Selene Stewart v. Department of Consumer Affairs

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 30, 2023
• Docket: 22-15315
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SELENE FUMIE STEWART, No. 22-15315

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-07674-EMC

v. MEMORANDUM* DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS OF CALIFORNIA; CALIFORNIA BOARD OF VOCATIONAL NURSES AND PSYCHIATRIC TECHNICIANS; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 26, 2023**

Before: CANBY, S.R. THOMAS, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Selene Fumie Stewart appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.

2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Stewart’s equal protection and

procedural due process claims because Stewart failed to allege facts sufficient to

state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.

2010) (holding that although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a

plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for

relief); see also Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting

forth pleading requirements for equal protection claim); Portman v. County of

Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth elements of

procedural due process claim).

In her opening brief, Stewart fails to address the grounds for dismissal of her

claims that arose prior to September 30, 2019 and has therefore waived her

challenge to the district court’s determination that those claims are untimely. See

Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e

will not consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening

brief.”); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues not

supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

2 22-15315 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 22-15315