Selmon v. State
This text of 1981 OK CR 95 (Selmon v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION
Charles Earl Selmon, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was charged, tried by a jury, and convicted in the District Court of Creek County, Case No. CRF-76-152, for the offense of Larceny of Domestic Animals, in violation of 4 O.S.1971, § 85.1 et seq., and 21 O.S.1971, § 1716. Punishment was set at three (3) years’ imprisonment in the Department of Corrections, with the last year suspended, and the defendant appeals.
The State’s evidence indicated that on Saturday, September 18,1976, Glendell Gas-kins, the complaining witness, left his farm to visit his father at a Tulsa hospital. Upon his return the next day, he discovered that some cattle were missing from his pasture. He also noticed a mother cow bawling, looking for her calf. Gaskins turned the mother cow loose, and the animal led him across several farms to property leased by the defendant and one Irving Cole. Once he got to the property, Gaskins discovered horse and tire tracks indicating that several cattle had been roped and loaded into trailers from that location. He contacted Deputy Sheriff Stephens and Don Gokeen, the Director of Theft Investigation for the Oklahoma Cattlemen’s Association, and reported the animals missing. Upon investí-[749]*749gation, it was discovered that six (6) of the missing cattle were sold on September 20, 1976, at the Tulsa Livestock Commission Company, and that a check for the sale had been made payable to “Mike Fisher” in the sum of Six Hundred Ninety-Three and 27/100 Dollars ($693.27). The State also presented testimony of three (3) witnesses, who admitted roping the cows for Fifteen Dollars ($15.00) per head. They testified that they brought two trailers for loading purposes, and that it was the defendant who had employed them and led them to the animals.
Taking the stand in his own defense, the defendant testified that he and Irving Cole were partners in the farming business, and that they had suffered losses for two consecutive years because stray cattle came onto their land and ate their crops. He never reported the matter to the police, nor did he investigate ownership of the cattle. He admitted that he and Irving Code paid for six of the animals to be put in a trailer. He also admitted selling them in Tulsa under the name of “Mike Fisher,” because he did not want his bank to know about the transaction. The only significant difference between the defendant’s testimony and the State’s case, and indeed the only defense offered, is the defendant’s insistence that he had no intention of keeping the proceeds of the sale for his own use.
i
The first assignment of error which we will address is the defendant’s assertion that the State failed to prove his intent to steal the animals. In our view, the error alleged is without merit.
In Lemmon v. State, 538 P.2d 596 (Okl.Cr.1975), we sustained a conviction for larceny of domestic animals where evidence of missing animals was supplemented with substantial facts tending to negate the idea that the defendant had obtained the animals in an honest manner. Again, in Bellows v. State, 545 P.2d 1303 (Okl.Cr.1976), another case involving larceny of domestic animals, we held that intent may be inferred from the commission of the crime itself and the absence of evidence to the contrary. The undisputed core of the evidence, as admitted by the defendant, is that he rounded up and sold animals belonging to someone else. His failure to inform the police, his refusal to inquire about the ownership of the animals, and the haste with which the operation was executed, give the appearance of stealth and subterfuge, contrary to the provisions of 4 O.S.1971, § 85.1 et seq., which prescribe the exact procedure for disposing of stray animals.1 The convergence of these facts are sufficient to [750]*750meet the standards articulated in Lemmon and Bellows. Taken together, they provide ample support for the verdict of the jury.
II
The defendant next complains about questions raised in the trial regarding the role of his partner, Irving Cole. Specifically, he asserts that it was error to interject Cole’s name into the proceedings, since Cole was not a defendant in the ease. Such action, the defendant contends, could only be calculated to prejudice the jury. We disagree.
The alleged remarks referred to the following: the partnership between the men; the fact that both men may have' taken the law into their own hands in the past; the fact that Irving Cole paid one-half of the cost of roping and loading the animals; and, whether or not Cole received any cattle as a result of the venture. We find that the actions of the defendant, his friends and his partner, were so interwoven on the day in question, that evidence of Cole’s activities were essential for the jury to understand exactly what had transpired. It was the defendant himself who first brought up the name of Irving Cole as being his business partner. The defendant also said that it was Cole who suggested rounding up the animals. Having denied that he had the requisite intent to steal the animals, and having built up his defense around his relationship with Irving Cole, the defendant cannot now complain about questions raised regarding Cole. See, Burnery v. State, 594 P.2d 1226 (Okl.Cr.1979); Boling v. State, 589 P.2d 1089 (Okl.Cr.1979). Indeed, such questions were consistent with the defense theory regarding the events on the day in question. Further, the defendant’s conduct was so closely related to that of his partner, that Cole’s whereabouts and actions were highly probative in establishing the State’s theory as to what happened.
In light of the defendant’s own testimony, and in view of the uncontroverted nexus between the conduct of both men, we hold the evidence admissible as tending to help the jury understand the entire transaction. See, Bruner v. State, 612 P.2d 1375 (Okl.Cr. 1980). Moreover, in Instruction No. 8,2 the [751]*751court instructed the jury not to consider evidence of other crimes in reaching its decision. This was a cautionary step designed to guard against the possibility of prejudice to the defendant. The jury’s decision of three (3) years’ imprisonment, out of a possible ten (10) years suggests to us that the instruction of the court was heeded. This assignment of error is thus without merit, and the judgment and sentence appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
1981 OK CR 95, 633 P.2d 748, 1981 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 251, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/selmon-v-state-oklacrimapp-1981.