Select Export Corporation v. Jack Richeson & Co

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedMay 29, 2013
Docket12-11761
StatusUnpublished

This text of Select Export Corporation v. Jack Richeson & Co (Select Export Corporation v. Jack Richeson & Co) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Select Export Corporation v. Jack Richeson & Co, (11th Cir. 2013).

Opinion

Case: 12-11761 Date Filed: 05/29/2013 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-11761 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________

D.C. Docket No. 9:10-cv-80526-WPD

SELECT EXPORT CORPORATION, a Florida corporation,

Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellant,

versus

JACK RICHESON & CO., a Wisconsin corporation,

Defendant - Counter Claimant - Appellee,

TRIDENT INDUSTRIA DE PRECISAO LTD., a foreign corporation, JERRY’S ARTARAMA N.C., INC., a North Carolina corporation, UTRECHT MANUFACTURING CORP., a New Jersey corporation, DAVID SCHWARTZ., individually, et al.,

Defendants -Appellees. Case: 12-11761 Date Filed: 05/29/2013 Page: 2 of 4

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _________________________

(May 29, 2013)

Before CARNES, BARKETT and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Select Export Corporation (SEC) appeals the district court’s denial of its

Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a final judgment. In its motion, SEC argued

the final judgment was invalid because it was based on an unenforceable

settlement agreement. According to SEC, the settlement was unenforceable

because its prior counsel was not authorized to enter it on SEC’s behalf. The

district court, however, disagreed with SEC and adopted the magistrate judge’s

finding that SEC’s prior counsel was indeed authorized to enter the settlement. On

appeal, SEC contends the district court did not apply the correct legal standard in

reaching that conclusion, and therefore the court abused its discretion by denying

SEC’s Rule 59(e) motion. We affirm. 1

When determining whether an attorney was authorized to enter a settlement 1 We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment for abuse of discretion. Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 (11th Cir. 2000). An abuse of discretion occurs if the court applies an erroneous legal standard or makes clearly erroneous findings of fact. Id. at 1137 n.69. 2 Case: 12-11761 Date Filed: 05/29/2013 Page: 3 of 4

agreement, we look to the law of the state in which the agreement was entered.

Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1994).

Under Florida law, the settlement agreement is valid if SEC’s prior counsel had

“clear and unequivocal” authority to enter it on SEC’s behalf. See Weitzman v.

Bergman, 555 So. 2d 448, 449–50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Although the district

court expressly adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that SEC’s prior counsel

had “clear and unequivocal” authority, SEC asserts the court “could not possibly

have employed” that standard in denying its Rule 59(e) motion.

SEC’s contention is meritless. Because SEC challenges only the district

court’s legal standard and not its factual findings, SEC has abandoned any claim

that those findings are erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d

1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that unless parties “plainly and

prominently” raise a claim or issue on appeal it “will be considered abandoned”).

Accordingly, we accept as true the following facts: (1) SEC “authorized [its prior

counsel] to negotiate a stipulated settlement of the instant case on behalf of” SEC,

(2) SEC and its prior counsel were in “frequent” communication during settlement

negotiations, (3) SEC was informed of and “agreed” to “the terms of the proposed

settlement,” and (4) SEC’s prior counsel “did not receive notice” of SEC’s “second

thoughts about the stipulation” until “well after the stipulation had become binding

3 Case: 12-11761 Date Filed: 05/29/2013 Page: 4 of 4

and enforceable.” On those facts, the district court did not err in concluding SEC’s

prior counsel had “clear and unequivocal” authority to enter the stipulated

settlement at the time the agreement was executed and filed. See Murchison, 13

F.3d at 1485–87.

The district court’s order denying SEC’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or

amend the final judgment in this case is AFFIRMED.

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Related

United States v. Jernigan
341 F.3d 1273 (Eleventh Circuit, 2003)
Weitzman v. Bergman
555 So. 2d 448 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1990)

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Select Export Corporation v. Jack Richeson & Co, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/select-export-corporation-v-jack-richeson-co-ca11-2013.