STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, SS. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-14-133 '- RECEIVED & F\LEO ANITA SELLARS ' ) . ' '- } { ' -
Plaintiff, ANDROSCOGG\t~ SUPER\0~ COURT v. ) ORDER ) JASON OSBORNE ) ) Defendant. )
Before the court is Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on
Defendant's Second Affirmative Defense, alleging comparative negligence.
I. Background
Plaintiff Anita Sellars and Defendant Jason Osborne were involved in a motor
vehicle collision on April 22, 2012. (Supp. S.M.F. 91 1.) The collision occurred at the
intersection of Route 9, Plummer Mill Rd., and Swamp Rd. in Durham, Maine. (Opp.
S.M.F. 9191 2, 5.) At the time of the collision, Plaintiff was traveling westbound on Route
9. (Opp. S.M.F.
At the intersection, Plaintiff made a right turn from Route 9 onto Swamp Rd. (Opp.
S.M.F. 91 5.) Plaintiff did not have a stop sign or traffic signal controlling her right tum
onto Swamp Rd. (Supp. S.M.F. 91 6; Opp. S.M.F. 91 6.) At about the same time,
Defendant made a left turn across the westbound lane of Route 9 onto Plummer Mill
Rd. (Supp. S.M.F. 91 8.) The front of Plaintiff's vehicle struck the rear of Defendant's
vehicle. (Opp. S.M.F. 91 9; Add. S.M.F. 91 17.)
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on August 19, 2014, alleging
negligence. (Pl.'s Compl. 9191 5-8.) Defendant filed an answer on September 9, 2014,
raising comparative negligence as an affirmative defense. (Def.'s Ans. 2). Plaintiff filed
1 a motion for partial summary judgment regarding the defense of comparative
negligence on May 26, 2015. (Pl.'s M.S.J. 1.)
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if the parties' statements of material fact and
the cited record indicate no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Dyer v. Dep't ofTransp., 2008
ME 106,
case. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the fact finder must choose between
competing versions of the truth." Dyer, 2008 ME 106,
citation and quotation marks omitted). When deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Id.
If a plaintiff moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense, the
defendant opposing summary judgment must establish a prima facie case for each
element of the affirmative defense in order to avoid summary judgment. Reliance Nat'l
Indemnity v. Knowles Indus. Servs., 2005 ME 29,
by the defendant "need not be persuasive at that stage, but the evidence must be
sufficient to allow a fact-finder to make a factual determination without speculating."
Estate of Smith v. Cumberland County, 2013 ME 13, 9I 19, 60 A.3d 759. The plaintiff is
entitled to a summary judgment if the evidence presented by the defendant in support
of its affirmative defense would, if produced at trial, fail to establish a prima facie case
and entitle the plaintiff to a judgment as a matter of law. Addy v. Jenkins, Inc., 2009 ME
46,
2 III. Discussion
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment argues that Defendant has failed
to produce evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case for comparative
negligence. (Pl.'s M.S.J. 2.) Under the Maine Comparative Negligence Act, when a
plaintiff suffers damages as a result partly of the plaintiff's own fault and partly of the
defendant's negligence, the damages recoverable from the defendant must be reduced
to the extent as the jury thinks just and equitable with regard to the plaintiff's share of
responsibility for their damages. 14 M.R.S.A. § 156. Thus, to maintain a defense of
comparative negligence, the defendant must produce prima facie evidence that the
plaintiff's own fault was a proximate cause of the underlying harm that gave rise to the
plaintiff's claim. Sealares v. Fleetwood Homes ofPa., Inc., 2005 ME 94,
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff cites to Defendant's
deposition testimony as demonstrating that Defendant has no evidence to support its
comparative negligence defense. (Supp. S.M.F.
testified that he did not know of any actions by Plaintiff that contributed to the collision,
that he did not see Plaintiff's vehicle long enough to determine if Plaintiff was speeding
when the collision occurred, and that he had no personal knowledge that Plaintiff did
anything wrong to cause the collision. Id.
In support of its opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment,
Defendant cites Plaintiff's testimony at deposition as prima facie evidence of Plaintiff's
own fault. (Add. S.M.F. CJ[CJ[ 15-18.) At deposition, Plaintiff testified that she was
traveling about 25 miles per hour, "maybe more," as she made her tum at the
intersection. (Opp. S.M.F. CJ[ 7.) Plaintiff also testified that she did not know whether
Defendant's left tum signal was activated prior to the collision, that she assumed
Defendant's vehicle would continue on Route 9, and that she never thought
3 Defendant's vehicle might turn onto another road at the intersection. (Add. S.M.F.
17.) Plaintiff further testified that she had traveled through the intersection of Route 9,
Swamp Rd., and Plummer Mill Rd. thousands of times before. (Add. S.M.F.
Plaintiff testified that she thought the intersection of Route 9, Swamp Rd., and Plummer
Mill Rd. was a dangerous intersection as a result of vehicles turning from Route 9 on to
Swamp Rd. or Plummer Mill Rd. at a high rate of speed. (Add. S.M.F.
Defendant also cites his own testimony in support of his opposition to Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. (Add. S.M.F.
intersection of Route 9, Swamp Rd., and Plummer Mill Rd. is a "tough intersection."
(Add. S.M.F.
steepness of the hill Plaintiff was descending make it difficult to see vehicles
approaching the intersection on Route 9. (Add. S.M.F.
looked to his left, to his right, to his left again, and to his right a final time before
proceeding and did not see Plaintiff's vehicle until an instant before the collision. (Add.
S.M.F.
Viewing the evidence produced by both parties in the light most favorable to
Defendant, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff's actions contributed
to the motor vehicle collision. Defendant has produced prima facie evidence in support
of its comparative negligence defense. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment regarding Defendant's affirmative defense of comparative
negligence is denied.
IV. Conclusion
The court denies summary judgment on Defendant's Second Affirmative
Defense.
4 Maryiay Kennedy Jpst}fe, ,_.... Superior C.9- ,'
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, SS. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-14-133 '- RECEIVED & F\LEO ANITA SELLARS ' ) . ' '- } { ' -
Plaintiff, ANDROSCOGG\t~ SUPER\0~ COURT v. ) ORDER ) JASON OSBORNE ) ) Defendant. )
Before the court is Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on
Defendant's Second Affirmative Defense, alleging comparative negligence.
I. Background
Plaintiff Anita Sellars and Defendant Jason Osborne were involved in a motor
vehicle collision on April 22, 2012. (Supp. S.M.F. 91 1.) The collision occurred at the
intersection of Route 9, Plummer Mill Rd., and Swamp Rd. in Durham, Maine. (Opp.
S.M.F. 9191 2, 5.) At the time of the collision, Plaintiff was traveling westbound on Route
9. (Opp. S.M.F.
At the intersection, Plaintiff made a right turn from Route 9 onto Swamp Rd. (Opp.
S.M.F. 91 5.) Plaintiff did not have a stop sign or traffic signal controlling her right tum
onto Swamp Rd. (Supp. S.M.F. 91 6; Opp. S.M.F. 91 6.) At about the same time,
Defendant made a left turn across the westbound lane of Route 9 onto Plummer Mill
Rd. (Supp. S.M.F. 91 8.) The front of Plaintiff's vehicle struck the rear of Defendant's
vehicle. (Opp. S.M.F. 91 9; Add. S.M.F. 91 17.)
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on August 19, 2014, alleging
negligence. (Pl.'s Compl. 9191 5-8.) Defendant filed an answer on September 9, 2014,
raising comparative negligence as an affirmative defense. (Def.'s Ans. 2). Plaintiff filed
1 a motion for partial summary judgment regarding the defense of comparative
negligence on May 26, 2015. (Pl.'s M.S.J. 1.)
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if the parties' statements of material fact and
the cited record indicate no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Dyer v. Dep't ofTransp., 2008
ME 106,
case. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the fact finder must choose between
competing versions of the truth." Dyer, 2008 ME 106,
citation and quotation marks omitted). When deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Id.
If a plaintiff moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense, the
defendant opposing summary judgment must establish a prima facie case for each
element of the affirmative defense in order to avoid summary judgment. Reliance Nat'l
Indemnity v. Knowles Indus. Servs., 2005 ME 29,
by the defendant "need not be persuasive at that stage, but the evidence must be
sufficient to allow a fact-finder to make a factual determination without speculating."
Estate of Smith v. Cumberland County, 2013 ME 13, 9I 19, 60 A.3d 759. The plaintiff is
entitled to a summary judgment if the evidence presented by the defendant in support
of its affirmative defense would, if produced at trial, fail to establish a prima facie case
and entitle the plaintiff to a judgment as a matter of law. Addy v. Jenkins, Inc., 2009 ME
46,
2 III. Discussion
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment argues that Defendant has failed
to produce evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case for comparative
negligence. (Pl.'s M.S.J. 2.) Under the Maine Comparative Negligence Act, when a
plaintiff suffers damages as a result partly of the plaintiff's own fault and partly of the
defendant's negligence, the damages recoverable from the defendant must be reduced
to the extent as the jury thinks just and equitable with regard to the plaintiff's share of
responsibility for their damages. 14 M.R.S.A. § 156. Thus, to maintain a defense of
comparative negligence, the defendant must produce prima facie evidence that the
plaintiff's own fault was a proximate cause of the underlying harm that gave rise to the
plaintiff's claim. Sealares v. Fleetwood Homes ofPa., Inc., 2005 ME 94,
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff cites to Defendant's
deposition testimony as demonstrating that Defendant has no evidence to support its
comparative negligence defense. (Supp. S.M.F.
testified that he did not know of any actions by Plaintiff that contributed to the collision,
that he did not see Plaintiff's vehicle long enough to determine if Plaintiff was speeding
when the collision occurred, and that he had no personal knowledge that Plaintiff did
anything wrong to cause the collision. Id.
In support of its opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment,
Defendant cites Plaintiff's testimony at deposition as prima facie evidence of Plaintiff's
own fault. (Add. S.M.F. CJ[CJ[ 15-18.) At deposition, Plaintiff testified that she was
traveling about 25 miles per hour, "maybe more," as she made her tum at the
intersection. (Opp. S.M.F. CJ[ 7.) Plaintiff also testified that she did not know whether
Defendant's left tum signal was activated prior to the collision, that she assumed
Defendant's vehicle would continue on Route 9, and that she never thought
3 Defendant's vehicle might turn onto another road at the intersection. (Add. S.M.F.
17.) Plaintiff further testified that she had traveled through the intersection of Route 9,
Swamp Rd., and Plummer Mill Rd. thousands of times before. (Add. S.M.F.
Plaintiff testified that she thought the intersection of Route 9, Swamp Rd., and Plummer
Mill Rd. was a dangerous intersection as a result of vehicles turning from Route 9 on to
Swamp Rd. or Plummer Mill Rd. at a high rate of speed. (Add. S.M.F.
Defendant also cites his own testimony in support of his opposition to Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. (Add. S.M.F.
intersection of Route 9, Swamp Rd., and Plummer Mill Rd. is a "tough intersection."
(Add. S.M.F.
steepness of the hill Plaintiff was descending make it difficult to see vehicles
approaching the intersection on Route 9. (Add. S.M.F.
looked to his left, to his right, to his left again, and to his right a final time before
proceeding and did not see Plaintiff's vehicle until an instant before the collision. (Add.
S.M.F.
Viewing the evidence produced by both parties in the light most favorable to
Defendant, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff's actions contributed
to the motor vehicle collision. Defendant has produced prima facie evidence in support
of its comparative negligence defense. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment regarding Defendant's affirmative defense of comparative
negligence is denied.
IV. Conclusion
The court denies summary judgment on Defendant's Second Affirmative
Defense.
4 Maryiay Kennedy Jpst}fe, ,_.... Superior C.9- ,'
5 ANITA SELLARS - PLAINTIFF SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. Attorney for: ANITA SELLARS Docket No AUBSC-CV-2014-00133 SHELDON J TEPLER - RETAINED HARDY WOLF & DOWNING 186 LISBON ST DOCKET RECORD PO BOX 3065 LEWISTON ME 04243-3065
vs JASON OSBORNE - DEFENDANT
Attorney for: JASON OSBORNE J WILLIAM DRUARY JR - RETAINED 09/09/2014 MARDEN DUBORD BERNIER & STEVENS 44 ELM STREET PO BOX 708 WATERVILLE ME 04901-0708
Filing Document: COMPLAINT Minor Case Type: AUTO NEGLIGENCE Filing Date: 08/19/2014
Docket Events: 08/19/2014 FILING DOCUMENT - COMPLAINT FILED ON 08/19/2014
08/19/2014 Party(s): ANITA SELLARS ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 08/19/2014 Plaintiff's Attorney: SHELDON J TEPLER
08/29/2014 Party(s): JASON OSBORNE SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS SERVED ON 08/21/2014 TO MEAGAN OSBORN
08/29/2014 Party(s): JASON OSBORNE SUMMONS/SERVICE - CIVIL SUMMONS FILED ON 08/29/2014
09/09/2014 Party(s): JASON OSBORNE RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER & AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FILED ON 09/09/2014
09/09/2014 ORDER - SCHEDULING ORDER ENTERED ON 09/09/2014 MARYGAY KENNEDY , JUDGE ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
09/09/2014 DISCOVERY FILING - DISCOVERY DEADLINE ENTERED ON 05/09/2015
09/09/2014 ASSIGNMENT - SINGLE JUDGE/JUSTICE ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE ON 09/09/2014 MARYGAY KENNEDY , JUDGE
09/25/2014 Party(s): JASON OSBORNE ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/09/2014 Defendant's Attorney: J WILLIAM DRUARY JR
11/13/2014 Party(s): JASON OSBORNE Page 1 of 2 Printed on: 09/01/2015