Selden v. Jackson

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Selden v. Jackson

169 A.2d 301, 403 Pa. 193, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 441

CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedMarch 13, 1961

DocketAppeal, 95

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 169 A.2d 301 (Selden v. Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Selden v. Jackson, 169 A.2d 301, 403 Pa. 193, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 441 (Pa. 1961).

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Opinion

Opinion by

Mb. Justice Boic,

Judgment on a single bill was entered by confession in Philadelphia County on March 9, 1955, against defendants. On March 15, 1955, the record of this judgment was exemplified and entered in Delaware County.

On February 5, 1960, a petition to open the judgment was filed in Delaware County, and, after hearing, an order was made, dated July 15, 1960, opening the judgment and letting the defendants in to a defense. The plaintiff appealed.

The matter before the Delaware County court was coram non judice, under the Act of April 16, 1840, P. L. 410, 12 PS §891. It had power over the judgment only for purposes of lien, revivals and execution, but had no power to inquire into the merits of the controversy. That was for the original judgment court alone.

In First National Bank & Trust Co. of Bethlehem v. Laubach, 333 Pa. 344 (1939), 5 A. 2d 139, we said: “Section 1 of the Act of April 16, 1840, P. L. 410, (‘construed’ by section 11 of the Act of April.16, 1845, P. L. 538), provides for the transfer of judgments from one court of common pleas to another, and that ‘as to lien, revivals, executions, and so forth,’ the transferred judgment ‘shall have the same force and effect, and no other,’ as if the judgment had been entered originally in the court to which the transfer was made. It is to be noted that this act is entitled ‘An Act Belating to Executions, . . .’ and it does not undertake to deal with a transferred judgment other than for purposes of realizing thereon. Such a transferred judgment is merely ‘a quasi judgment, and that too only for limited purposes’: Brandt’s Appeal, 16 *195 Pa. 343, 346. It has been held time and again that the court of tbe county to which the judgment is transferred has no power over it except for purposes of execution, and cannot inquire into its merits. That can be done only by the court in which it was originally obtained: King v. Nimick, 34 Pa. 297; Mellon v. Guthrie, 51 Pa. 116; Beck v. Church, 113 Pa. 200; Nelson v. Guffey, 131 Pa. 273; Lehigh & New England R. R. Co. v. Hanhauser, 222 Pa. 248; Shotts & Co. v. Agnew & Barnett, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 458, 461.”

To the same effect are Banning v. Taylor, 24 Pa. 297 (1855), and Williams v. VanKemp, 370 Pa. 359 (1952), 88 A. 2d 49.

The order is reversed, costs on the defendant.

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Opinion by

Mb. Justice Boic,

Judgment on a single bill was entered by confession in Philadelphia County on March 9, 1955, against defendants. On March 15, 1955, the record of this judgment was exemplified and entered in Delaware County.

On February 5, 1960, a petition to open the judgment was filed in Delaware County, and, after hearing, an order was made, dated July 15, 1960, opening the judgment and letting the defendants in to a defense. The plaintiff appealed.

The matter before the Delaware County court was coram non judice, under the Act of April 16, 1840, P. L. 410, 12 PS §891. It had power over the judgment only for purposes of lien, revivals and execution, but had no power to inquire into the merits of the controversy. That was for the original judgment court alone.

In First National Bank & Trust Co. of Bethlehem v. Laubach, 333 Pa. 344 (1939), 5 A. 2d 139, we said: “Section 1 of the Act of April 16, 1840, P. L. 410, (‘construed’ by section 11 of the Act of April.16, 1845, P. L. 538), provides for the transfer of judgments from one court of common pleas to another, and that ‘as to lien, revivals, executions, and so forth,’ the transferred judgment ‘shall have the same force and effect, and no other,’ as if the judgment had been entered originally in the court to which the transfer was made. It is to be noted that this act is entitled ‘An Act Belating to Executions, . . .’ and it does not undertake to deal with a transferred judgment other than for purposes of realizing thereon. Such a transferred judgment is merely ‘a quasi judgment, and that too only for limited purposes’: Brandt’s Appeal, 16 *195 Pa. 343, 346. It has been held time and again that the court of tbe county to which the judgment is transferred has no power over it except for purposes of execution, and cannot inquire into its merits. That can be done only by the court in which it was originally obtained: King v. Nimick, 34 Pa. 297; Mellon v. Guthrie, 51 Pa. 116; Beck v. Church, 113 Pa. 200; Nelson v. Guffey, 131 Pa. 273; Lehigh & New England R. R. Co. v. Hanhauser, 222 Pa. 248; Shotts & Co. v. Agnew & Barnett, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 458, 461.”

To the same effect are Banning v. Taylor, 24 Pa. 297 (1855), and Williams v. VanKemp, 370 Pa. 359 (1952), 88 A. 2d 49.

The order is reversed, costs on the defendant.

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169 A.2d 301, 403 Pa. 193, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/selden-v-jackson-pa-1961.

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