Sekermestrovich v. State Accident Insurance Fund

561 P.2d 1043, 28 Or. App. 901, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2818
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMarch 28, 1977
DocketNo. 30524, CA 7243
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 561 P.2d 1043 (Sekermestrovich v. State Accident Insurance Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sekermestrovich v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 561 P.2d 1043, 28 Or. App. 901, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2818 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

TANZER, J.

The issue in this workmen’s compensation case is whether claimant’s reliance upon her attorney to file a timely request for a hearing following denial of her compensation claim constitutes good cause, under ORS 656.319,1 for delay in filing that request.

The State Accident Insurance Fund notified claimant on June 25, 1974, that her claim was denied and advised her that she could request a hearing but that failure to do so within 60 days would foreclose her right to object to the denial. Claimant read the notice of her hearing rights. Within four days thereafter she consulted an attorney and indicated to him her objection to the letter of denial. During the next five months, claimant maintained regular correspondence with her attorney but she was unaware that he had failed to file a request for a hearing. When, on December 11, 1974, she learned of this failure, she consulted another attorney who immediately filed a request for a hearing on her behalf.

A hearings referee found that claimant had shown good cause for her failure to request a hearing within 60 days. The Workmen’s Compensation Board reversed the referee’s finding, holding that claimant was chargeable with her first attorney’s negligence. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s order and this appeal followed.

The Board’s determination as to whether good cause has been shown is entitled to deference. We have previously held that, in making a similar determina[904]*904tion under a similar statute, the Employment Appeals Board operates within a range of discretion "at least commensurate with that of a circuit court in passing on a motion to be relieved from default.” Brooks v. Employment Division, 24 Or App 547, 550, 546 P2d 760 (1976). In this context, the discretion of the Workmen’s Compensation Board is equally broad.

Here, it was within reason for the Board to conclude that claimant is not relieved of all responsibility for the prosecution of her claim merely because she has retained an attorney. A lawyer acts as an agent of the client. Accordingly, the client is chargeable with the lawyer’s negligence. We therefore hold that, at least absent additional factors affecting claimant’s capacity to conduct her own affairs, the Board was justified in refusing to find good cause. See Fulop v. Oregonian Pub. Co., 10 Or App 1, 498 P2d 801 (1972).

Affirmed.

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Related

Hood River County v. Department of Revenue
8 Or. Tax 279 (Oregon Tax Court, 1980)
Sekermestrovich v. State Accident Insurance Fund
573 P.2d 275 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
561 P.2d 1043, 28 Or. App. 901, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2818, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sekermestrovich-v-state-accident-insurance-fund-orctapp-1977.