggested Chima was a licensed attorney authorized to litigate on Steph Acquisitions’ behalf. (ECF

No. 12.) Accordingly, Judge Wettre ordered Steph Acquisitions to obtain counsel by April 15, 2025, warning that failure to do so could result in dismissal of its claims (id.); and WHEREAS rather than retain counsel, Chima filed a motion on March 17, 2025, seeking to substitute himself, in his individual capacity, as plaintiff pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. (ECF No. 13.) Chima signed the motion as Steph Acquisitions’ “Authorized Member” (id.); and WHEREAS on June 6, 2025, Judge Wettre denied Plaintiff’s motion to substitute and issued a Memorandum Order and Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending dismissal of the complaint without prejudice because Steph Acquisitions had failed to comply with the March 11, 2025 Order requiring representation by counsel (ECF No. 16); and WHEREAS on July 10, 2025, this Court adopted the R&R, denied the motion to substitute, and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. (ECF No. 17.)2 The Court further ordered Steph

Acquisitions to have licensed counsel enter an appearance no later than August 11, 2025, advising that failure to comply would result in a dismissal with prejudice (id.); and WHEREAS eleven days later, instead of complying with the Court’s July 10, 2025 Order by securing counsel for Steph Acquisitions, Chima filed a new action in his own name, Chima v. Readycap Lending, LLC, Civil Action No. 25-13597 (JXN)(LDW) (“Chima II”). Although styled as an individual action, Chima II arises from the same SBA loan, the same alleged tender of the IBOE, Defendant’s refusal to accept that instrument as payment, and the same alleged resulting

2 The Court’s Order also denied Defendant’s motions to dismiss the Complaint (ECF Nos. 4, 15) as moot. damages that formed the basis of this matter. (Compare Compl., with Chima II, Compl., ECF No. 13); and WHEREAS, rather than comply with the Court’s July 10, 2025, directive that Steph Acquisitions obtain counsel, Chima commenced a new action asserting substantially the same

factual allegations and legal theories in his own name after the Court had denied his request to substitute himself as plaintiff in this action; and WHEREAS, Seph Acquisitions, LLC, failed to appear by counsel within the time prescribed in, nor did it request an extension to do so; therefore, the Court now dismisses this matter with prejudice pursuant to the July 10 Order; and WHEREAS district courts have an inherent power to “control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants,” Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Accordingly, IT IS on this 25th day of June 2026, ORDERED that the Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice; 4 it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE this matter; and it is further

3 In Chima II, Chima asserts breach of contract (Count I); violation of UCC §§ 3-603 and 3-604 (Count II); and unjust enrichment (Count III). (See id. ¶¶ 13–21.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and declaratory relief. (Id. at *2.) 4 Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Involuntary Dismissal; Effect, provides: If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule--except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates as an adjudication on the merits. Further, in Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Supreme Court cautioned that Rule 41(b) was not intended to govern federal claim preclusion. See 531 U.S. 497, 501-06 (2001). Instead, Rule 41(b)'s reference to “adjudication on the merits” should be read as shorthand for “dismissal with prejudice,” and the effect of dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) is simply to prevent the losing party from bringing the same claims back to the same court. Id. at 505–06. By implication, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) does not necessarily preclude bringing the same claims to a different court. Jackson v. Dow Chem. Co., 902 F. Supp. 2d 658, 669–70 (E.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd, 518 F. App'x 99 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505–06). Accordingly, this Order prevents Plaintiff from bringing the same claims in this Court. ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail.

JU XAVIER NEALS United States District Judge