Semon Bache & Co. v. United States

25 C.C.P.A. 239, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 201
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 23, 1937
DocketNo. 4074
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 25 C.C.P.A. 239 (Semon Bache & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Semon Bache & Co. v. United States, 25 C.C.P.A. 239, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 201 (ccpa 1937).

Opinion

LeNuoot, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal involves the classification for duty of certain glass rods imported at the port of New York during the years 1931, 1932, 1933 and 1934.

They were classified and assessed for duty by the collector under subparagraph (b) of paragraph 218 of the Tariff Act of 1930, at the rate of 65 per centum ad valorem. Appellant protested, claiming the merchandise to be dutiable under paragraph 227 as optical glass at the rate of 50 per centum ad valorem, or under the provisions of paragraph 230 at the rate of 50 per centum ad valorem. Various other claims were made in the protests, none of which were pressed before the trial court or before us.

At the trial two witnesses testified in behalf of appellant, and certain exhibits, both physical and documentary, were introduced. Among [241]*241the physical exhibits so introduced were samples of the involved merchandise, marked ‘‘Collective Exhibit 1.” The Government offered no evidence.

The Customs Court, First Division, overruled the protests and •entered judgment accordingly, whereupon appellant took this appeal from such judgment.

The provisions of said tariff act here involved read as follows:

PAR. 218. * * * * * . *
(b) Tubes (except gauge glass tubes), rods, canes, and tubing, with ends ■finished or unfinished, for whatever purpose used, wholly or in chief value of glass, 65 per centum ad valorem * * *.
Par. 227. Optical glass or glass used in the manufacture of lenses or prisms for ■spectacles, or for optical instruments or equipment, or for optical parts, scientific •or commercial, in any and all forms, 50 per centum ad valorem.
Par. 230. ******
(d) All glass, and manufactures of glass, or of which glass is the component of •chief value, except broken glass or glass waste fit only for remanufacture, not ■specially provided for, 50 per centum ad valorem.

In its decision the Customs Court said:

The testimony establishes that the merchandise at bar is “rods, canes * * * wholly or in chief value of glass,” and that it is “optical cane” glass or “optical glass.” It will be observed that paragraph 218 (b) provides for rods or canes “for whatever purpose used”, and that paragraph 227 relates to “optical glass or glass used in the manufacture of lenses”, etc., “in any and all forms.” It will be noted in addition that paragraph 227 indicates that the glass covered thereby is such as is “used in the manufacture of lenses or prisms for spectacles, or for optical instruments or equipment, or for optical parts, scientific or commercial.” It has not been established that the glass at bar is used in the manufacture of lenses or prisms for spectacles. Therefore, we must assume it is not this class of glass. It is used in making reflecting danger signals or signs for automobiles, or reflecting advertising signs. Is such a use “in the manufacture of * * * optical instruments or equipment for optical parts”? In other words, are reflecting danger signals or signs for automobiles or reflecting advertising signs ■“optical instruments or equipment” or “optical parts”? We think not.
It will be observed that the words of paragraph 227 are “optical glass or glass used in the manufacture of lenses or prisms for spectacles, or for optical instruments.” We are of opinion that what follows the third word in this clause “or” is in effect a definition of such optical glass as is intended to be covered by the paragraph, viz, that said optical glass is such glass as is used as material in the manufacture of lenses or prisms for spectacles, or for optical instruments •or equipment, or for optical parts. (See quotation from Central Scientific Co. ■case, infra.) It does not seem to us that the reflector buttons or even the lenses that are manufactured from the glass rods at bar are lenses “for optical instruments or equipment, or for optical parts.” Can flashlights, advertising signs, or reflecting danger signals for automobiles be termed “optical instruments or equipment” or “optical parts”? We think not.

[242]*242The court expressly held that, “as shown by the facts,” the involved glass rods are not embraced within the provisions of paragraph 227, and that, under the authority of our decision in the case of United States v. Meadows, Wye & Co., 23 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 276, T. D. 48143, they were properly classified by the collector under the provisions of paragraph 218 (b).

Before us appellant contends that the Customs Court did not correctly construe said paragraph 227. In the brief of its counsel it is stated:

Had Congress recognized “optical glass” as glass irrevocably dedicated to the uses enumerated in the second clause then there would have been no reason for the eo nomine provision for optical glass. The intent of Congress could not have been to describe the same kind of glass in both clauses. Therefore, it is obvious that the intendment of this paragraph is to provide for two different kinds or classes of glass, one of which “optical glass” is provided for eo nomine without qualification, limitation or restriction, the other of which, non-optical glass, was very carefully restricted.
Reading the word “or” as the word “and” enables the paragraph to express correctly the legislative intention. Such reading is permissible in order to give expression to the real enactment (People ex rel Municipal Gas Company v. Public Service Commission, 224 N. Y. 156, 165).

We do not find it necessary to pass upon the correctness of the construction given the paragraph by the trial court for the reason that we are convinced that the record fails to establish that the imported merchandise is optical glass within the meaning of that term as used in paragraph 227, either as construed by the trial court or by appellant's counsel.

Optical glass is defined by lexicographers as follows:

Optical glass: A flint-glass used in the manufacture of optical instruments. It contains a large proportion of lead, and hence is of great density. — Century Dictionary.
Optical glass: Flint glass containing a high percentage of lead.' — Funh & Wag-nails New Standard Dictionary.
Optical glass: An extra fine quality of flint or crown glass used for making lenses, prisms, etc. — Webster’s New International Dictionary.
Optical glass. — The term is usually regarded as applying to the highest qualities of glass used for telescopes, microscopes, camera lenses and scientific instruments of precision and not to spectacle lenses and pressed lenses for which inferior glass is used. * * *■ — Encyclopaedia Britannica, Yol. 10, p. 417.

From an examination of modern standard works on glass making we are of the opinion that optical glass may be made of crown glass, and that a high percentage of lead is not essential.

In the Summary of Tariff Information 1929, Yol. 1, p. 551, we find the following statement:

Optical Glass
Description and uses.

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Related

Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States
468 F. Supp. 1318 (U.S. Customs Court, 1979)

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25 C.C.P.A. 239, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 201, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/semon-bache-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1937.