Sekuler v. C R Bard Incorporated

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedFebruary 11, 2022
Docket2:19-cv-01585
StatusUnknown

This text of Sekuler v. C R Bard Incorporated (Sekuler v. C R Bard Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sekuler v. C R Bard Incorporated, (D. Nev. 2022).

Opinion

1 ERIC W. SWANIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6840 2 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 10845 Griffith Peak Drive, Suite 600 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 792-3773 4 Facsimile: (702) 792-9002 Email: swanise@gtlaw.com 5 CHRISTOPHER J. NEUMANN, ESQ.* *Admitted Pro Hac Vice 6 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 1144 15th Street, Suite 3300 7 Denver, Colorado 80202 Telephone: (303) 572-6500 8 Email: neumannc@gtlaw.com 9 C ounsel for Defendants 10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11

FOR THE DISTRI CT OF NEVADA 12 SUZANNE SEKULER, Case No. 2:19-cv-01585-KJD-BNW

13 Plaintiff, STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO STAY 14 v. 15 C. R. BARD, INCORPORATED and BARD 16 PERIPHERAL VASCULAR, INCORPORATED,

17 Defendants. 18 19 Plaintiff Suzanne Sekuler (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral 20 Vascular, Inc. (“Defendants”) (Plaintiff and Defendants are collectively referred to herein as the 21 “Parties”) pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 26 and this Court’s inherent powers, respectfully request that 22 this Court enter an Order temporarily staying discovery and all pretrial deadlines imposed by the 23 Court, the Local Rules, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for ninety (90) days to permit the 24 parties to finalize their settlement of all claims. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff claims injuries related to the purported implantation of an Inferior Vena Cava 27 (“IVC”) filter allegedly manufactured by Defendants. (ECF No. 1). The Parties have conducted 28 various discovery, including depositions of the plaintiff and medical providers, medical records 1 collection, and initial and supplemental disclosures, but have reached an agreement in principle to 2 resolve all claims. As such, the Parties hereby jointly move this Court to enter a stay of all discovery 3 and pretrial deadlines in this case for a period of ninety (90) days. 4 II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 5 A. This Court Has Authority to Grant the Requested Stay 6 Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b) and 26, and this Court’s inherent authority 7 and discretion to manage its own docket, this Court has the authority to grant the requested stay. Fed. 8 R. Civ. P. 6(b) (“When an act may or must be done within a specified time the court may, for good 9 cause, extend the time…”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (“A party or any person from whom discovery is 10 sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending…The Court may, 11 for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 12 oppression, or undue burden or expense.”). Therefore, this Court has broad discretion to stay 13 proceedings as incidental to its power to control its own docket – particularly where, as here, a stay 14 would promote judicial economy and efficiency. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998); 15 Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 446 F.3d 808, 816 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Clinton v. 16 Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997)). 17 A stipulation to stay proceedings, like the Parties seek here, is an appropriate exercise of this 18 Court’s jurisdiction. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (explaining a court’s 19 power to stay proceedings is incidental to its inherent power to control the disposition of the cases 20 on its docket to save the time and effort of the court, counsel, and the parties.) 21 The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort 22 for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even 23 balance. 24 Id. (citing Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 760, 763 (1931)); see also, CMAX, Inc. 25 v. Hall, 300 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (district courts possess “inherent power to control the 26 disposition of the cases on its docket in a manner which will promote economy of time and effort for 27 itself, for counsel, and for litigants”); Garlock Sealing Tech., LLC v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (In 28 re Pittsburgh Corning Corp.), No. 11-1406, 11-1452, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86193, at *11 (W.D. 1 Mo. June 21, 201) (noting a court’s power to stay proceedings is incidental to its power to control 2 the disposition of the cases on its docket). 3 Furthermore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (26(c) and 26(d) also vest the Court with 4 authority to limit the scope of discovery or control its sequence and may grant a stay to allow parties 5 to negotiate a settlement. Britton, 523 U.S. at 598. 6 B. Good Cause Exists to Grant the Requested Stay 7 As noted herein, the Parties have reached a settlement in principle and are currently working 8 to finalize all necessary documentation regarding the same. As such, the Parties do not seek the stay 9 requested herein in bad faith but instead seek to stay all proceedings in the interest of efficiency and 10 judicial economy. Granting the stay here will unquestionably save the time and effort of this Court, 11 counsel, and the parties, and provide counsel with an opportunity to finalize the settlement of this 12 case without any additional litigation expense. 13 Facilitating the Parties’ efforts to resolve this dispute entirely through settlement is reasonable 14 and constitutes good cause for granting the requested stay. The Parties agree that the relief sought 15 herein is necessary to handle and resolve this case in the most economical fashion, and that the relief 16 sought in this stipulation is not for delay, but in the interest of efficiency. 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 I. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Parties respectfully request that this Court enter a stay of al 3 || activity in this case, for a period of ninety (90) days. If Plaintiffs have not filed dismissal paper 4 || within ninety (90) days from the stay being granted, the Parties request the opportunity to file a join 5 || status report regarding the status of the settlement. 6 IT IS SO STIPULATED. 7 Dated this 10™ day of February 2022. 8 WETHERALL GROUP, LTD. GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 9 By: _/s/ Peter C. Wetherall By: _/s/ Eric W. Swanis 10 PETER C. WETHERALL, ESQ. ERIC W. SWANIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4414 Nevada Bar No. 6840 1 9345 W. Sunset Road, Suite 100 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 10845 Griffith Peak Drive, Suite 600 12 pwetherall@wetherallgroup.com Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Email: swanise@gtlaw.com 13 Counsel for Plaintiffs CHRISTOPHER J. NEUMANN, ESQ.* *Admitted Pro Hac Vice 14 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 1144 15" Street, Suite 3300 15 Denver, Colorado 80202 Telephone: (303) 572-6500 16 Email: neumannc@gtlaw.com 17 Counsel for Defendants 18 19 ORDER IT IS ORDERED that ECF No. 55 is 20 GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a joint status report is due by 21 5/11/2022. IT IS SO ORDERED 22 DATED: 11:42 am, February 11, 2022 23 oon le BRENDA WEKSLER 94 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. United States
282 U.S. 760 (Supreme Court, 1931)
Landis v. North American Co.
299 U.S. 248 (Supreme Court, 1936)
Crawford-El v. Britton
523 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Cmax, Inc. v. Hall
300 F.2d 265 (Ninth Circuit, 1962)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Sekuler v. C R Bard Incorporated, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sekuler-v-c-r-bard-incorporated-nvd-2022.