Selkin v. Selkin

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Selkin v. Selkin

254 A.D.2d 408, 678 N.Y.S.2d 753, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11077

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 19, 1998

StatusPublished

This text of 254 A.D.2d 408 (Selkin v. Selkin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Selkin v. Selkin, 254 A.D.2d 408, 678 N.Y.S.2d 753, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11077 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered October 13, 1995, which incorporated a stipulation of settlement dated June 16, 1995, the defendant former husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.), dated June 27, 1997, as adopted a Receiver’s Report and Accounting dated March 12, 1997, and granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave to enter a judgment in the sum of $179,045.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court correctly precluded the defendant from relitigating his claim that the terms of the judgment of divorce were unconscionable. This issue was previously addressed in an order of the same court, dated May 22, 1996, from which no appeal was taken (see, Haibi v Haibi, 171 AD2d 842). Further, we decline to exercise our discretion to address the merits of the defendant’s contention (see, Haibi v Haibi, supra).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered October 13, 1995, which incorporated a stipulation of settlement dated June 16, 1995, the defendant former husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.), dated June 27, 1997, as adopted a Receiver’s Report and Accounting dated March 12, 1997, and granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave to enter a judgment in the sum of $179,045.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court correctly precluded the defendant from relitigating his claim that the terms of the judgment of divorce were unconscionable. This issue was previously addressed in an order of the same court, dated May 22, 1996, from which no appeal was taken (see, Haibi v Haibi, 171 AD2d 842). Further, we decline to exercise our discretion to address the merits of the defendant’s contention (see, Haibi v Haibi, supra).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

254 A.D.2d 408, 678 N.Y.S.2d 753, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11077, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/selkin-v-selkin-nyappdiv-1998.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack