1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON May 22, 2026
2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 SELIA R.,1 No. 1:25-cv-3196-EFS
8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING THE ALJ’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS: 9 v. REMANDING FOR PARTIAL PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, FOR A CLOSED PERIOD AND Commissioner of Social Security, FOR FURTHER 11 PROCEEDINGS AS TO Defendant. REMAINING PERIOD 12
Five Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) have reviewed Plaintiff 13 Selia R.’s request for Title 16 benefits based on physical and mental 14 impairments. The most recent ALJ again erred when evaluating the 15 evidence regarding Plaintiff’s hands and mental health. A remand for 16 17
18 1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last 19 initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 20 1 payment of benefits is warranted for the period January 9, 2013–April
2 5, 2017, while a remand for further proceedings, including physical and 3 psychological consultative examinations, is directed for the remaining 4 period of April 6, 2017–August 5, 2024.
5 I. Background 6 On January 9, 2013, at the age of 43, Plaintiff filed for disability 7 based on back pain, depression, and anxiety, and she later
8 supplemented her claim with reports of hand pain and numbness.2 9 Several administrative hearings have been held, and her application 10 for disability has been repeatedly denied.3 Plaintiff testified at each of
11 12
13 2 Administrative Record (AR) 283–95, 96, 340, 358. 14 3 AR 120–42 (July 2015: ALJ’s disability denial); AR 143–48 (Feb. 2017: 15 Appeals Council’s remand); AR 12–35 (April 2018: ALJ’s disability 16 denial); AR 1024–60 (April 2020: district court’s remand, EDWA No. 17 1:19-cv-3041-FVS); AR 1066–100 (Dec. 2021: ALJ’s disability denial); 18 AR 1101–04 (June 2022: Appeals Council’s remand); AR 1727–64 (Oct. 19 2023: ALJ’s non-disability decision); AR 1765–67 (May 2024: federal 20 1 the administrative hearings in 2015, 2017, 2021, 2023, and 2025,
2 providing testimony about her hand symptoms, hip and back pain, 3 anxiety, panic attacks, nightmares, and difficulty concentrating and 4 being in public, and her treatment for such conditions.4 The most
5 recent hearing was held in July 2025 with ALJ Malcolm Ross.5 6 Plaintiff testified that she continues to be anxious in public, has 7 difficulty standing for longer than 20 minutes and with sleeping, and
8 has pain in her hips, thumb, hand, and now elbow.6 9 After the hearing, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, 10 finding Plaintiff disabled when she turned 55 and changed age
11 categories on August 6, 2024, per Medical-Vocational Rule 202.01.7 The 12
13 court remand pursuant to stipulation of parties); AR 1770–71 (July 14 2024: direction from Appeals Council on remand). 15 4 AR 49–75, 858–81, 1915–32, 1705–26. 16 5 AR 1705–26. 17 6 AR 1711–17. 18 7 AR 1667–90. Per 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)–(g), a five-step evaluation 19 determines whether a claimant is disabled. 20 1 ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms were not fully supported and,
2 as to the medical opinions, gave: 3 • significant weight to the light-work opinion of Gordan Hale, 4 MD, except little to no weight to his manipulative and
5 environmental restrictions. 6 • little weight to the mental-health opinions of Emily 7 Shoemaker, LMFT, MHP; Jesse McClelland, MD; and Elsa
8 Haloman, MD. 9 • partial weight to the mental-health opinion of Patricia Kraft, 10 PhD, except little weight to her opinion that Plaintiff needs
11 additional time adapting to routine and help with goals and 12 planning. 13 • little to no weight to the mental-health assessment of Gabriela
14 Mondragon, MSW.8 15 As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found: 16 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
17 activity since January 9, 2013, the date of application. 18
19 8 AR 1676–87. 20 1 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable
2 severe impairments: obesity, degenerative disc disease, carpal 3 tunnel syndrome status post release, status post bilateral 4 trigger finger release, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder,
5 and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 6 • Step three: Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 7 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
8 severity of one of the listed impairments. 9 • RFC: Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with 10 postural and environmental limitations and the following
11 additional limitations: 12 frequently handle and finger bilaterally; . . . simple, routine, and repetitive work; . . . occasional contact 13 with coworkers and supervisors and with superficial, incidental contact with the public; occasional, routine 14 workplace changes; and with work goals set by others.
15 • Step four: Plaintiff has no past relevant work. 16 • Step five: considering Plaintiff’s RFC, education, work history, 17 and age prior to August 6, 2024, Plaintiff could perform work 18 that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, 19 such as housekeeping cleaner, small products assembler, and 20 1 office helper. Beginning on August 6, 2024, when Plaintiff’s
2 age category changed to 55 years old, there were no jobs that 3 exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 4 Plaintiff can perform.9
5 Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s nondisability 6 decision for the period January 9, 2013, to August 5, 2024.10 7 II. Standard of Review
8 The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by 9 substantial evidence or is based on legal error”11 and such error 10 impacted the nondisability determination.12 Substantial evidence is
12 9 AR 1667–90. 13 10 ECF No. 1. 14 11 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. § 15 405(g). 16 12 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on 17 other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (recognizing that the court may 18 not reverse an ALJ decision due to a harmless error—one that “is 19 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 20 1 “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such
2 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 3 support a conclusion.”13 4 III. Analysis
5 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred when evaluating the medical 6 opinions and her subjective complaints, resulting in an RFC that did 7 not include an occasional-fingering limitation, additional supervision,
8 and productivity limitations. The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s 9 challenges amount to an improper request to reweigh the evidence, the 10 ALJ committed no consequential error, and substantial evidence
12 13 Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 13 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 14 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court “must consider the entire record as a 15 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 16 detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion,” not simply the evidence 17 cited by the ALJ or the parties.) (cleaned up); Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 18 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does 19 not indicate that such evidence was not considered[.]”). 20 1 supports the ALJ’s decision. As is explained below, the ALJ’s errors
2 when evaluating Dr. Hale’s occasional-fingering limitation and the 3 mental-health opinions impacted the ALJ’s denial of disability for the 4 at-issue period.
5 A. Manipulation Limitation: Plaintiff establishes 6 consequential error. 7 Rather than utilize Dr. Hale’s occasional-fingering limitation, the
8 RFC allowed for frequent bilateral fingering and handling. Plaintiff 9 argues the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence and is based 10 on a misevaluation of Dr. Hale’s manipulation limitation and Plaintiff’s
11 reported hand symptoms. The Commissioner argues the ALJ’s frequent 12 bilateral fingering and handling limitation is supported by substantial 13 evidence. As is explained below, the ALJ’s errors when evaluating
14 Dr. Hale’s occasional-fingering limitation and Plaintiff’s reported hand 15 symptoms resulted in an incomplete RFC. 16 1. Standards for medical opinions and Plaintiff’s reports
17 When a treating physician’s or evaluating physician’s opinion is 18 not contradicted by another physician’s opinion, it can be rejected only 19 for “clear and convincing” reasons, and when it is contradicted, it can
20 1 be rejected for “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by
2 substantial evidence.14 A reviewing physician’s opinion can be rejected 3 for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence, 4 and the opinion of an “other” medical source can be rejected for specific
5 and germane reasons supported by substantial evidence.15 6 As to Plaintiff’s reported symptoms, the ALJ must assess the 7 intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how
8 they affect her ability to work.16 Factors the ALJ may consider when 9 evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms 10 include: (1) objective medical evidence; (2) daily activities; (3) the
11 location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; 12 (4) factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (5) the type, 13 dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant
15 14 When Plaintiff filed her disability application, a former regulation 16 applied to assessing medical-opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927; 17 Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010). 18 15 Turner, 613 F.3d at 1224. 19 16 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c). 20 1 takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (6) treatment,
2 other than medication, the claimant receives or has received for relief 3 of pain or other symptoms; and (7) any non-treatment measures the 4 claimant uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms.17 If the
5 ALJ finds inconsistency between the claimant’s reported symptoms and 6 the evidence, the ALJ must identify what symptom claims are being 7 discounted and clearly and convincingly explain the rationale for
8 discounting the symptoms with supporting citation to evidence.18 This 9 requires the ALJ to “show his work” and provide a “rationale . . . clear 10 enough that it has the power to convince” the reviewing court.19
11 12 13
14 17 Id. § 416.929(c)(2), (3). See also 3 Soc. Sec. Law & Prac. § 36:25, 15 Consideration of objective medical evidence (2025). 16 18 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c); Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th 17 Cir. 2022); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014); Soc. 18 Sec. Rlg. 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7. 19 19 Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. 20 1 2. Treatment and reported hand symptoms
2 In June 2013, Plaintiff sought treatment for persistent, aching 3 right hand pain for two weeks, primarily in her thumb and base of her 4 thumb, which would “pop,” and the pain was aggravated by making a
5 fist and relieved with modified activity or heat.20 A normal grip 6 strength and tone was observed with tenderness at the base of the 7 thumb and reduced range of thumb movement.21 A month later,
8 Plaintiff still reported pain and popping in the thumb and popping of 9 the thumb joint was observed.22 A thumb splint was provided and a 10 steroid joint injection recommended if symptoms continued.23
11 Symptoms continued, with popping of the thumb again observed.24 12 Late August 2013, Plaintiff was observed with crepitus and limited 13 flexion and extension of her right thumb and crepitus at the
15 20 AR 614. 16 21 AR 614. 17 22 AR 612–13. 18 23 AR 613. 19 24 AR 650–51. 20 1 metacarpophalangeal joint and she was given a steroid injection for her
2 trigger finger/thumb.25 3 Plaintiff reported experiencing numbness in her right arm and 4 hand about nine months later.26 In September 2014, she had a positive
5 Tinel’s sign on her right; she was encouraged to wear a wrist splint and 6 advised that nerve conduction testing and surgery may be needed.27 7 Nerve conduction testing in November 2014 revealed median nerve
8 compromise at or near the right wrist (severe) and left wrist (mild); she 9 was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel affecting the sensory and 10 motor components.28 Surgery was recommended for the right hand.29
11 During an examination a month later, she had reduced strength in the 12 thumb and index finger; x-rays revealed possible osteophyte and 13
15 25 AR 655. 16 26 AR 637. 17 27 AR 638. 18 28 AR 655. 19 29 AR 655. 20 1 sesamoid bones, which could be causing pain.30 At an orthopedic
2 appointment in January 2015, Plaintiff was observed with “left thumb 3 trigger causing A1 pulley tenderness, clicking, and locking, as well as 4 impairment,” and with “severe right carpal tunnel syndrome causing
5 pain, numbness, tingling, as well as impairment.”31 Surgery was again 6 recommended for her right hand, and a corticosteroid injection 7 recommended for the left thumb.32
8 Plaintiff underwent these procedures later that month.33 At her 9 follow-up appointment, Plaintiff still did not have full range of motion 10 in her right hand and limited hand activity was recommended.34 In
11 April 2015, she still reported right wrist pain and was observed with 12 slight decrease in the vibratory sensation in the right hand.35 13
14 30 AR 671. 15 31 AR 659. 16 32 AR 659. 17 33 AR 656. 18 34 AR 1498. 19 35 AR 856. 20 1 At the administrative hearing in May 2015, she testified that her
2 right hand was still weak and painful although with less numbness, 3 she experienced difficulty holding objects, and her left thumb would get 4 swollen and painful.36 At a March 2016 appointment, Plaintiff again
5 complained of hand pain and limitations, including that her right 6 middle finger would get stuck in the flexed position and then painfully 7 “pop,” and she had pain and numbness in her left hand, causing her to
8 drop objects.37 Locking and popping of her right middle finger was 9 observed along with a mid-palm nodule on her right hand and a 10 positive Phalen’s test on her right.38 The provider found the
11 examination consistent with trigger finger on the right middle finger 12 and carpal tunnel of the left hand; it was recommended that Plaintiff 13 wear volar wrist/hand splints and a finger splint for her right middle
14 finger.39 15
16 36 AR 59–60, 73. 17 37 AR 849. 18 38 AR 850. 19 39 AR 850. 20 1 Months later, Plaintiff was again observed with her right middle
2 finger getting stuck in the flexed position and popping; she had been 3 wearing the finger splint “off and on,” finding it unhelpful.40 She was 4 referred for a steroid injection for her right finger and carpal tunnel
5 surgery on her left hand.41 The recommended surgery and injection 6 were performed in November 2016.42 At the post-op appointment in 7 mid-November 2016, she still did not have full range of motion or
8 strength in her left hand and it was recommended that she limit 9 activity until she achieved full range of motion and strength in her left 10 hand.43
11 At an appointment on April 6, 2017, for neck and left shoulder 12 pain related to moving a mattress, Plaintiff reported that “she has not 13 [sic] hand complaints at this time,” and her grip strength was 5/5
14 15
16 40 AR 846. 17 41 AR 847. 18 42 AR 809. 19 43 AR 1491–92. 20 1 bilaterally.44 But then at the administrative hearing in October 2017,
2 she wore braces on both wrist/hands and she testified that she still has 3 trigger finger and she experiences numbness, tingling, and pain in her 4 right hand if she uses it too long.45 Likewise, at the hearing in October
5 2021, Plaintiff testified that she wears braces on her wrists and finger 6 splints at night, when she drives, and during the day if she has 7 hand/finger pain.46 She stated that her right finger, thumb, and wrist
8 start hurting if she uses them too much and her finger gets stuck.47 9 Plaintiff did not seek further medical treatment for hand pain 10 until March 2022 during which she reported pain at the base of her
11 right thumb and index finger, numbness and tingling of all digits of the 12 right hand, diffuse hand pain especially with gripping, and hand 13 weakness after prolonged use.48 She reported that the past steroid
15 44 AR 841. 16 45 AR 870–72. 17 46 AR 1915–16, 1924. 18 47 AR 1923. 19 48 AR 1659. 20 1 injection to her right middle finger and the finger splint had helped,
2 and she had not been wearing the braces at night.49 She was observed 3 with positive tenderness with palpation of the base of the right index 4 finger and thumb, along with trigger finger of the right index finger
5 and a positive Tinel’s on her right.50 It was suggested that she wear the 6 wrist brace at night and a finger splint for her index finger, along with 7 taking over-the-counter medication, and that if symptoms persist, she
8 could have another steroid injection or be referred to an orthopedic.51 9 In March 2023, Plaintiff endorsed right hand pain and numbness, 10 which the provider noted as “persistent symptoms consistent with
11 carpal tunnel syndrome.”52 The provider recommended volar splints 12
13 49 AR 1659. 14 50 AR 1661. 15 51 AR 1661. 16 52 AR 1617, 1678. It is unclear if this is a treatment record from March 17 2023 or a reprint of a prior treatment appointment. Nonetheless, the 18 ALJ considered this to be a treatment appointment in March 2023, and 19 so the Court likewise treats it as such. AR 1678. 20 1 and continuing medication and to obtain nerve imaging if her
2 symptoms persist.53 3 During the June 2023 hearing, Plaintiff testified that both of her 4 hands experience numbness and tingle at night or when she uses them
5 too much, although her right hand hurts more.54 She explained that 6 after the carpal tunnel surgery, she had relief for a period but then her 7 hands started hurting and tingling again; she wears a brace if she
8 drives for a long time; and she has difficulty holding onto a shopping 9 cart on uneven surfaces.55 10 3. Dr. Hale’s Opinion
11 In September 2013, Dr. Hale reviewed the record and opined that 12 Plaintiff could perform light work with occasional fingering with her 13 right hand because of her right thumb trigger-finger symptoms, noting
14 15 16
17 53 AR 1617. 18 54 AR 1940–43. 19 55 AR 1940–41, 1943. 20 1 that they “are seen as likely to resolve.”56 Dr. Hale provided the only
2 physical medical source report of record. 3 4. The ALJ’s findings re: hand limitations and symptoms 4 The ALJ gave “significant weight” to Dr. Hale’s light-work
5 opinion but discounted his occasional-fingering limitation because it 6 “appear[s] excessive compared to his explanation which lack[s] 7 consistency with the treatment, workup findings, and physical
8 examinations.”57 The ALJ stated that Plaintiff “underwent limited 9 treatment until quite recently, where she was noted with primarily 10 subjective symptoms, had full grip strength, and was started on only
11 conservative treatment.”58 As a result, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to 12 frequent, not occasional, bilateral handling and fingering.59 13 When assessing Plaintiff’s reported hand symptoms, the ALJ
14 found them inconsistent with the evidence because (1) her symptoms 15
16 56 AR 111–13. 17 57 AR 1684. 18 58 AR 1685. 19 59 AR 1685. 20 1 were episodic and responded well to treatment, (2) Plaintiff did not
2 seek treatment for hand symptoms between November 2016 and March 3 2022, (3) she gave inconsistent statements as to whether she wore her 4 splints, (4) she often had full grip strength and negative tests, (5)
5 Plaintiff did not seek follow-up care after March 2023 for her hands, 6 and (6) her reported symptoms are inconsistent with her ability to 7 drive, move a mattress, go to the gym, and walk her dog.60
8 5. Analysis of the ALJ’s findings 9 The ALJ failed to fairly consider that Plaintiff’s hand pain and 10 symptoms shifted depending on which fingers and hands were
11 impacted and the course of treatment. As a result, the ALJ’s findings 12 about episodic complaints and responsiveness to treatment are not 13 fairly applied to the entire period.61
14 For instance, Plaintiff did not report any hand symptoms until 15 May 20, 2013—two weeks before the June 3, 2013 appointment at 16
17 60 AR 1678–79, 1683. 18 61 See Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1113–16 (9th Cir. 2021) 19 (requiring that the progression of an impairment must be considered). 20 1 which Plaintiff reported trigger finger symptoms for the past two
2 weeks.62 Accordingly, there is no basis in the record to support an 3 occasional-fingering limitation before May 20, 2013. Therefore, there is 4 no consequential error by the ALJ as to the period of January 9, 2013–
5 May 19, 2013. 6 However, the ALJ’s errors consequentially impacted the RFC for 7 the period of May 20, 2013, to April 5, 2017. Contrary to the ALJ’s
8 finding otherwise, Plaintiff’s hand symptoms did not fully resolve after 9 the first steroid injection to Plaintiff’s thumb and Dr. Hale’s review of 10 the record. Instead, as mentioned above, in 2014, Plaintiff resumed
11 experiencing hand pain and other symptoms, continued to seek 12 treatment for such, including more injections and carpal tunnel release 13 surgery on each hand. It was not until April 2017 that Plaintiff told a
14 treating provider that she did not have any complaints as to her hands. 15
16 62 AR 614. Although Plaintiff did have numbness in her entire left 17 upper extremity and tingling in her left second finger in November 18 2012, this was assessed to be related to left shoulder impairment, not 19 carpal tunnel or trigger finger. AR 597–98. 20 1 The treatment during this 2013–17 period—with two surgeries and
2 three steroid injections—was not conservative nor limited. Moreover, 3 the symptoms observed during this period by treating providers are 4 consistent with the symptoms for which Dr. Hale imposed an
5 occasional-fingering limitation. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision to 6 discount Dr. Hale’s occasional-fingering limitation and Plaintiff’s 7 reported hand symptoms during this period is not supported by
8 substantial evidence. Moreover, the ALJ failed to clearly explain why 9 Plaintiff’s ability to drive a vehicle for child or household purposes was 10 inconsistent with her reported hand symptoms, as Plaintiff reported
11 that she wore braces/splints on her hands when driving, as needed.63 12 Likewise, the ALJ failed to clearly explain how Plaintiff’s mental- 13 health therapy goals in 2023 of walking her dogs short distances or
14 enjoying family BBQs was inconsistent with her hand symptoms.64 15
16 63 AR 1916. 17 64 AR 1622, 1992 (noting that Plaintiff was “progressing” toward her 18 goal of “going to the park, walking the dogs, and planning BBQ’s”); AR 19 1994. 20 1 These errors impacted the ALJ’s nondisability decision as the
2 ALJ did not accept Dr. Hale’s occasional-fingering limitation. Plus, the 3 vocational expert during the 2023 hearing testified that each of the 4 identified jobs required bilateral frequent handling and fingering.65
5 Because Dr. Hale’s opinion is the only physical medical opinion of 6 record, his occasional-fingering limitation is uncontested and is to be 7 credited for the period of May 20, 2013, to April 5, 2017. Benefits are to
8 be awarded for this closed period. 9 For the remaining period of April 6, 2017, to August 5, 2024, the 10 Court finds the ALJ again erred. In March 2022 and 2023, Plaintiff
11 was observed with finger tenderness and popping, which is consistent 12 with her testimony that she continued to experience hand symptoms, 13 notwithstanding her report of improvement in April 2017. The ALJ
14 must resolve whether, during all or a portion of this later period, 15
16 65 AR 1955. Likewise, the vocational expert at the hearing in 2021 17 testified that most of the occupations with no public contact and 18 occasional contact with coworkers requires frequent or constant 19 handling and fingering. AR 1927. 20 1 Dr. Hale’s occasional-fingering limitation is consistent with and
2 supported by the evidence. 3 Complicating this assessment is that more than three years have 4 passed since the most recent treatment record pertaining to Plaintiff’s
5 hands. Even though this matter was remanded multiple times and the 6 Appeals Council referenced that a consultative examination may be 7 warranted, no new consultative examination, either physical or mental,
8 was obtained.66 A new physical consultative examination is necessary 9 to provide context and perspective as to Plaintiff’s bilateral 10 manipulative abilities, along with other exertional abilities, for the
11 period April 6, 2017, to August 5, 2024. The consultative examiner is to 12 be given, minimally, a copy of the November 2 and 15, 2016, March 15, 13 2022, October 11, 2022, March 10, 2023, and May 16, 2023 treatment
14 records.67 15 16
18 66 AR 146. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912, 416.917. 19 67 AR 809, 1491–93, 1653–56, 1610–18, 1659–63, 1989–91. 20 1 6. Conclusion
2 The ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Hale’s occasional-manipulation 3 limitation is supported for the period before May 20, 2013. However, it 4 is not supported for the period on and after May 20, 2013. Dr. Hale’s
5 occasional-fingering limitation is credited for the period May 20, 2013, 6 to April 5, 2017. Remand for further proceedings, including a physical 7 consultative examination, is needed as to the remaining at-issue period
8 of April 6, 2017, to August 5, 2024. 9 B. Non-Exertional Limitations: Plaintiff establishes 10 consequential error.
11 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to 12 Dr. McClelland’s and Dr. Haloman’s consultative psychological 13 opinions. Contrary to the Commissioner’s argument otherwise, the
14 ALJ’s evaluation of these opinions is not based on specific and 15 legitimate reasons supported substantial evidence. A more recent 16 consultative psychological examination is necessary.
17 18 19
20 1 1. Mental-Health Opinions68
2 a. Dr. McClelland 3 In May 2011, Dr. McClelland examined Plaintiff and reviewed 4 the provided mental-health notes.69 He diagnosed Plaintiff with severe,
5 recurrent major depressive disorder and PTSD.70 He opined that 6 Plaintiff should not manage funds as she seemed cognitively impaired; 7 her abilities to accept instructions from supervisors and interact with
8 coworkers and the public were impaired; and she would struggle 9 10
11 68 Other mental-health opinions of record include Ms. Mondragon’s 12 2009 opinion that Plaintiff has difficulty concentrating; 13 Ms. Shoemaker’s 2010 and 2011 opinions that Plaintiff would have 14 difficulty following instructions, concentrating, and interacting with 15 others; and Dr. Kraft’s October 2015 opinion that Plaintiff needed 16 additional time to adapt and help with planning and scheduling. AR 17 86–91, 110–16, 689–94. 18 69 AR 504–08. 19 70 AR 507. 20 1 without special or additional instructions and with attendance,
2 completing a workday, and workplace stress.71 3 b. Dr. Haloman 4 In September 2023, Dr. Haloman conducted a mental-health
5 examination, including a review of a January 2011 depression 6 evaluation and mental-health discharge summary, June and July 2013 7 treatment notes for back and hand pain, and a function report.72 She
8 diagnosed Plaintiff with depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and 9 suspected borderline intellect; found Plaintiff capable of managing 10 funds; and opined that Plaintiff would benefit from clear and simple
11 instructions and would need more supervision to stay on task.73 12 2. The ALJ’s findings as to the mental-health opinions 13 The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. McClelland’s opined limitations
14 because (1) the opinion was issued more than two years before the at- 15 issue period; (2) there was no basis for the PTSD diagnosis because 16
17 71 AR 508. 18 72 AR 618–25. 19 73 AR 623–24. 20 1 there was little mention of childhood abuse in the record; (3)
2 Dr. McClelland was not aware of Plaintiff’s gym attendance, dog 3 walking, and family engagement; (4) his opinion was not supported by 4 his examination; and (5) Plaintiff did not regularly report panic
5 attacks.74 6 The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Haloman’s opinion because (1) 7 it was not established that Plaintiff had borderline intellect; (2)
8 Plaintiff’s reports of hallucinations and panic attacks appear to be 9 raised to seek benefits and were not consistent with treatment or other 10 reports; (3) Plaintiff did not mention child abuse; (4) Plaintiff reported
11 that she delegates tasks to her children; and (5) treatment records 12 after 2013 show improvement with minimal treatment.75 13 3. Analysis of the ALJ’s findings
14 a. Period from January 9, 2013–May 20, 2013 15 As set forth above, benefits are to be awarded on remand for a 16 closed-period beginning May 20, 2013. As a result, there remains about
18 74 AR 1683–84. 19 75 AR 1684. 20 1 four months at the beginning of the alleged disability period, for which
2 analysis of the mental-health opinions is important. As is explained 3 more below, none of the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. McClelland’s 4 and Dr. Haloman’s opinions about Plaintiff’s need for more supervision
5 are supported by substantial evidence for this early period, as any 6 improvement found by the ALJ was after 2013. Therefore, their 7 opinions are to be credited for the period of January 9, 2013–May 20,
8 2013, and benefits are awarded for this period as well. 9 b. Period from April 6, 2017, to August 5, 2024. 10 Because benefits are to be awarded on remand for the earlier part
11 of the at-issue period, review of how the ALJ evaluated 12 Dr. McClelland’s and Dr. Haloman’s opinions is focused on this later 13 period. The ALJ’s reasons for discounting these opinions are addressed.
14 i. Dr. McClelland 15 First, consistent with the prior district court’s ruling, that 16 Dr. McClelland issued his opinion in 2011 is not reason to discount his
17 opinion as to Plaintiff’s long-standing mental-health symptoms.76 18
19 76 AR 1050. 20 1 Second, in addition to reporting childhood abuse to
2 Dr. McClelland, Plaintiff reported childhood abuse to treating 3 providers.77 Thus, the ALJ’s finding that there was no basis in the 4 record to support Dr. McClelland’s PTSD diagnosis or that Plaintiff
5 offered inconsistent statements about prior abuse is not supported by 6 substantial evidence. 7 Third, as to whether Dr. McClelland’s opinion is supported by his
8 examination, the ALJ made no mention that Dr. McClelland noted that 9 Plaintiff “was very slow in answering questions and took a strong effort 10 on her part to focus on the tasks below.”78 Without mentioning this
11 observation by Dr. McClelland, which he noted as a basis for his 12 opinion that she would struggle with attendance and completing a 13 workday, the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. McClelland’s opinion as not
14 supported by his examination is not supported by substantial evidence, 15 16
18 77 AR 472, 483, 685, 1568. 19 78 AR 506. 20 1 considering this observed slowness, along with the observed blunted
2 and depressed affect and 2/3 five-minute recall.79 3 The ALJ’s fourth reason—that Dr. McClelland’s opinion was 4 inconsistent with Plaintiff’s minimal and inconsistent complaints of
5 panic attacks—is also not supported by the record. Plaintiff reported 6 panic attacks to treating providers and during the evaluation with 7 Dr. Haloman, and she had an observed panic attack while at a
8 hospital.80 Moreover, Plaintiff reported to treating providers that she 9 had difficulty leaving the house, and her therapy goals focused on 10 improving her ability to leave the house.81
11 Finally, the ALJ gave unfair weight to the statements in 12 counseling records, twelve years after Dr. McClelland’s evaluation, that 13 Plaintiff went to the gym, walked her dogs, and engaged with her
14 family. These activities could be performed consistent with Plaintiff’s 15 reports that she does not feel comfortable interacting with other people 16
17 79 AR 506–08. 18 80 AR 468, 515, 619, 636, 700, 856. 19 81 AR 847, 1480, 1619. 20 1 besides her family, as she only went to the gym with her daughters and
2 walking her dog did not require interacting with strangers.82 Plus, 3 these 2023 therapy-driven activities reflect that Plaintiff was making 4 progress in reducing her anxiety, and should not be used to discount
5 Dr. McClelland’s opinion issued the prior decade. For instance, in 2014, 6 following her son’s shooting, she was unable to walk to the park, sit 7 outside, or go to the grocery store without fear and worry, and in 2016,
8 after her daughter’s death, she mentioned to a treating provider that 9 she missed appointments due to difficulties leaving the house.83 10 Accordingly, the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. McClelland’s opinion is
11 not based on specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 12 evidence. 13 ii. Dr. Haloman
16 82 AR 1619, 1716–17. See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th 17 Cir. 1984) (disallowing the ALJ from cherry picking evidence to support 18 a conclusion that contradicts the overall diagnostic record). 19 83 AR 632, 675; 847; see also AR 636. 20 1 First, regardless of whether Plaintiff had an intellectual
2 disability diagnosis, Dr. Haloman observed Plaintiff with a poor fund of 3 knowledge, concrete and quite simple thinking, and difficulty with 4 basic tasks.84 The ALJ failed to explain why these observations do not
5 support Dr. Haloman’s opinion that Plaintiff would need prompting 6 and redirection and special or additional instruction or supervision to 7 complete tasks.
8 Second, as mentioned above, contrary to the ALJ’s finding, 9 Plaintiff did complain of panic attacks and a panic attack was observed 10 by a treating provider.85 While the ALJ is correct that the record has
11 little information about hallucinations, Dr. Haloman did not base her 12 opined limitations on reported hallucinations; instead, her pace and 13 supervision limitations were based on Plaintiff’s “need[ for] a lot of
14 prompting and redirection . . . and difficulty understanding 15 instructions.”86 16
17 84 AR 621–24. 18 85 AR 468, 515, 619, 636, 700, 856. 19 86 AR 624. 20 1 As to whether Plaintiff told Dr. Haloman about being abused as a
2 child, Dr. Haloman noted that Plaintiff’s “mom was neglectful” and 3 that Plaintiff had no supervision as a child.87 Plus, Dr. Haloman 4 reviewed records mentioning that Plaintiff reported being abused by
5 the father of six of her children and she was observed with bruising on 6 her arm.88 Thus, Dr. Haloman knew that Plaintiff had suffered abuse 7 and neglect, either at the hands of her mother or a significant other.
8 Other treatment records report abuse as well: “her mother was an 9 alcoholic, neglected and physically abused her when growing up,”89 10 “recalled several childhood memories of her mother which involved
11 beatings and severe abuse,”90 and “Family of origin relationships were 12 marked by neglect and abandonment. . . . There is a family history of 13 violence. Her brother and her mother. Discipline consisted of physical
16 87 AR 469–70, 504, 636, 700. 17 88 See AR 470, 518–22. 18 89 AR 472. 19 90 AR 483. 20 1 abuse by mother. Mother and father were alcoholic.”91 Substantial
2 evidence does not support a finding that Plaintiff provided inconsistent 3 reports pertaining to past abuse. 4 The ALJ also found Dr. Haloman’s opined limitations
5 inconsistent with Plaintiff’s ability to delegate household tasks to her 6 older children and supervise them, finding this “suggests she is able to 7 take on more responsibility than alleged.”92 However, Dr. Haloman was
8 aware that Plaintiff “delegate[d] full-time tasks such as cooking with 9 her children.”93 Dr. Haloman still opined that Plaintiff would need “a 10 lot of prompting and redirection” and that she could not “perform work
11 activities on a consistent basis without special or additional 12 instructions.”94 This opinion was shared by Dr. McClelland, who was 13 also aware that Plaintiff “tells her children what to do,” but still opined
14 that Plaintiff would struggle with being productive without special or 15
16 91 AR 685. 17 92 AR 1684. 18 93 AR 624. 19 94 AR 624. 20 1 additional instructions.95 Likewise, even Dr. Kraft opined,
2 notwithstanding Plaintiff’s delegation of tasks to her children, that she 3 would having difficulty adapting to routine and needed help with goals 4 and plans.96 Thus, on this record, that Plaintiff could delegate
5 household tasks to her older children is not a specific and legitimate 6 reason supported by substantial evidence to discount Dr. Haloman’s 7 opinion that Plaintiff would need redirection and additional
8 supervision if she were to consistently perform a fulltime job. 9 Finally, the ALJ discounted Dr. Haloman’s opinion because 10 treatment records after 2013 show reported improvement in mental
11 health and that she had minimal treatment.97 These findings are in 12 part supported by substantial evidence. At times, Plaintiff’s mental- 13 health treatment could be considered minimal; however, at other times,
14 she regularly engaged in treatment: in 2011; then again for a few 15 months in 2014 after her son’s shooting; then in 2017–18 after her 16
17 95 AR 506, 508. 18 96 AR 114–16. 19 97 AR 1684. 20 1 daughter’s death; and in 2023, with the last mental-health record being
2 from May 2023.98 The record reflects that Plaintiff participated in 3 mental-health treatment following a significant triggering event but at 4 other times as well. The ALJ failed to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s
5 minimal treatment was caused by her own mental-health struggles, 6 including reported difficulty attending appointments outside of her 7 home: “She is interested in trying OMT but states she is overwhelmed
8 with appointments and often misses because she does not feel 9 comfortable leaving the house sometimes.”99 10 c. On remand
11 On remand, the ALJ must consider whether Plaintiff had good 12 cause to not consistently engage in mental-health treatment. Plus, the 13 ALJ must consider whether Plaintiff achieved sustained mental-health
14 improvement. To aid the ALJ’s re-evaluation, a psychological 15 consultative examination is to be ordered and the examiner asked to 16
17 98 See, e.g., AR 468–93, 632–69, 675–94, 833–35, 1490–81, 1619–21, 18 1992–94. 19 99 AR 847. 20 1 offer an opinion as to Plaintiff’s mental-health functioning since April
2 6, 2017. The examiner is to be given a copy of Dr. McClelland’s and Dr. 3 Haloman’s reports, along with the records they reviewed if available, 4 and a sampling of behavioral mental-health treatment records since
5 April 6, 2017. 6 C. Remand 7 Benefits are to be awarded for the closed period of January 9,
8 2013, to April 5, 2017. For this period, the record is fully developed as 9 to Plaintiff’s hand and mental impairments and symptoms and no 10 further administrative proceedings are needed.100
11 As to the later period of April 6, 2017, to August 5, 2024, the 12 Court, reluctantly, declines to award benefits.101 The Court’s reluctance 13 is based on that the Commissioner has had ample opportunity to
14 develop this record during each prior remand, such as by ordering 15 physical and psychological consultative examinations or obtaining 16
17 100 See Treichler v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 18 (9th Cir. 2014). 19 101 See id. at 1099. 20 1 testimony from a medical expert, and the Commissioner chose not to do
2 so.102 3 Nonetheless, because newer physical and psychological 4 consultative examinations will assist in the evaluation of the medical
5 evidence as to the sole-remaining period of April 6, 2017, to August 5, 6 2024, the Court remands this matter for further proceedings. 7 On remand, the ALJ may not discount the herein-challenged
8 prior medical opinions because of staleness, given that any purported 9 staleness is the direct result of the Commissioner’s poor and slow 10 handling of this disability claim. In addition, when evaluating the
11 consistency of a mental-health medical opinion against the treatment 12 record, the ALJ is to rely more heavily on mental-health treatment 13
14 102 “The ALJ always has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the 15 record” to make a fair determination as to disability, even where, as 16 here, “the claimant is represented by counsel.” Celaya v. Halter, 332 17 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). This “affirmative 18 responsibility to develop the record” is necessary to ensure that the 19 ALJ’s decision is based on substantial evidence. Id. at 1184. 20 1 records rather than treatment notes from appointments solely for a
2 physical condition. 3 IV. Conclusion 4 Plaintiff establishes the ALJ erred and that an award of benefits
5 is appropriate for the identified closed-period and that a re-evaluation 6 is appropriate for the later remaining period. The ALJ’s determination 7 that Plaintiff is disabled as of August 6, 2024, still controls and is not
8 altered by this remand. 9 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 10 1. The ALJ’s nondisability decision is REVERSED, and this
11 matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social 12 Security for immediate calculation and award of 13 benefits for the period January 9, 2013–April 5, 2017.
14 2. The ALJ’s nondisability decision is REVERSED, and this 15 matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social 16 Security for further proceedings pursuant to
17 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the period April 6, 18 2017–August 5, 2024. 19
20 1 3. The Clerk’s Office shall TERM the parties’ briefs, ECF
2 Nos. 14 and 16, enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff, 3 and CLOSE the case.
4 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to file this
5 ||order and provide copies to all counsel.
6 DATED this 22nd day of May 2026.
8 EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 DISPOSITIVE ORDER - 41