Sepanski v. Ashleigh Fisher Consulting, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: July 15, 2026
• Docket: 25-1073
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Jefferson Griffin

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 25-1073

Filed 15 July 2026

Wake County, No. 23CV012649-910

ASHLEY SEPANSKI, Plaintiff,

v.

ASHLEIGH FISHER CONSULTING, LLC, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 12 December 2024 by Judge

Rebecca W. Holt in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20

May 2026.

Ryan Hayden Smith for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Davis Hartman Wright LLP, by M. Brad Hill, for Defendant-Appellant.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Defendant Ashleigh Fisher Consulting, LLC, appeals from the trial court’s

order. The trial court granted Plaintiff Ashley Sepanski’s motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing claims. The trial court also denied Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. Defendant argues the trial court erred by relying on Plaintiff’s

interpretation of the contract because Defendant fulfilled all its obligations and acted

in good faith. We agree with Defendant and reverse.

I. Factual and Procedural Background SEPANSKI V. ASHLEIGH FISHER CONSULTING, LLC

Opinion of the Court

In August 2022, Defendant, a small consulting firm, contacted Plaintiff via

LinkedIn to inquire about her consulting services. After a preliminary discussion,

Defendant sent its standardized draft agreement to hire Plaintiff as an independent

contractor. In response, Plaintiff sent a revised version of the agreement containing

redlines and an attachment labeled “Appendix A.” The parties then negotiated the

terms of the agreement until the agreement was fully executed on 29 August 2022.

This agreement remains the only contract between the parties.

Plaintiff immediately began working with Defendant’s client, Doral Investors

Group. On 30 August 2022, Plaintiff sent an invoice for her “September Monthly

Retainer Fee.” Defendant paid this invoice.

The parties’ agreement included the following provisions:

3.1 Compensation. Company agrees to pay Consultant a fee as defined in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. A record of Consultant's time and work for which Consultant should be compensated is to be maintained and reported by Consultant to Company in a timeframe and format designated by Company. Consultant shall additionally submit an invoice to company on a monthly basis.

3.1.1 Client-Related Compensation. Compensation for consulting service related to a client engagement shall be as designated in an addendum to this agreement (Appendix A). Payment to Consultant will be made within ten (10) business days of receipt by Company of Consultant’s invoice.

Appendix A, Plaintiff’s incorporated revision, describes the payment schedule:

A2.1 Consulting services provided are estimated to require a total billable time of approximately 20 hours per week, for which it is agreed that the Consultant will submit an invoice with monthly retainer fee in the amount of $17,000.00 on or before the first of the month.

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(Emphasis added).

Plaintiff drafted a second invoice on 28 September 2022, for an “October

Retainer Fee” and “Additional time as discussed.” Defendant received this invoice on

13 October 2022.

On 18 October 2022, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s work on the Doral

project. Doral expressed it was “unhappy with [Plaintiff’s] performance and w[as]

concerned with the value [it was] receiving relative to the cost.” Defendant offered to

keep Plaintiff’s contract active for projects with other clients, but Plaintiff declined.

Plaintiff did not perform any more work for Defendant after this. Defendant sent

Plaintiff an email confirming the termination of the contract, indicating it would pay

Plaintiff’s October invoice, and told her not to send further invoices. Plaintiff

acknowledged her termination, but also inquired about her payment during the

termination notice period. Defendant reiterated it would not accept any new invoices

since Plaintiff did not do any further work during the termination notice period.

Sometime thereafter, Defendant paid the October invoice.

The agreement contained the following termination notice period provision:

7.2 Early Termination. Either party upon sixty days (60) of written notice may cancel this Agreement. In such case, Company will pay Consultant only for the work completed through the end of the notice period and any expenses incurred by Consultant on Company's behalf, in accordance with Section 3 (Compensation and Expenses).

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Plaintiff then sent a demand letter to Defendant asserting it was in breach of

the contract’s Section 7.2 Early Termination provision. Plaintiff filed her complaint

alleging breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. Plaintiff requested damages in the amount of $34,000: the monthly retainer

fee payments during the sixty-day termination notice period.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on 3 October 2024, and

Plaintiff filed her response and cross motion for summary judgment about a month

later. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment on 12 December 2024. {R. p. 75}. The trial court determined no

material issue of fact existed and entered judgment against Defendant for $26,633.33.

Defendant timely appealed.

II. Analysis

The standard of review for an appeal from summary judgment is de novo. In

re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (citing Forbis v. Neal,

361 N.C. 519, 523–24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)). Summary judgment is proper

when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C.

R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2023). A summary judgment ruling must consider the evidence in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Morrell v. Hardin Creek, Inc., 371

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N.C. 672, 680, 821 S.E.2d 360, 366 (2018) (citing Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83,

530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000)).

Contract interpretation is a matter of law. Advisor L., LLC v. Holland, --- N.C.

App. ---, ---, 927 S.E.2d 39, 43 (2026) (citation omitted); Shelton v. Duke Univ. Health

Sys., Inc., 179 N.C. App. 120, 123, 633 S.E.2d 113, 115 (2006) (citing Internet East,

Inc. v. Duro Communs., Inc., 146 N.C. App. 401, 405, 553 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2001)). Thus,

courts “may enter summary judgment in contract disputes because they have the

power to interpret the terms of contracts,” McKinnon v. CV Indus., Inc., 213 N.C. App.

328, 333, 713 S.E.2d 495, 500 (2011) (citing Hodgin v. Brighton, 196 N.C. App. 126,

128, 674 S.E.2d 444, 446 (2009)), and determine whether the language of a contract

is ambiguous, Morrell, 371 N.C. at 680, 821 S.E.2d at 366.

First, Defendant argues the trial court erred by interpreting the contract under

Plaintiff’s definition of “retainer” because it is not consistent with the contract’s plain

language. Defendant argues its own interpretation—where the payment schedule is

based on work completed—should prevail because it harmonizes the provisions of the

contract and is consistent with contract interpretation principles.

Second, Defendant argues the trial court should have granted Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment because it fulfilled its obligations under the

agreement. Defendant purports, even under Plaintiff’s interpretation, the condition

precedent to payment was not met.

A. Contract Interpretation for the Breach of Contract Claim

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The purpose of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the parties

at execution. Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 409–10, 200 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1973)

(citations omitted). To ascertain the parties’ intent, we start the interpretation

analysis with the plain language of the contract wherein “[u]ndefined words are given

their ordinary meaning consistent with the context in which the term is used.” North

State Deli, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 386 N.C. 733, 740, 908 S.E.2d 802, 808–09

(2024) (citation omitted). This Court may consult standard, nonlegal dictionaries to

discern the ordinary meaning, which is used “unless it is apparent another meaning

is intended.” Peirson v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 249 N.C. 580, 583, 107 S.E.2d

137, 139 (1959).

If the contract language is clear and unambiguous, “effect must be given to its

terms.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 257 N.C. 717, 719, 127

S.E.2d 539, 541 (1962). However, “[a]n ambiguity exists in a contract when either

the meaning of words or the effect of provisions is uncertain or capable of several

reasonable interpretations.” Galloway as Tr. of Melissa Galloway Snell Living Tr.

Dated May 1, 2018 v. Snell, 384 N.C. 285, 288, 885 S.E.2d 834, 836 (2023) (citation

omitted). The mere “fact that a dispute has arisen as to the parties’ interpretation

. . . is some indication that the language of the contract is, at best, ambiguous.” Gay

v. Saber Healthcare Group, LLC, 271 N.C. App. 1, 7, 842 S.E.2d 635, 640 (2020)

(emphasis added) (quoting Salvaggio v. New Breed Transfer Corp., 150 N.C. App 688,

690, 564 S.E.2d 641, 643 (2002)).

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When discerning the meaning of contract terms, “[w]here the immediate

context in which words are used is not clearly indicative of the meaning intended,

resort may be had to other portions . . . to bring them into harmony.” Wachovia Bank

& Tr. Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 355, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970).

“[A] contract must be considered as an entirety. The problem is not what the separate

parts mean, but what the contract means when considered as a whole.” Meehan v.

Am. Media Int’l, LLC, 214 N.C. App. 245, 256, 712 S.E.2d 904, 911 (2011) (citation

omitted). Further, “[i]ndividual clauses in an agreement and particular words must

be considered in connection with the rest of the agreement.” Robbins v. C. W. Myers

Trading Post, Inc., 253 N.C. 474, 477, 117 S.E.2d 438, 440–41 (1960) (citation

omitted).

The Court may also look at “[e]vidence of statements and conduct by the parties

after executing a contract” to determine the practical meaning the parties attributed

to the contract terms. Heater v. Heater, 53 N.C. App. 101, 104, 280 S.E.2d 19, 21

(1981) (citation omitted). “Parties are far less liable to have been mistaken as to the

meaning of their contract during the period while harmonious and practical

construction reflects that intention.” Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282

N.C. 585, 601, 194 S.E.2d 133, 144 (1973) (citation omitted). “The parties are

presumed to know the intent and meaning of their contract better than strangers.”

Davis v. McRee, 299 N.C. 498, 502, 263 S.E.2d 604, 607 (1980). However, “[i]t is not

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the understanding or intent of one of the parties that controls the interpretation.”

Vestal v. Vestal, 49 N.C. App. 263, 268, 271 S.E.2d 306, 310 (1980) (citation omitted).

B. The Contract’s Plain Meaning

Defendant contends the trial court erred by relying on Plaintiff’s interpretation

of the word “retainer” as a means to secure someone’s availability. Instead,

Defendant argues the retainer payments functioned as an advance on billable work,

directly connected to Plaintiff’s consulting services actually provided.

Defendant points to the language in the termination notice period which said,

“Company will pay Consultant only for the work completed.” In contrast, Plaintiff

argues a plain text reading of the payment provisions in the agreement required a

monthly fee to secure Plaintiff’s availability. We now turn to the contract

interpretation analysis.

1. The Contract Language Used

In the contract, “retainer” appears solely in Appendix A2.1: “the Consultant

will submit an invoice with monthly retainer fee.” Since the word “retainer” is

undefined in the contract, this Court consults standard, nonlegal dictionaries to

ascertain the plain meaning of the word. Merriam-Webster defines retainer as “a fee

paid to a lawyer or professional adviser for advice or services or for a claim on services

when needed.” Retainer, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/retainer (last visited June 23, 2026). The Oxford English

Dictionary defines retainer as “a sum paid to secure a person’s services as and when

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required.” Retainer, Oxford English Dictionary,

https://www.oed.com/dictionary/retainer_n1?tl=true&tab=meaning_and_use (last

visited June 23, 2026). The Cambridge Dictionary defines retainer as “an amount of

money that you pay someone so as to be sure that that person can work for you when

you need them to.” Retainer, Cambridge Dictionary,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/retainer (last visited June 23,

2026).

These dictionary definitions all include some service in exchange for

compensation. For each definition, there is an expectation that work will come: “for

advice or services;” “as and when required;” and “to be sure that person can work.”

Here, however, upon early termination, there was no expectation for any future work.

When Defendant informed Plaintiff her work with Doral was done, Defendant offered

to keep the contract active in the event Defendant could staff her on another project.

Plaintiff declined. That same day, Defendant sent Plaintiff an email confirming

termination and told her not to send any more invoices because there would not be

any further client work to invoice for. At her choice and decision, Plaintiff had notice

her services were no longer required and there would not be any additional work for

her to complete.

Although Plaintiff contends in her deposition the retainer fee was for her

availability for the sixty-day termination period, in discussing what the advanced

payment was based upon, she states:

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The advance would be based upon [Defendant’s] estimate that the work that I was to accomplish would be approximately in at least 20 hours per week . . . so therefore, $17,000 in advance says to me that there would be 80-ish hours per month available for me to work and he instead of dealing with hourly, wanted to pay a cumulative sum to make it easier and the 17,000 would then cover the estimation of 20 hours per week that he would have available for work.

This explanation provides context on the payment expectations between the

parties. Plaintiff believed this retainer would be a substitute “instead of dealing with

hourly” for an “estimate [of] the work [Plaintiff] was to accomplish.” This statement

tends to show Plaintiff knew the retainer was directly connected to the future

accomplishment or her completion of estimated work.

Other provisions of the contract align with Defendant’s definition of retainer

as an advance on future billable work. Section 3 states: “[a] record of Consultant’s

time and work for which consultant should be compensated is to be maintained and

reported.” The termination terms in Section 7.2 outline Plaintiff’s payment “only for

the work completed.” In the Appendix, the compensation section begins with

“[c]onsulting services provided,” not availability or mere time. These provisions

demonstrate that Plaintiff should have received payment for her completed and

provided work.

Here, Plaintiff’s purported definition of “retainer” as relying solely on

availability would not be harmonious with other sections of the contract. The

“retainer” language is not ambiguous and effect must be given to the contract’s terms

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altogether. See Weyerhaeuser Co., 257 N.C. at 719, 127 S.E.2d at 541. We hold

Defendant did not have the obligation to pay the retainer fee during the termination

notice period.

2. Conduct After Execution

For additional assistance in understanding the parties’ intent, this Court may

look to conduct of the parties after a contract is executed. Heater, 53 N.C. App. at

104, 280 S.E.2d at 21.

While Appendix A reads the Consultant will submit an invoice with the

monthly retainer fee “on or before the first of the month,” in practice, Plaintiff

submitted her invoices inconsistently. In accordance with Appendix A, the first

invoice for Plaintiff’s “September Fee” was sent on 30 August 2022. However, the

second invoice was not sent until the middle of October for Plaintiff’s “October

Retainer Fee.” Further, the contract provides Defendant with ten business days to

pay the invoice, which means payment is not mandated nor has been completed

consistently in practice “on or before the first of the month.” In analyzing the parties’

conduct, the retainer payment was consistently sent after Plaintiff had completed at

least some work for Defendant’s client.

Post-execution conduct by the parties highlights a payment structure that was

inconsistent with a retainer to be paid solely for availability. Even if Plaintiff

intended for the retainer fee to be an advance for availability, the intent of one party

does not control, Vestal, 49 N.C. App. at 268, 271 S.E.2d at 310; instead, in looking at

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both parties’ conduct, the contract was not executed with payment solely for

Plaintiff’s availability in mind.

C. Defendant Fulfilled Its Obligations Under the Agreement

A breach of contract claim requires that terms of the agreement be breached.

McKinnon, 213 N.C. App. at 333, 713 S.E.2d at 500. Here, Defendant did not breach

the contract because its actions were consistent with what was required of it during

the termination notice period. Defendant did not have to compensate Plaintiff

because Plaintiff did not complete any further work for the company as required for

payment during the notice period.

III. Conclusion

We hold the trial court erred by granting Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim

because the payment structure is determined by work completed. Based upon this

definition, Defendant did not breach the contract nor breach the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment

for Plaintiff, vacate that order, and remand for entry of summary judgment for

Defendant.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judges TYSON and ARROWOOD concur.

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