Seigle v. Thomas

1981 OK 6, 627 P.2d 417, 1981 Okla. LEXIS 182
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedJanuary 20, 1981
Docket51019
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 1981 OK 6 (Seigle v. Thomas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seigle v. Thomas, 1981 OK 6, 627 P.2d 417, 1981 Okla. LEXIS 182 (Okla. 1981).

Opinion

WILLIAMS, Justice.

This appeal, concerning ownership of accreted lands arises from a quiet title action between appellants, record owners of the surface and mineral interests in a riparian tract, and appellees, claimants by adverse possession of both the surface and mineral estates in the above mentioned accretions.

The area in question is on the south side of the South Canadian River and according to the original Government Survey is located within the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 9 West, Indian Meridian (hereinafter 10-11-9) in Canadian County, Oklahoma. For ease of terminology, the parties throughout this matter have referred to this parcel as being comprised of four tracts, A, B, C, and D, see illustration. Tract A is the original riparian land (designated lot 4) of which appellants are the record owners of the several mineral interests. 1 The remaining area, identified as tracts B, C, and D, were formed by accretion and are situated to the east of tract A.

*418 Appellees are the record owners of lots 6, 7, and 8 in 10-11-9 in Canadian County, Oklahoma. These lots are located to the south and east of tract A (lot 4) and south of tracts B, C, and D. According to evidence contained in the record, it appears that appellee, Sam Thomas, erected a first fence around his original property including lots 6, 7, and 8 shortly after he purchased it in approximately 1950. He testified this fence ran to a point some 30 yards south of the river.

In 1953, acting under the impression that the accretion which had occurred to both the northward and eastward belonged to him, Thomas built a second fence extending the fence along his western boundary line northward to a point within 30 steps of the river, enclosing that area of accretion labeled tract C.

In approximately 1973, appellee Thomas again extended his fence northward towards the river and attempted to encircle that portion of accreted lands, some of which had occurred since 1953 and which in large part is contained in the area identified as tract D. This dispute arose shortly thereafter.

By stipulations before the trial court, the parties agreed that only tracts C and D were the contested areas. Defendant Thomas’ evidence showed beyond controversy that he exercised possessory control over area D, pasturing it, repeatedly bulldozing over ditches washed out, and cleaning out undergrowth. 2 The trial court ruled that title to the surface and minerals of tracts C and D should be quieted in the defendants, appellees. The trial court determined ap-pellees had been “in open, exclusive, continuous, hostile and adverse possession of tract C” for the required period. 3 It further found that tract D accreted to tract C for ownership purposes, and “that title to accreted land follows the title of riparian land to which it is attached regardless of whether the latter title is acquired by deed or adverse possession.”

From that decision, the appellants have perfected their appeal. They state they do not challenge that portion of the decision of the trial court holding appellees acquired title by adverse possession to tract C, but rather, they urge the trial court erred when it held appellees acquired title to tract D.

We recently stated:

“In a case of equitable cognizance, this court must examine the record and weigh the evidence and the judgment will be sustained on appeal unless it is found to be against the clear weight of the evidence. As a quiet title action is one of equitable cognizance, the trial court’s determination must be left undisturbed unless, after examining the entire record, it is clearly against the weight of the evidence.” Nilsen v. Tenneco Oil Co., 614 P.2d 36, 39 (Okl.1980).

Appellants make two main assertions of error. First, that the parties’ stipulation that tract D accreted to tract A prevents appellees from claiming title to tract D. Second, appellants contend they were in constructive possession of tract D because they were in actual possession of other portions of their land, tracts A and B. They say tract D had a common border with both tracts B and C and that tract D’s formation *419 had begun before appellees gained title to tract C. Therefore, they assert under Oklahoma case law which provides title to accretions belongs in the rightful owners of the land to which the accretions attach, title to D should have been quieted in the appellants.

Appellants’ first proposition rests for support upon their contention that a remark made by their trial counsel (who we note is not the same as their appellate counsel) referring to lines on an exhibit (see illustration) depicting the area in controversy was a stipulation by the parties that tracts B, C, and D had accreted to tract A. The statement made by appellant’s attorney at the trial level was “And this is for simply a convenience for the lawyers and the court other than the fact that the lines shown by the engineer represents the accretion to lot 4 [tract A].”

Immediately thereafter defendants’-ap-pellees’ attorney replied, “Not that the accreted land is the plaintiffs by stipulation.”

We find the trial court’s determination that the stipulations in the transcript were of effect that the questions to be decided were whether or not defendants-appellees had acquired title to tract C by adverse possession; and if so, did area D accrete to it.

Our determination, after a complete examination of the stipulation transcript, is that the trial court’s ruling was not contrary to the pretrial stipulations made by the parties and that appellants’ first contention of error is without merit.

We now turn to appellants’ second proposition. They cite two Oklahoma cases, Johnson v. Butler, 206 Okl. 632, 245 P.2d 720 (1952), and Briggs v. Sarkeys, 418 P.2d 620 (Okl.1966) which they say hold that accretions become part of the land to which they attach. They also rely upon Dougherty v. Looney, 108 Okl. 279, 236 P. 583 (1923) for the proposition that where the true owner is in actual possession of one part of his land and an intruder occupies another part, the owner will be held to be in constructive possession of all that part not in actual occupancy.

On the basis of these cases, appellants contend “the rightful owner of land possessed by an adverse claimant retains title to accretions thereto formed during the limitation period.” They state, “Since the appellants constructively possessed the accretions and the appellees had no actual possession of them, title to the accretions lies in the appellants.” They assert further that “a claimant [by adverse possession] must perform the same actions to claim title to the accretions as he must perform to claim the land to which the accretions attached.”

No Oklahoma decisions have been cited by the parties as to whether or not accretions follow title to the mainland in situations of adverse possession, nor have we found any primary Oklahoma authority in our research.

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Bluebook (online)
1981 OK 6, 627 P.2d 417, 1981 Okla. LEXIS 182, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seigle-v-thomas-okla-1981.