Senrick Shern Wilkerson v. Stephen Ray Lafuente, ET AL.

• Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
• Decided: December 30, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02374
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION SENRICK SHERN WILKERSON, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:25-cv-2374-B-BN § STEPHEN RAY LAFUENTE, ET AL., § § Defendants. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Senrick Shern Wilkerson filed a pro se complaint alleging state-law claims for legal malpractice, breach of contract, and fraud and misrepresentation relating to felony cases from 2008 and 2010. See Dkt. Nos. 3, 9. And United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred Wilkerson’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. After reviewing the complaint, the undersigned questioned whether there was subject matter jurisdiction and entered a notice of deficiency and order (“NOD”) requiring Wilkerson to file an amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 6. And in response, Wilkerson filed an amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 10. But the amended complaint generally does not resolve the deficiencies in the original complaint and to the extent that it should be liberally construed as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to Wilkerson’s convictions, those claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). So the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action. Legal Standards

A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed IFP (that is, without payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll, 470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted). “[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano

v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)). And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett, 2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted).

And, because “‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)), “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level,” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999) (citations omitted). And, if the party invoking federal jurisdiction fails to establish it, the lawsuit

must be dismissed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Because federal jurisdiction is not assumed, “the basis upon which jurisdiction depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633,

636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction, parties must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’ in their pleadings.” (quoting Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259)). As to dismissal for failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, just “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of

categories of statements, including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)). And, so, to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));

see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’ is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)). Analysis Wilkerson’s listed causes of action are all state law claims directed at his defense attorneys – (1) a claim for legal malpractice, (2) a claim for breach of the

contract for legal representation, and (3) a claim for fraud and misrepresentation based on representations about defendants’ “intentions and ability to provide competent legal representation.” See Dkt. No. 9 at 11-12. So at least with respect to the fully pled causes of action, there is no basis for federal question jurisdiction. And because all the parties appear to be citizens of Texas, see id. at 3, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction.

But, while it is not listed as a cause of action, Wilkerson does assert that he brings his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights and “conspiracy to violate due process,” id. at 2, and many of the defendants are not subject to the claims listed under causes of action. But to the extent that Wilkerson’s complaint should be liberally construed as bringing claims under Section 1983, he “demands relief [currently] barred by Heck v. Humphrey,” 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and therefore “fails to state a claim.” Ray v. Recovery Healthcare Corp., No. 22-10303, 2022 WL 16945898, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (per curiam) (citing Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 190 (5th Cir. 2022)).

That is, a Section 1983 claim that “falls under the rule in Heck is legally frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.” Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). As to whether a particular civil claim is subject to the rule in Heck, [i]t is well settled under Heck that a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights if that “violation arose from the same facts attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves ‘that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.’” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting, in turn, Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)); accord Magee v. Reed, 912 F.3d 820, 822 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“In Heck, the Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff’s civil rights claim for damages challenges the validity of his criminal conviction or sentence, and the plaintiff cannot show that such conviction or sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside, the claim is not cognizable under § 1983.” (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)). Put differently, “Heck does not allow a civil rights lawsuit to be an alternative vehicle to a criminal case for challenging law enforcement decisions that resulted in arrest or prosecution unless the criminal case was resolved ‘in favor of the accused.’” Morris v. Mekdessie, 768 F. App’x 299, 301 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up; quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 484). Wilkerson fails to show that the criminal conviction that underlies his civil

claims has been reversed, invalidated, set aside, or otherwise resolved in his favor. To the contrary, the allegations in the complaint indicate that the criminal conviction still stands. See Dkt. No. 9 at 5 (“Plaintiff is being forced to register[] with the State of Texas sex control unit as a sex offender….”). So the claims asserted – calling that conviction into question – are currently subject to the rule in Heck and thus not cognizable. And, where this is the case, the Court should dismiss the lawsuit without

prejudice, as a Heck “dismissal ‘does not preclude a later claim meeting the preconditions for suit.’ That is, a Heck dismissal is a dismissal without prejudice.” Cook v. City of Tyler, Tex., 974 F.3d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (cleaned up; quoting Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996); citing Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc)). Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice. A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: December 30, 2025

DAVIDL.HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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