SELWYN VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS v. CLINE & CO.

651 S.E.2d 909
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedNovember 6, 2007
DocketNo. COA07-116.
StatusPublished

This text of 651 S.E.2d 909 (SELWYN VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS v. CLINE & CO.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SELWYN VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS v. CLINE & CO., 651 S.E.2d 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

TYSON, Judge.

Cline & Company, Inc. ("defendant") appeals from order entered enforcing a settlement agreement with Selwyn Village Homeowners Association ("plaintiff") and from *910judgment entered awarding plaintiff $26,000.00. We dismiss defendant's appeal.

I. Background

In June 2003, plaintiff's condominium units were flooded during a rain storm. During this time, defendant was responsible for managing plaintiff's homeowners association. Edwards, Church & Muse, Inc. ("ECM") provided hazard insurance to plaintiff. Plaintiff made a timely claim, together with a proof of loss under the insurance policy obtained by defendant and ECM for the association. Plaintiff subsequently discovered the property was grossly underinsured. Plaintiff brought an action against defendant and ECM alleging breach of contract and negligence.

On 26 April 2006, during the third day of trial, the parties settled the case. The settlement agreement provided defendant shall pay $26,000.00 to plaintiff in installments and the terms of the settlement shall include a confidentiality and non-disparagement agreement. The confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions were to be "worked out" by the parties in a mutually agreeable consent order.

On 25 May 2006, while negotiations were underway concerning the wording of the consent order, plaintiff's counsel was asked by plaintiff's board of directors to explain the settlement terms to members of its homeowners association. Defendant discovered this disclosure and refused to finalize the settlement documents or to make payment to plaintiff. Defendant argued the disclosure by plaintiff's counsel to the members of plaintiff's homeowners association violated the confidentiality and non-disparagement agreement and rendered the settlement void.

On 12 July 2006, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice against ECM regarding this action. On 19 July 2006, plaintiff moved to enforce the settlement agreement. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion. Defendant appeals.

II. Issues

Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) concluding plaintiff did not breach the terms of the settlement agreement; (2) finding members of plaintiff's homeowners association were clients of plaintiff's counsel and were entitled to receive the settlement information; (3) concluding plaintiff's counsel did not intend his report to disclose information other than what related to the settlement agreement; (4) finding that Kelly Ann Cline "surreptitiously" recorded communications between plaintiff's counsel and plaintiff's members; (5) concluding the disclosures made by plaintiff's counsel were not damaging to defendant; and (6) entering judgment against defendant.

III. Motion to Dismiss for Appellate Rules Violations

On 18 May 2007, plaintiff moved to dismiss defendant's appeal for numerous appellate rule violations. Defendant has failed to amend or correct the errors raised in plaintiff's motion to dismiss.

A. Appellate Rules Violations

"It is well settled that the Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory and not directory. Thus, compliance with the Rules is required." State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 311, 644 S.E.2d 201, 202 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Our Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the Appellate Rules is neither new nor has changed in the past 120 years. In 1889, in the case of Walker v. Scott, our Supreme Court stated:

The impression seems to prevail, to some extent, that the Rules of Practice prescribed by this Court are merely directory-that they may be ignored, disregarded and suspended almost as of course. This is a serious mistake. The Court has ample authority to make them. (The Const., Art. IV, sec. 12; The Code, sec. 961; Rencher v. Anderson, 93 N.C. 105 (1885); Barnes v. Easton, 98 N.C. 116, 3 S.E. 744 (1887).) They are deemed essential to the protection of the rights of litigants and the due administration of justice. They have force, and the Court will certainly see that they have effect and are duly observed, whenever they properly apply.

102 N.C. 487, 490, 9 S.E. 488, 489 (1889).

Nearly eighty years ago, our Supreme Court also stated:

*911We have held in a number of cases that the rules of this Court, governing appeals, are mandatory and not directory. They may not be disregarded or set at naught (1) by act of the Legislature, (2) by order of the judge of the Superior Court, (3) by consent of litigants or counsel. The Court has not only found it necessary to adopt them, but equally necessary to enforce them and to enforce them uniformly.

Pruitt v. Wood, 199 N.C. 788, 789-90, 156 S.E. 126, 127 (1930) (emphasis supplied).

"`Violation of the mandatory rules will subject an appeal to dismissal.'" Hart, 361 N.C. at 311, 644 S.E.2d at 202 (quoting Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 65, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299 (1999)). "When our Supreme Court said an appeal is subject to dismissal for rules violations, it did not mean that an appeal shall be dismissed for any violation. Rather, subject to means that dismissal is one possible sanction." Id. at 313, 644 S.E.2d at 203 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

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Related

State v. Sanders
321 S.E.2d 836 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1984)
Steingress v. Steingress
511 S.E.2d 298 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1999)
Viar v. North Carolina Department of Transportation
610 S.E.2d 360 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2005)
State v. Hart
644 S.E.2d 201 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2007)
Lewis v. Craven Regional Medical Center
468 S.E.2d 269 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1996)
Walker v. . Scott
9 S.E. 488 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1889)
Rencher v. . Anderson
93 N.C. 105 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1885)
Bradshaw v. . Stansberry
79 S.E. 302 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1913)
Barnes v. . Easton
3 S.E. 744 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1887)
Pruitt v. . Wood
156 S.E. 126 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1930)
State v. . Newton
177 S.E. 184 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1934)
Pruitt v. Wood
199 N.C. 788 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1930)

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Bluebook (online)
651 S.E.2d 909, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/selwyn-village-homeowners-v-cline-co-ncctapp-2007.