Senpike Mall Co. v. Assessor of New Hartford

136 A.D.2d 19, 525 N.Y.S.2d 104, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2056
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 4, 1988
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 136 A.D.2d 19 (Senpike Mall Co. v. Assessor of New Hartford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Senpike Mall Co. v. Assessor of New Hartford, 136 A.D.2d 19, 525 N.Y.S.2d 104, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2056 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Boomer, J.

Petitioners, the owners of a regional shopping mall in the Town of New Hartford, brought this proceeding pursuant to Real Property Tax Law article 7, to reduce the assessments upon their property. After a trial, the Judicial Hearing Officer reduced the assessments from $4,566,400 for the tax years 1982 through 1984 to $3,179,750 for 1982, $3,284,250 for 1983, and $3,372,500 for 1984. On appeal the assessors of the town and the school district raise several issues, all but one of which may be briefly addressed.

The decision of the Federal court involving the value of the property in 1982 does not collaterally estop the owners from establishing a different value in this proceeding. In that action (Interstate Props, v Pyramid Co., 581 F Supp 982), the District Court, based upon the testimony of a real estate appraiser, determined that the value of the mall in 1982 for mortgage purposes was $55,000,000 and, accordingly, it determined that the mortgage loan made by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Fund was excessive and ordered the owners to return a portion of the loan. The appraiser in that case had testified that, in valuing the mall for mortgage purposes, he considered its value subject to the existing financing. With the existing financing, he concluded, the property was worth $55,000,000, but without that favorable financing, it would be worth only $43,000,000.

Although the Federal court, in determining the value of the property for mortgage loan purposes, valued the property subject to existing financing, the rule is otherwise in determin[21]*21ing value for assessment purposes. In tax certiorari proceedings, the property must be valued without regard to its existing mortgage financing (Matter of Mid-Island Shopping Plaza v Podeyn, 25 Misc 2d 972, 989, affd 14 AD2d 571, affd 10 NY2d 966). Since the issue in the Federal action was not the same as the issue presented here, the principle of collateral estoppel does not apply.

The Judicial Hearing Officer properly declined to give great weight to the principal amounts of the mortgage loans and to the fire insurance coverage on the property (see, Farash v Smith, 59 NY2d 952, 955; People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v Miller, 287 NY 126; Matter of River House Co. v Assessor of City of Binghamton, 56 AD2d 980, Iv denied 42 NY2d 811).

The assessors contend that, in using the income approach in valuating the property, the owners’ appraiser improperly excluded from his estimate of gross income certain payments made by the tenants for the use of the fixtures and equipment paid for and installed by the owner. These payments were properly excluded in estimating the value for assessment purposes because the items installed were not taxable as part of the realty.

There is no merit to the assessors’ contention that the Hearing Officer should have relied upon the market data approach submitted by the assessors’ appraiser rather than upon the income approach. The Hearing Officer properly rejected the market data approach submitted on behalf of the assessors because he found that none of the sales relied upon by the appraiser were sufficiently comparable to the subject property to serve as a reliable guide to its value. In the case of income-producing properties, particularly shopping malls where investors are interested in net income, "the capitalization of income approach is usually a sure guide to value” (Roosevelt Nassau Operating Corp. v Board of Assessors, 68 Misc 2d 183, 188, affd 41 AD2d 647, mot to dismiss appeal granted 33 NY2d 825, Iv denied 34 NY2d 514, and cases cited therein).

The issue requiring more extended analysis concerns the proper treatment of the real estate taxes. The assessors contend that the owners’ appraiser and the Hearing Officer, in their income approach, improperly used the "assessor’s formula” and thus erroneously took credit for taxes paid by the tenants.

[22]*22The income approach to valuation is based on the premise that income-producing property derives its value from the net income it is able to produce. In estimating the value by this method, the appraiser estimates the fair market rental of the property, deducts a percentage for vacancy and loss of rentals, and arrives at the effective gross income. From this he deducts the reasonable expenses of the property to arrive at the net income, which he capitalizes at a rate representing the rate of return a knowledgeable investor would expect from the property. Ordinarily, in the case of rental property, real estate taxes are the responsibility of the owner and in using the income method of valuation, real estate taxes are deducted as an expense in arriving at net income.

In the case of valuation for tax certiorari purposes, however, deduction of the actual real estate taxes paid may result in a distortion of the value. This may be illustrated by the figures in the present case. The taxes for the initial year in question were $1,263,196. The owner, however, is seeking a reduction in his assessment, and if the assessment is reduced based on his estimate of value, the real estate taxes will be only $1,020,515, rather than the $1,263,196 actually paid, and the owner will get a refund of $242,681 in taxes. This will increase his net income by $242,681 which, when capitalized here at the rate of 12.5%, would result in a value of $1,941,448 more than if the taxes were not reduced and the tax expense remained at $1,263,196.

Thus, in using the income approach for tax certiorari purposes, the proper method is not to deduct the existing real estate taxes as an expense, but instead to use what is called the "assessor’s formula” by adding to the capitalization rate a factor

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Bluebook (online)
136 A.D.2d 19, 525 N.Y.S.2d 104, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2056, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/senpike-mall-co-v-assessor-of-new-hartford-nyappdiv-1988.