Sekerke v. Leo

District Court, S.D. California·Decided May 26, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-00034·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 KEITH WAYNE SEKERKE, Case No.: 3:19-cv-0034-GPC-RBB Booking No. 18165284, 12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS Plaintiff, 13 MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY vs. RESTRAINING ORDER AND 14 INJUNCTION

15 ARTURO LEON; MARK O’BRIEN; [ECF No. 77] 16 JON MONTGOMERY; DANE OLSEN 17 and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, 18 Defendants. 19 20 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and 21 injunction. ECF No. 77 (“Mot.”). No oppositions or replies have been filed. The Court 22 hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 23 On January 7, 2019, Plaintiff proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 24 lawsuit. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in San Diego County Jail as a 25 pretrial detainee. On February 10, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to file a 26 Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). ECF No. 53. In the SAC, Plaintiff argues that his 27 right to medical care has been violated due to Defendants’ policy of refusing to provide 28 narcotics to inmates and that he has suffered retaliation as a result of filing these claims. 1 ECF No. 54 (“SAC”). On April 15, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part 2 Defendants Arturo Leon and Mark O’Brien’s motion to dismiss the SAC. ECF No. 68. 3 The remaining causes of action in the SAC are: Inadequate Medical Care against Dr. 4 Leon as to the failure to provide morphine theory of recovery (claim one); Inadequate 5 Medical Care – methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”) Infection (failure 6 to provide treatment) against Dr. Leon (claim two); (3) Inadequate medical care – 7 Denying Prescription against Dr. Montgomery (claim three); State Supplemental Medical 8 Claims against Dr. Leon (claim four); Retaliation against Deputy Olsen (claim six); and 9 Liability of San Diego County based on all other Defendants being agents, employees, or 10 co-conspirators (claim seven). 11 Legal Standard 12 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 13 Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “In each case, courts 14 must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party 15 of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Id. (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. 16 Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) (internal citations omitted)). As such, the “grant of a 17 preliminary injunction is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge[.]” Evans 18 v. Shoshone–Bannock Land Use Policy Comm'n, 736 F.3d 1298, 1307 (9th Cir. 2013). 19 This discretion allows courts to properly evaluate when it is appropriate to grant 20 preliminary relief in light of the “infinite variety of situations which may confront it.” 21 A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 761, 763 (3d Cir. 1971). 22 District courts exercise this discretion according to a four-factor test mandated by 23 traditional principles of equity. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 24 (2006). The test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the 25 merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that 26 the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff's favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the 27 public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 28 (2008). 1 In performing this analysis, district courts must consider whether the nature of the 2 relief sought in the motion is sufficiently related to the claims that give rise to the action. 3 “The Ninth Circuit has formally adopted the rule . . . which requires a sufficient nexus 4 between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the 5 underlying complaint itself.” Hansen v. Cty. of San Diego, 2018 WL 3584461, at *2 6 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2018). As such, “[t]here must be a relationship between the injury 7 claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying 8 complaint for a court to grant a motion for injunctive relief; this requires a sufficient 9 nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth 10 in the underlying complaint itself.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 11 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). The relationship between the preliminary injunction 12 and the underlying complaint must be “sufficiently strong where the preliminary 13 injunction would grant relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.” 14 Id. (citations omitted). “Absent that relationship or nexus, the district court lacks 15 authority to grant the relief requested.” Id. 16 Discussion 17 On February 10, 2020, the Court denied Plaintiff’s prior motion for a temporary 18 restraining order and emergency injunction in order to obtain a magnetic resonance 19 imaging (“MRI”) scan, which Plaintiff alleged was recommended by a physician on a 20 November 20, 2019 due to Plaintiff’s hydrocephalus condition. ECF No. 53. In denying 21 Plaintiff’s motion, the Court explained that Plaintiff sought relief based on events that 22 were outside of the scope of the events that give rise to this action – i.e., the October- 23 November 2018 provision of medical care and the “no narcotic” policy. ECF No. 53 at 24 17. 25 The same logic applies again to the instant motion. Here, Plaintiff filed a motion 26 for a temporary restraining order on the basis that jail officials have denied Plaintiff 27 Tramadol medication, which was prescribed to Plaintiff by a neurologist from an April 28 20, 2020 visit to a neurologist at University of California San Diego. Mot. at 1. Plaintiff 1 || asserts that this Tramadol prescription is to “treat pain” — the “very pain outlined in 2 || Plaintiffs complaint in which defendants have denied treatment for.” /d. Plaintiff notes 3 || that Tramadol is a “non-narcotic.” Id. 4 Since Plaintiff is seeking to obtain non-narcotic prescription medication prescribed 5 a result of a visit to a neurologist, he is seeking relief that is outside the scope of this 6 ||action. See e.g., Davis v. Paramo, 2016 WL 5682550, (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2016) (rejecting 7 || plaintiff's medical care claims that arose from events that occurred after the plaintiff filed 8 complaint). Plaintiff notes that he “realizes these are grounds for an entirely new and 9 || separate lawsuit” but has filed in this case in order to save the court time, effort and 10 ||resources. In order to adjudicate Plaintiffs allegations regarding Defendants’ failure to 11 || provide a non-narcotic medication prescribed by a neurologist — presumably related to 12 || Plaintiff's neurological condition — the Court would be required to engage in a factual 13 || analysis distinct from the analysis required by the substantial claims already alleged in 14 || the SAC against Defendants — i.e., inadequate medical care on the basis of failure to 15 || provide narcotic medication, inadequate medical care with respect to Plaintiff's MRSA 16 ||infection, and retaliation for filing these claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is 17 || DENIED. 18 20 || Dated: May 26, 2020 (2 21 Hon. athe Cae 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 4

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