Sellers v. Life Insurance Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Sellers v. Life Insurance Co.

171 S.E. 328, 205 N.C. 355, 1933 N.C. LEXIS 556

Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided November 1, 1933·Published·Cited by 9 cases

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

It is conceded that the policy in suit lapsed on 12 July, 1932, for nonpayment of balance of the 12 May quarterly premium, unless strict compliance was waived by mailing notice of the next regular quarterly premium due 12 August, 1932, in accordance with the provisions of C. S., 6465.

As tending to support her claim of waiver, the plaintiff relies upon Murphy v. Ins. Co., 167 N. C., 334, 83 S. E., 461, and Moore v. Assurance Corp., 173 N. C., 532, 92 S. E., 362, but these authorities are not accordant with plaintiff’s position. Had the notice been a demand for the payment of the extended balance due on the 12 May premium, similar to the demand in the Murphy case, quite a different situation would have been presented.

The doctrine of waiver, of course, is well established (Ins. Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S., 572), but it is also uniformly held that a note given in extension of payment, in whole or in part, of a premium due on a life insurance policy, which provides for forfeiture of the policy in case the note is not paid at maturity, or that the contract of insurance shall cease and determine upon default in payment of the note according to its tenor, such provision thereupon becomes, for the time being at least, the measuring stick for determining the rights of the parties, and avoids *357 tbe policy, or contract of insurance, if said note is not paid at maturity. Hayworth v. Ins. Co., 190 N. C., 757, 130 S. E., 612; Underwood v. Ins. Co., 177 N. C., 327, 98 S. E., 832; Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 187 U. S., 335; Delhi v. Ins. Co., 213 N. W. (Ia.), 753, 53 A. L. R., 1528.

Mailing notice of tbe regular quarterly premium due 12 August, 1932, in compliance with tbe provisions of tbe statute, was but a routine matter, and did not bave tbe effect of waiving tbe intervening forfeiture and reviving tbe policy. Sexton v. Ins. Co., 160 N. C., 597, 76 S. E., 535; Perry v. Ins. Co., 150 N. C., 143, 63 S. E., 679; McGraw v. Ins. Co., 78 N. C., 149. Tbe demurrer to tbe evidence was properly sustained.

Affirmed.

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Stacy, C. J.

It is conceded that the policy in suit lapsed on 12 July, 1932, for nonpayment of balance of the 12 May quarterly premium, unless strict compliance was waived by mailing notice of the next regular quarterly premium due 12 August, 1932, in accordance with the provisions of C. S., 6465.

As tending to support her claim of waiver, the plaintiff relies upon Murphy v. Ins. Co., 167 N. C., 334, 83 S. E., 461, and Moore v. Assurance Corp., 173 N. C., 532, 92 S. E., 362, but these authorities are not accordant with plaintiff’s position. Had the notice been a demand for the payment of the extended balance due on the 12 May premium, similar to the demand in the Murphy case, quite a different situation would have been presented.

The doctrine of waiver, of course, is well established (Ins. Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S., 572), but it is also uniformly held that a note given in extension of payment, in whole or in part, of a premium due on a life insurance policy, which provides for forfeiture of the policy in case the note is not paid at maturity, or that the contract of insurance shall cease and determine upon default in payment of the note according to its tenor, such provision thereupon becomes, for the time being at least, the measuring stick for determining the rights of the parties, and avoids *357 tbe policy, or contract of insurance, if said note is not paid at maturity. Hayworth v. Ins. Co., 190 N. C., 757, 130 S. E., 612; Underwood v. Ins. Co., 177 N. C., 327, 98 S. E., 832; Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 187 U. S., 335; Delhi v. Ins. Co., 213 N. W. (Ia.), 753, 53 A. L. R., 1528.

Mailing notice of tbe regular quarterly premium due 12 August, 1932, in compliance with tbe provisions of tbe statute, was but a routine matter, and did not bave tbe effect of waiving tbe intervening forfeiture and reviving tbe policy. Sexton v. Ins. Co., 160 N. C., 597, 76 S. E., 535; Perry v. Ins. Co., 150 N. C., 143, 63 S. E., 679; McGraw v. Ins. Co., 78 N. C., 149. Tbe demurrer to tbe evidence was properly sustained.

Affirmed.

Sellers v. Life Insurance Co., 171 S.E. 328, 205 N.C. 355, 1933 N.C. LEXIS 556 (N.C. 1933).

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